


LESSONS OF THE WAR
AND
THE PEACE CONFERENCE

ORESTE FERRARA



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LESSONS OF THE WAR AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE

BY

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"CAUSES AND PRETEXTS OF THE WORLD WAR"

AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION
FROM THE SPANISH BY

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LESSONS OF THE WAR AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE

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P R E F A C E

THE year 1918 marks a millennial era unparalleled in the long course of history and differs from all other dates which definitely seal the greatest events in human life, by reason of the unexpectedness of the occurrences it records. The fall of Rome was foreseen and of no world importance. The discovery of America was great, not because of the intrinsic significance of having found a new land peopled by inferior races, but rather as the result of the vast developments that followed. The capture of the Bastille, which gave humanity a new conception of right, was of relative importance, although Louis XVI did not mention it in his diary, the word "nothing" being the only entry on that day; and on the same night Parisians found their usual amusement in the theaters, while Waterloo, with all its traditional glamour, was little more than a sequel to the first abdication of Napoleon.

The year 1918 entirely alters the course of history. It has brought a tremendous crisis in our social

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organization which will be better understood and appreciated by posterity than by ourselves, the actors in the sensational drama. It has also produced phenomena which no one could have conceived as a contingent possibility arising out of the problem created in 1914 by Germany's declaration of war against Russia. To the future generations who will judge us, we shall appear as giants if a favorable solution of the crisis is reached as a consequence of the heroic efforts put forth and the sacrifices borne in the cause of human liberty. On the other hand, if the results of the titanic struggle of the past four years should ultimately conflict with general interests, we shall be reputed to have been both reckless and bloodthirsty. Our great duties have now entered a new phase because higher civic qualities are required to sustain those patriotic principles which resist all obstacles to national ideals and all concurrent forces of disorder, than are demanded for the exercise of valor on the battle-field, the instinct of self-preservation having prepared us beforehand for that form of heroic action. The army is the great instrument of war: the integrity of society is the essential element of peace. To-day the nations are confronted by the task of solving problems of

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peace which are to establish the bases of a new human society, to reconstruct the map of the world on three of its greatest continents, to formulate new rules of public law, and to settle the many existing conflicts between governments and the governed. The most balanced mind staggers at the magnitude of these problems, which embrace the creation of a new constitution of the civilized world out of the *pot-pourri* of national hatreds, class struggles, differences of philosophic thought, and the inordinate ambitions of unjust rulers. The statesmen upon whose shoulders has fallen the heavy responsibility attaching to a task involving such tremendous issues will not approach it without serious misgivings and, above all, without a full consideration of the bearing of history on the momentous questions to be decided. A failure to assign to historic precedents the true significance of their effects on human nature would be to invite unconquerable resistance to the reconstruction when, once it had reached the stage of practical operation, it would be too late to retrace the steps taken.

In all war alliances formed against a common enemy it has been an invariable practice to prearrange by treaty the dispositions of the peace questions in their

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application to the respective interests of the allies; and the conflict just ended was similarly preceded by the Treaty of London. That treaty was signed by Russia, who by her repudiation of its provisions and withdrawal from the war has rendered nugatory all the important agreements made concerning the East. It was not subscribed to by the United States, whose moral and material contributions to the victory achieved have evoked the gratitude and admiration of the people of all the allied countries; nor did it provide for the situation that has been created by the downfall of Germany, Austria, and Turkey, as none of the parties to the treaty could measure the changes wrought by America's entry into the war, or the great upheaval which has dislocated the life of the enemy countries, more than their actual defeat and more than the war itself. The Treaty of London—so far as we know, the only international agreement relating to the war—will doubtless serve as the basis of the peace terms, but exclusively within the strict and narrow limits it embodies. We are not of those who, from a desire to gain power, or to lessen the severity of the defeat, would extend or destroy its clearly defined objects, as such a course would imply as little respect for

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national obligations as was shown by Germany in violating the treaty maintaining Belgian neutrality, which, at least, offered the extenuating excuse of age, while the Treaty of London is of recent date. That instrument, however, which was divulged by the indiscretion of the Bolsheviki government of Russia, does not cover other important readjustments rendered necessary by subsequent events. The Russian problem was not within the purview of practical politicians at the time the treaty was entered into; and the League of Nations and "Freedom of the Seas" are entirely new questions. Only situations of an old order were foreshadowed in London.

To-day social problems present themselves with all the exigencies of a modern world at war. The attention of the governments of the world will be directed to the Conference Hall at Paris and to the feverish activities of that city, when the Peace Delegates assemble for their deliberations; but the masses of the people of all nations will more anxiously study the resolutions arising out of those deliberations with an ardent desire to affix their seal of approval to the great work of their statesmen. For that reason it is necessary that the utmost publicity should be given to the discussions

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dealing with the dissolving of old empires and the opening of new horizons for the nations—some to be freed from the yoke, and others from the menace, of powerful reactionary forces as represented by the former.

These hastily written pages merely claim to present those points of view in which there is a harmony of the purest ideal and the possibility of its early realization. They do not portray the dreams of unpractical, generous souls, nor do they treat of hatreds. The reader will find in them thoughts that occur to him daily and many facts already known to him; but he may also see in them helpful suggestions to lessen the difficulty of preserving a mental and moral equilibrium at a moment of great crisis, as well as material to enable him to form an impartial judgment of the many questions now stirring humanity to its very depths. In the effort to achieve that purpose there have probably been lapses into errors, but even that fault may be justified by the phrase used by the Emperor Frederick to Pandolfo Petrucci, the tyrant of Siena:

These times are superior to brains.

THE AUTHOR.

NEW YORK, *December, 1918.*

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CHAPTER I

GERMAN POLICY

THE true inwardness of many great historic events cannot be accurately measured by a merely superficial examination of the occurrences of their respective periods. It is necessary to make a comprehensive study of the conditions preceding and succeeding those events in order to form the perspective needed to follow the various stages in the evolution of a people. Failing this, the effect is of a kaleidoscopic nature creating but an imperfect impression as to the extent or degree of the moral development of a nation or State.

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That period of German history beginning with the war against Denmark in 1864, and ending with the defeat of 1918, must be considered, therefore, in its relation to the periods preceding it, so that we may properly estimate the future of the nation and the steps to be taken to prevent her from causing new upheavals and misery for humanity, and to make her become an inoffensive State of Central Europe. A deeper knowledge of past history, a more comprehensive survey of a past era, will enable the governing nations to determine the true causes of Germany's defiance of the whole world, a defiance as stupid as it was arrogant; and of that insatiable lust for conquest which imperilled her own tremendous welfare. Armed with this knowledge, the statesmen of today, even those of Germany, will be enabled to eradicate the evil by removing its root, the continued existence of which would be to leave the relation of cause and effect undisturbed. On the other hand, care should be exercised not to penetrate the sore too deeply, so that there may not be a destruction of elements which do not threaten the tranquillity of the world, but are favorable rather to its development through active co-operation of work, strength, studies, and ideas of order.

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The modern history of Germany presents two leading phases—Austrian Germany and Prussian Germany. The latter is the more recent and has brought about the fall of the Empire by the exercise of principles of force based on the conception of Right. Droysen, the eminent historian, divides the history of Prussia into five epochs, and attributes to the last (1871–1914) the identification of Prussia with the Germanic States, in other words, the Prussian-German epoch. The other four, forming what may be described as a pre-history of modern Germany, are classified as the epoch of territorial formation of 1415 to 1618; of intelligent despotism of 1618 to 1786, including the governments of Frederick William (called the Great Elector) and Frederick the Great; of the Revolution, covering a few years, 1786 to 1815, which recalls the splendid Napoleonic victories; and the period, initiated by Stein, of rebirth and unification pertaining to Bismarck and closing in 1871. The Austro-German phase represented world dominion, but it was an epoch of disorders, fighting, and lack of discipline. The Emperors were rarely backed by a people ready to follow them in the undertaking of a world conquest. Many of the petty chiefs of insignificant States failed to respond

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to this combination of lust and power. Diets were convened without arriving at any agreement; and at times, on the battle-fields of Italy, Emperors were defeated for lack of a sufficient supply of men and money. In reality, the unity of Germany was an outcome of the policy of Napoleon I and, even more, of the painful interlude of defeats and invasions at the beginning of the past century. It was then that men of letters, precursors of men of action, began to give forth complaints, formulate projects, indicate possibilities, and enumerate probabilities—Fichte at their head. Dreamers gave way to politics which leagued the many States together; and, finally, it was at Versailles, where the present Peace Delegates will confer, that the Empire from which Austria had been expelled five years previously, in 1866, was definitely completed.

To retrace these latter periods and remove each step in the gradual preparation for world dominion is a necessary task to avoid a future revival of the Teutonic menace. Apparently it is more difficult to undo the events of history than to form them, but it is undoubtedly easy, in political reorganizations, to suppress from the beginning those mischievous

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factors which have patiently accumulated during many years. In the work of reconstruction, however, as in all necessary reaction, it is still more imperative to enforce greater rigor than in the making of events, because the task in hand is not only the changing of the course of history, but also involves the necessity of reversing those basic principles which controlled the minds of all and formed a collective psychology more dangerous than even objective force. In Germany the idea of a State reached such proportions as are sufficient to explain and justify how severely her people have been disciplined, even to an evil end, without the protest of a single honorable conscience. Hegel laid it down that "the aim of the State embodies the greatest right over individuals, whose most precious privilege is in being members of the State." Thus, blind obedience in the service of the State was placed above every moral and religious sentiment, above all physical repugnance to State dependence, and above every political conception which would make the individual an instrument of good. This is but another version of Hegel's theory that "the State is the moral idea in action." Schopenhauer, who was contemporary with Hegel and taught for some

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time in Berlin, expressed vigorous opposition to some of the master's ideas. He said:

This man (Hegel) in order to destroy once more that liberty of thought inaugurated by Kant, dares to transform Philosophy, that daughter of Reason, into an instrument of governmental intrigues equal to antiquated foggery and protesting Jesuitism; and to avoid opprobrium and secure at the same time the greatest possible abasement of intelligence, his ideas are clothed in the utmost verbosity and the most nonsensical gibberish that has been known outside of a lunatic asylum.

But in spite of Schopenhauer's polemic spirit and his attacks on Hegel, that great philosopher remains the true representative of German thought, notwithstanding that Schopenhauer himself, like Kant, had expounded similar ideas. In fact, Kant went as far as to say:

Obedience to the law of legislative power is inevitable, no matter what may be its origin. And we infer that the Supreme power of the State has no duties towards its subjects but only right.

Successive authors have repeated these ideas and reaffirmed these views. They have carried this doctrine into the camp of all social and political sciences, establishing in the conscience of all the idea of force as the one virtue and the basis of all human

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progress. So also we have the cry of the philosophers through Nietzsche, "The suppression of war would be an immoral act." German historians spoke through Treitschke in the endeavor to prove that only brute force is supreme. Economists are represented by the political economy of Frederick List, or by the theory of the independent zones (which can exist without outside co-operation) of Friedrich Naumann and others; and the socialists, by the speeches of the proletariat invented by Karl Marx as a counterblast to the generous and almost evangelical ideas of the French and English socialists such as Fourier, Viscount Saint-Simon, Cabet, and Owen. This advocacy of force was combined with the national aspirations of the precursors of Pan-Germanism; and later, by the practical politicians of the same trend who saw in the Prussian Government a divine mission giving it the right to extend over all Germany and giving the latter, in turn, the right to extend over the world. Frederick List, already referred to, who derived no benefit from the years he spent in the United States of America, sums up this expansion briefly as follows:

There is no doubt that the German race, through her nature and her very being, has been designed by Providence to solve

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this great problem: to direct the affairs of the entire world, to civilize ignorant and barbarous countries, and even to populate the uninhabited.

Later, in 1896, William II echoed these manifestations of this theory of political economy in the discourse delivered in commemoration of the twenty-fifth year of the Empire's foundation:

The German Empire has now become a world Empire. Our people are to be found in thousands all over the furthest continents. The wealth, the science, and industries of Germany traverse the oceans. Billions of German merchandise are transported across the seas. Yours, gentlemen, is the grave duty of helping me to unite firmly together this Empire here with that Greater German Empire.

Lange, the publicist, has with great brutality defined this sentiment of conquest, dominion, and force thus:

German egoism should with double fists mark its seal on all political acts at their very beginning. The supreme principle of our policy both at home and abroad ought to be that the most German of the Germans should be satisfied, and not the rest. . . . Only superficial and visionary minds will think that a policy of this kind is brutal and supported by force. In reality it fulfils the highest justice, because the bloodthirsty decisions that give rise to war among peoples are indicative of universal justice towards the valor of each one of them. . . . We have with the full knowledge of the nations the supreme right to se-

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cure for our race the conditions necessary for her life, against the Russians and the French, as well as the Austro-Hungarians, the Italians, and the English.

Professor Ernest Hasse said:

The earth is divided periodically between the powerful and the strong. . . . It is our conviction that the German Empire, compressed between the powers of the East and the West, must be extended.

And Albrecht Wirth, the historian, interprets this necessary expansion in the following sentences:

We hope and believe that the empire of the world will belong to the Germans. If we do not soon acquire new territories we shall suffer a terrible catastrophe. Whether in Brazil, or Siberia, or Anatolia, or South Africa, it does not matter so long as we can move freely and happily. Once more, as happened two thousand years ago when Cimbrians and Teutons reached the gates of Rome, once more sounds the cry, sometimes afflicted and full of unsatisfied desire, sometimes provoking and confident, growing stronger each time: "We need land, more land."

The well-known anthropologist, Reiner, in a study of the German race, makes the following deduction, which is the final synthesis of the majority of German writers and of almost all Germans, including those who pompously called themselves internationalists:

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With the support of the nation's idea, I have placed a true mark on the false conception of humanity which has blinded our vision and prevented us from seeing the true Humanity. It is from the picture of German Humanity that this nation takes its strength and gains its evidence. For the Utopian cosmopolitan State of Humanity I have substituted the German Pan-German world Empire, the Empire of a Pan-German humanity and nation, the only state in conformity with Nature.

The citation of these passages from the writings of leading German philosophers shows the necessity, in the future, for moral defence to be even greater than for political defence.

The conception of force as the basis of Right and human progress found an easy application in the external life of the nation, as the German had held a fixed idea of his military nature since the times of Machiavelli, who tells us that he was always prepared for arms; and that if this warlike preparation was not entirely effective, it was because the States forming the Empire were divided and subject to the caprice of Princes whose interests were opposed. Machiavelli wrote these observations in 1508 and 1509 when *Machtpolitik*, the policy of force, had not as yet assumed its modern form, supported by standing armies. A century and a half after the death of the Great Elector there was a standing army of

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38,000 soldiers in a State of 1,500,000 inhabitants at a time when the limited resources and rudimentary organization of the public treasury did not allow of much expenditure. And a century later, on the death of Frederick the Great, there was a standing army of 195,000 soldiers, at a time of peace, in a State of 5,500,000 inhabitants, a figure which has not been reached in normal periods by modern nations of infinitely larger populations whose public and private resources are ten times greater than those of Prussia.

These ideas put into general practice have penetrated the minds of the Germans; they have become a second nature; all their mentality has been subdued by these principles, which are a long, uninterrupted chain of inheritance of customs and ideals from fathers to sons. Those who have a wider vision of history than has been furnished by the events of the last few years will certainly not see in the German defeat the destruction of the German love of force or its militaristic spirit, because, as the past teaches us, the final effects of war pass away more quickly than the human mind conceives. What remains are the great battles, the great victories which take hold of public imagination, firing the sentiments and

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affecting the mind of the public, especially when acts of bravery have been cleverly exploited by militaristic governments. The great Napoleonic chapter furnished many examples, making the final defeat appear today as a mere incident, the result of chance: Grouchy not responding to the voice of cannon, the aged Blücher quickly recovering from the fall from his horse and from the blows of French artillery two days before; and rain falling on the battle-field; while for posterity, which cares little for the study of history, Waterloo is the result of chance. On the other hand, our imagination magnifies the great battles of the victorious Emperor; and it would be unreasonable to deny that the German imagination of the future may easily be excited by the memories of this great war, and consequently might find a stimulus instead of a curb to its warlike spirit. Prince Edward von Bülow referring to the German navy has already made this never-to-be-forgotten prophecy:

The brave fighters of the *Emden*, the *Karlsruhe*, the *Königsberg*, and the *Möwe*, Count Spee and his two sons, Otto Weddigen and all the commanders of submarines, will never be forgotten by our people. They will live long in their hearts like the heroes of ancient wars and legends, such as Orlando, Siegfried and Arminius.

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The work of the civil community of the world, which bases its action not on blind brute force, but on great, well-sustained principles of good, must henceforth be to avoid the repetition of past sorrows and dangers by depriving the Germans of the use of the weapons that made these possible and by the destruction of the illusions of their past inheritance, thus establishing an internal political organization symbolizing not force, but Liberty and Right, the natural products of human co-operation. A peace formed with this end in view will be the highest good for all nations, including Germany herself, who could thus strengthen her talents, practical and intellectual, become useful to the world, and regain in the field of peace what she has lost in the field of battle. To accomplish this result two opposing elements must disappear: the entire work of Bismarck and the whole economic system of *Mittel Europa*, although we believe that, while the former was a tangible reality and the latter simply an aspiration, it will be easier to undo the first than to kill the ambition embodied in the second. The Great Chancellor's predominant idea was the union of all the States of the Confederation under the sceptre of the King of Prussia. This was the object of the wars outside the Empire. The

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last of the great servants of kings was the first great servant of the people. His idea was that in serving the Emperor he served the Empire; in serving Prussia he served Germany; in conquering the world he established the greatness of his Emperor. He thus raised Prussia to the height of her mission and created Germany; and the result was the union of these three entities in an indissoluble bond. This idea was formed during 1851-1859, the year when he represented Prussia in the Diet of Frankfort. He devoted his entire life to its development, and would have doubtless reinforced it still more in his declining years if the presumptuous pride of William II, soon after ascending the throne, had not deprived him of his position. In this conception lay the germ of its own swift destruction. Neither time nor the will of its promoters can keep up the serious menace of the great Teuton nation.

Bismarck made a practical beginning of his program by declaring war against Denmark in order to get Schleswig-Holstein, "an act of plunder inferior only to the division of Poland." The Chancellor made a union with Austria to conquer the other German powers; and the latter nation fell into the trap set by Bismarck under the specious pretext that

liberal ideas would create a breach among the German peoples, if Schleswig-Holstein were occupied by Hanover and Saxony. Francis Joseph, a reactionary from his cradle, was seized with fear and agreed with Prussia's scheme of plunder. As far as Bismarck was concerned, he only wanted to rob Austria of her moral ascendancy in the confederation from which he meant soon to oust her; and he carried his intentions into effect two years later in what was called "the six weeks' war." Thus in 1866, on August 2d, the Treaty of Prague destroyed the German Confederation, annexed the Kingdom of Hanover to Prussia, gave him the Duchies of the North, which was the object of the previous war; and Prussia gained possession of the Bay of Kiel by means of which she could later join the Baltic to the North Sea. The German Confederation then existing as a Bund Council disappeared and received a new form of union in the North. The Franco-Prussian War gave the desired shape to the Confederation; and there was no restraint used in the accomplishment of these objects, the conviction being that they were supremely necessary to the ambitions of the Hohenzollerns, of Prussia, and of Germany herself.

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On this point it is easy to recast the course of history: the Treaty of Vienna of October, 1864, by which Denmark gave up her right to the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein in favor of Prussia and Austria; and the Treaty of Frankfort of May 10, 1871, which gave Alsace and Lorraine to Germany, must be annulled; also the conventions of the German States touching Confederation, which were entered into, practically, through coercion. The State, or organization, should remain *in statu quo ante* excepting the modifications of internal right which might be made by the evolution of time or the expressed wish of citizens. If the Confederation should resume its old form, it would preserve a political unity useful in Central Europe, because it is not to be forgotten that the eastern part of the continent has always been an unknown quantity, even as it is today; and this opinion is not founded on the once fashionable theory of the Russian peril, a giant ready to spring upon Europe, but on a reasonable fear that the Slav world, unprepared for organized social life, may more than ever be a source of constant difficulties, because of the creation of various small States with conflicting purposes and interests.

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The political unity above referred to, however, should not be subject to any internal hegemony; not to Prussia, weakened by disaster and reduced to the geographical limits existing previous to 1864, with a proportionate diminution of population; nor to Austria, whose tie with the Germans no longer holds and who should remain united to Hungary, as suggested in another chapter, with the Magyar element predominating in the central government. The countries of democratic tendency, such as Saxony and Bavaria, would become the most powerful groups of the convention, and the free cities of Hamburg and Bremen would have great moral command through their commercial influence. The German Confederation should continue its *Zollverein*, or Customs Union, and, perhaps, its railroad union, not as a network of military communication, but as a powerful economic factor, serving as a guarantee in the hands of the western Powers for war indemnities. Thus, the people who are to form the Confederation would lose the military aspect of long years; they would remain outside the sphere of the influence of Austria, the former military power; and that of Prussia, the modern military power *par excellence*. A political organization based on

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liberty would then arise, preserving at the same time its economic union and proving its great capacity for production and commerce.

Given a situation of this kind, there would be no relapsing into bad habits; it would be impossible to restore the work of Bismarck, or even of Frederick the Great. In order to reconstruct Germany as a nation internationally powerful it is necessary for the Germans to adopt an internal policy that would be characteristic of themselves, patient and intelligent, aiming towards methods that would be generally acceptable. As we have seen, the internal policy of Bismarck gave the sequel of external wars without which it would never have been grasped by the German mind whose motive power was the conception of force. The Chancellor has made many complaints about this absence of virtue in his people; and another Chancellor, Prince von Bülow, says the same very clearly and apparently with conviction in his last book, *German Politics*, in 1917:

We German people, with our unfitness for politics and an undefined and disordered national life, have frequently lost the fruits of the victories gained by our arms; and throughout the centuries we have not been able to secure those results which are necessary to us in our foreign policy, on account of our narrow, short-sighted internal policy.

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In reality these two great statesmen have attributed to the German people a defect which they have not, and they fall into this error because they refuse to confess an obvious truth. In Germany, the nation and the State do not co-operate, and the result is that there is no substratum capable, by its spontaneous adherence, of supporting a social solidarity within the limits of the State; consequently, with such abnormal conditions that solidarity can only be maintained by the display of force which chiefly proceeds from international wars. It is very difficult, on the other hand, to offer a substitute to Germany for her economic dream of a *Mittel Europa*. The conception of Central Europe first arose in the mind of Bismarck and, according to Friedrich Naumann (whose book bearing that title was only comparable in its success to the memoirs of the old Chancellor), Bismarck should be considered as its herald. He did not seek extension in distant colonies, but preferred the control of European commerce. Thus construed, his economic conception may be said to have initiated the movement which assumed such vast political proportions in Germany. *Mittel Europa*, in its industrial and commercial aspect, produced the political doctrine of a greater

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empire designed to absorb all its neighbors; but even with the suppression of that doctrine by the force of events there remains the other aspiration based on reciprocal needs which can only be replaced by the creation of others more adequate. If the victory had been favorable to Germany the immediate result would certainly have been the Customs Union with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, and perhaps Greece and Rumania, according to Germany's wishes. The Customs Union in one of these two forms would have been mainly advantageous to the conquering State, in spite of the book of the distinguished Austrian professor, von Philipovich, *The Economic and Customs Union of Germany and Austria-Hungary*.

Since Germany and her allies have been defeated, it is superfluous to speak of a Customs Union. But the fact remains that a league of this sort is not necessary to the possible and gradual formation of an extensive zone which may include Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Poland, Bosnia, and a large part of Russia, endangering other interests and forming the basis for greater aspirations in the future. Before the war, Russia received from Germany and Austria-Hungary 45% of her imports and sent 34%

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of her exports. Bohemia and Poland up to yesterday have depended on Austria and Germany, their commerce and their industries being in direct contact with the Germans of the West and South. Commerce between Germany and Rumania in the year preceding the war was increased 100%, which may be regarded as extraordinary; and Serbian commerce was in the hands of Austria. The Balkans are neither great producers nor consumers in an absolute sense, on account of their poverty and limited population; but it is obvious from their geographic situation, their railroads, and their river communications, that they can easily, logically and inevitably be absorbed to the economic advantage of Germany and Austria.

It is not difficult to see that the desire for an international policy is of small value in comparison with the necessity that binds States together. Not to understand this principle would be to fall into deep error. The problem, however, should be treated and solved by the Powers to whom victory today gives temporary control of the world. Germany's advantageous position can be fought by way of the seas and by a greater economic influence than Italy could attain; while Russia's co-operation is needed as a basis for the reciprocal interests of the great indus-

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trial Powers. The port of Danzig connected by great railroads reaching to Poland, Bohemia, and Russia, might form an important center for interchange and for separating Germany from those countries. In order, however, to effect this, Danzig would have to be separated from Germany. The Danube carries enormous cereal products from Russia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, in exchange principally for coal and iron coming from France and England, chiefly by the same route. This same river could carry on still greater commerce if redeemed from the hands of Austria-Hungary, who has violated all the treaties regulating its navigation and even sanctioned this violation by the decree of July 14, 1899. By fulfilling the obligations of the Danubian treaties, or by accentuating somewhat the international character of this great avenue of communication, strong advantages might be secured by penetrating to the center of countries otherwise inaccessible to commerce except with Austria-Hungary and Germany. Similarly, the Balkans could gain access by well-designed railroads to the Ægean and the Adriatic, facing Italy, who has become an industrial nation of the highest order and could, therefore, in the future, easily exchange her agricultural products for manu-

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factured goods. Still more efficacious results might be attained by encouraging the industrial production of Russia and Poland in favor of Bohemia and curtailing German activity on that side of Germany, with the restitution of the District of Posen to Poland. The District of Posen, with an established archdiocese, was, in the year 1,000, the center of ancient Poland, and to return it would be equally an act of policy and justice. The advantages of such a situation could be further extended by vigorous action on the part of the newly organized States, by the economic influence of the rich States, and by the depression of Germany following the peace; but it is certain that if measures of geographic economy are not adopted, it would be very difficult to prevent Germany from gaining supremacy in the whole region of Eastern Europe, which would again awaken her dreams of conquest.

The economic depression that peace will bring to Germany on account of the heavy indemnities she will have to pay may last many years; on the other hand, it may be overcome in a short time. When Bismarck made France pay 5,000,000,000 francs for war indemnities, he thought she would remain his vassal for a long time, but France paid it quickly,

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which proves the theory in financial matters, that what often appears to be extraordinary is of common occurrence. The figures of the public Treasury of the United States today would cause utter amazement to that famous French Minister of Finance in the reign of Louis Philippe, who rose in Parliament in defence of the budget, which reached the billion mark in francs, and exclaimed at the close of his speech: "Gentlemen, three cheers for this figure, the like of which will never again be reached." Thus it is within the bounds of probability that future State officials who study the potentiality of the resources of Germany and Austria may find themselves in conditions identical with those of Louis Philippe's Minister of Finance.

The question of indemnities presents no difficulty. In the nature of things, Germany must pay for the tragedy she has occasioned. Such a debt is imposed by international right and by history. It may be argued that this item has not been included in the points made by the President of the United States as the basis for Germany's signing of the armistice, but in any event it is amply covered by the previous declarations of the Allies. If Germany were not obliged to pay indemnities she would come out of

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this war richer than she entered it and once more would Mirabeau be justified in saying, "War is the national industry of Prussia." Existing conditions point to the conclusion that Germany *is* emerging from this war richer than when she entered it, as has been appropriately shown by the French writer, André Chéradame. Germany has had no outside expenditure, the expenses of war being only an exchange of wealth from the hands of one to another, excepting the destruction of property, which does not embody the main expense. She has had under military command 500,000,000 square kilometers, which she has exploited with the ease of an invader of ancient legendary times; she has absorbed the wealth of the vassal nations, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Tributes of war, unlawfully imposed and with violence unheard of, have produced for her enormous sums. Belgium alone has given her every year half a billion francs. The mines of the richest districts of France and Belgium have been abundantly developed. The banks of the invaded nations have been plundered; and Russia has paid large indemnities and lost great wealth which the Germans have profited by. If a balance were drawn, there would be shown a great increase of wealth through

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spoliations, in the proportion of that which pre-existed. We must reckon besides the increase of wealth due to greater activity, to the discoveries of the period of the war and to new initiatives developed in the industrial field through the spur of necessity.

The form in which the indemnities are to be paid is a more serious problem than the question of indemnity itself. Ives Guyot, the energetic and intelligent French economist, proposed almost at the beginning of the war the appropriation of the German railroads, which would be a great gain, but insufficient compensation for the enormous damage sustained. The control of the railroads would ultimately give a military advantage, as it would prevent all surprise attacks. But this control, like other internal measures, would be dependent on an accepted criterion of general order—that is, that Germany must not remain without internal surveillance. In this case taxes must likewise be resorted to. A source of wealth to serve for the payment of indemnities might be found in the colonies, unless the Powers of the Entente and the United States do not think that the separation of the colonies should be treated as an economic question.

A point of departure for fixing the indemnity and

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its payment may be found in a continuance of the war taxes that the German people have borne for years without murmuring. Thus, while Germany pays what she owes to the nations she provoked, she would receive a daily objective lesson on the consequences of her militarist spirit. The expenses of her civil list might also be added to the sum of indemnity and the transfer of her railroads; and for a number of years the financial intervention of the Allies would force a scrupulous compliance with these treaties. Allowing a long period for the payment of indemnities, two results will be gained: Germany's economic activity would not be unduly suppressed and she would be kept under surveillance so long as there is any appearance of the smallest desire for world conquest on her part. The most difficult task for the modern world in connection with this strange nation is to eradicate from its mind the idea that force, or, in other words, the principle of militarism, is superior to everything. Frederick William I, the father of Frederick the Great, an extremely exaggerated person whose infamy and cruelty were first visited on his distinguished son, left this legacy in the Military Regulation which he himself wrote:

Every Prussian subject is born for arms.

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Centuries later, Prince von Bülow says:

The Army is what it represents in history: the powerful expression of union between Empire, State, and people.

Consequently, every particular policy, especially in the economic field, is to be carefully watched. A national economy and those large, independent zones may express an established empire always in a state of preparation for war, supposing war to be always a necessity; but this is not for nations who wish to live in peace, ever co-operating towards a general well-being which is the legitimate consequence of the summing up of individual welfare. Germany will redeem herself the day she considers herself one of the factors, and not the chief factor, of the world. Then may she throw a veil over the past, begin to take part in the society of nations, see her country free from foreign surveillance, her railroads independent; and then may she freely hoist her flag over the seas, create commerce with nations across every ocean, and receive credit for her payment of indemnities. Until then she is an enemy even in time of peace, a potential enemy who may some day resume the attempt which ended in disaster for her, owing to the concerted efforts of great and small nations from

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every continent, the consensus of opinion of all peoples, a phenomenon which does not easily occur twice. Bismarck declared, on assuming authority, that the German question was to be settled by iron and fire. Those who share the old Chancellor's ideas are to be shown that this question, like all human affairs, is to be settled only through justice and mutual interest. If this new psychology fails to penetrate the Teuton brain spontaneously, then the free world will be obliged to force it upon them in legitimate defence through iron and fire.

CHAPTER II

DISMEMBERMENT OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

THE circumstances surrounding the downfall of the ancient monarchy of the Hapsburgs and the collapse of the great Empire whose destinies it had guided for so many centuries, are almost without parallel in history. In possession of a veteran army commanded by able leaders of international repute, the Dual Monarchy yielded up its power to enemy forces, inferior in numbers, probably not so well equipped, and certainly with less powerful artillery. The internal conditions of Austria's military organization at no time furnished a basis for the belief that, like that of Russia, it was influenced by revolutionary tendencies. On the contrary, subsequent events have shown that the loudly proclaimed Austrian "revolution" was nothing more than the manufactured product of sensational journalists, of committees formed in Europe and America, and of

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German propagandists desirous of creating a false impression among English people and capitalists of the United States. After the humiliating armistice a revolution might reasonably have been expected. The resultant facts, however, falsified such anticipations, as amid all the anxieties and hardships of the war, the assembled masses of people of different races and opposed beliefs subject to Austrian rule kept a kindly eye on the veteran armies at the battle-fronts while the latter responded most efficiently to the orders of their chiefs. When General Diaz thought that the decisive moment had arrived for the last great offensive—which will constitute an imperishable record in the annals of the war—grave doubts existed as to its possibilities of success. But the brilliant strategy of Diaz and the splendid bravery of the forces under his command not only gave victory to Italy in what, perhaps, was the most transcendent battle in the recent world conflict, but forced the enemy to surrender to her will. Austria paid the highest tribute to Italy when she described her as her only enemy, an admission that the peninsula of 38,000,000 inhabitants had conquered the vast empire of 55,000,000. Yet the tribute was abundantly justified by the fact that on the main

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battle-front against Austria, Italy had drawn from the allied forces only three English divisions, two French, one regiment from the United States, and some small Czecho-Slovak units aggregating a smaller total than the number of Italians fighting on other fronts.

The armistice signed by Austria, so humiliating for the military caste, was a most necessary measure to conquer for all time the vanity of the Empire, for which no punishment of the past, such as Arcole, Marengo, Magenta, and Sadowa, could atone. Unfortunately for Austria, justice cannot be invoked to protect her territory; and being formed of different peoples composed of fragments of foreign nations, she cannot hope for mutual respect from secular conquests, seeing that only the exercise of great prudence on her part made her at all tolerable in the past. The day that she rushed into the vanguard of Germany's audacious acts of force and sent the ultimatum to Serbia—an inconceivable political document—unmindful of the imperial decrees of former years concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina, she herself created the problem of her existence as a State, for which, historically, there was good reason. In the early stages of her history, the "Marcha

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Orientalis," or Austria, defended all Western Europe from the assaults of Oriental peoples. Matthias Corvin threatened her in the second half of the fifteenth century; Soliman II reached the walls of the capital in 1529; a century later she was only saved by the bravery of the Poles, who brought their own King, John Sobieski, to the front; but, on the whole, she successfully resisted the attempted invasions of armed forces from the East. At the beginning of what may be called the modern period there was no further need for anxiety as to the defence of her frontiers, as by that time she had placed an effectual curb on the Slav and had inspired fear in the Turk. It sufficed that she foresaw the possibility of an extension of her boundaries and the inclusion within her immense Empire of a variety of widely different races and conflicting psychology; and with these ambitions fulfilled she raised herself from the position of an advance sentinel of Europe in the direction of the Orient to that of an organized State based on force and dominating large groups of people. Then it was that she turned her eyes and retraced her steps from the East to the West, with the object of making her own the rich plains of Northern Italy. This march

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westward, in which we find the reason for the Napoleonic wars, continued until 1859, when the Italian War of Independence wrested the first big prize from the Empire—Lombardy; but notwithstanding this check to her ambitions, Austria still remained a State organized for offence and, as a consequence of the diversity of peoples composing her population, chiefly for internal offence. In the pursuance of this policy Austria took full advantage of the predomination of the German element of the population to govern the strong Magyar group with a stern severity which the descendants of Kossuth have apparently forgotten. She also raised her mailed fist against the Italians of Trento, Gorizia, Istria, and Dalmatia; she subdued the Czechs and Poles of the North, as well as the Croatians, Slovenes, and Bosnians of the South; and, with the strong Rumanian group in the East, managed to build up the great Danubian State. This conglomeration of nationalities was skilfully handled, the southern Slavs being thrown against Italians, Magyars against Slavs and Rumanians and those of German origin against Magyars. With these methods of government the Hapsburg monarchy could have appropriately adopted the ancient motto, "*Divide et im-*

pera," because no conqueror had ever used it more efficiently.

Yet in the face of a situation so contrary to a normal standard of power, Austria still represented the *status quo* and received the necessary support of the other Powers. England was her traditional friend. Germany herself, after the victory of Sadowa, through the iron will of Bismarck, did not wish to humiliate her, and shortly afterwards made her an ally. Even France, in spite of the two Napoleonic wars, made her a natural ally; Italy, which had her last war in 1866, sought an alliance with her in 1870 to save France; and later, in 1882, she formed that alliance, while Russia, who had always found her an obstacle to Muscovite aspirations, broke off friendship entirely as a result of the events immediately preceding the war just ended. It was the last period of Pan-German politics that precipitated her ruin. Caught in Prussian meshes, she could not resist the golden dreams into which the crafty minds of her powerful neighbors drew her. Germany, as we have already said, decided to place her in the vanguard of her dreams and guided her on the route towards the West as she wished. The teaching of Bismarck, that "the politics of the State

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govern those of nations," found a favorable echo in a country where this theory worked into secular practice, and it was not difficult to adopt it as a means of conquering other peoples. The economic successes of the neighboring Empire contributed considerably to the awakening of desires for increasing her territory; and the prospect of an easy march to Salonica, and thence towards the Asiatic Orient, still further increased the desire for conquest and the fulfilment of imperialistic aims. Inspired by these dreams, Austria departed from the suave methods of the diplomacy of Metternich and of the modern Beust to secure more daring diplomats in Andrassy, in Aehrenthal, and in Bertchold. The war, which did not occur in 1908, when the unexpected annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was carried into effect, and was again avoided in 1913, came as a surprise to the world in July, 1914, when it was discovered that Austria had become the instrument of Germany in the terrible judgments of that time. The lack of foresight on the part of her statesmen and the warlike intoxication of the people, largely created by German intrigue, had warped all understanding of the fact that she was placing herself on the horns of a dilemma. Victorious, she would un-

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doubtedly have fallen further into the clutches of the Prussian war-lords; defeated, she was destined to almost complete disintegration.

In the light of previous events, it is difficult to conceive how her successive governments could not see the danger of diverting her efforts from the path of peaceful economic expansion. Mistress of the entire tract of the Danube, even of that part which extended beyond the limits of her territory (in spite of Bismarck's view that the Danube was the heritage of the German people); owner of the finest harbors of the Adriatic, previously the great sea of communication with the Orient; and connected with Germany by a network of railways which carried her products to many foreign ports—Austria held a commanding position for commercial expansion. Her proximity to the Ægean Sea would have made it an easy matter to reconstruct the Balkan railway system and so to take advantage of her eminently continental situation. Victory in the war could not have given her as much as could have been secured by the exercise of political prudence; but the moment for discussing the hypotheses of victory has finally passed. It is now merely a question of a just peace; and that can only be attained by the

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internal problem of Austria-Hungary being considered from all its angles, in a broad, statesman-like spirit by the Supreme Court of the Great Powers. The situation bristles with difficulties and complexities, owing to the variety of the conflicting interests and racial elements involved.

The Dual Monarchy, according to its own figures furnished by the census of 1910, had at that time a population of 12,000,000 Germans, 10,000,000 Magyars, 8,500,000 Czecho-Slovaks, 5,500,000 Serbo-Croatians, 5,000,000 Poles, 4,000,000 Ruthenians, 3,000,000 Slovenes, 1,000,000 Italians, and a group of 150,000 Turks. These figures were probably manipulated to meet the exigencies of the government in its effort to make Slavs of Italians and Hungarians of Rumanians; but assuming the correctness of that suggestion, accurate statistics would not materially lessen the necessity for taking so varied a population into most careful account in the formulation of a peace treaty after a war between two opposing tendencies—liberal and reactionary. In the adjustment of territorial compensations, the Conference must, in justice, consult the wishes of the various peoples forming the conglomeration that served as a justification, under the pretext of pro-

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tection, for the maintenance of the *status quo*. At the Conference on these questions it will be impossible for Austria to put any limit on the rights of Italy. The unredeemed lands, or, in other words, those which the armistice has authorized the Italian forces to occupy, will be returned to the motherland, where the hope of their restoration has been cherished for many long years. In this case the right of war is an elemental criterion of justice. Trentino, subdued by Austria after the downfall of Napoleon and having been for centuries a principality ruled by its bishop, has never ceased to be Italian in spite of the continuous efforts of the Teutons in the northern Tyrol to Germanize it. Situated between Venice and Lombardy, the peace treaty of 1866 made it Austrian because Bismarck designed this in favor of Austria following her defeat at Sadowa, and not in favor of Italy, her ally in the war. Trentino has really been the advance-guard of the Austrian army in the heart of Italy and has stood as a barrier to the movements of the Italian forces; and it may be safely affirmed that if the frontier had been identified with the national boundary in 1866, the overthrow of Austria would have taken place in 1915. Trieste, of all the cities under the Austrian yoke, is the most

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genuinely Italian in her aspirations. Originally bound to Venice during that city's most glorious epochs, it has been united for five centuries to Austria, except during the Napoleonic interlude; but that prolonged union has not changed the psychology of *Venezia Giulia*. Istria, Gorizia, and Dalmatia have always aspired to join their destinies with the peninsula which could offer them a past of grandeur and a safe and prosperous future. Austria pushed the Southern Slavs of different races into these lands to "de-Italianize" them, but with less successful results on the coasts than at some interior points in the mountains. The Southern Slavs, without culture, art, history, or wealth, have sometimes appeared to outnumber the Italian element, but at no time could they claim to be the dominant factor. On the other hand, the Slavs and Croats, who number many less than the official statistics show, have always been the most tenacious, ardent, and energetic defenders of the Hapsburg monarchy, both in the exterior and in the interior.

At the other extreme of the Danube Austria also possesses territories which do not rightfully belong to her, but in these, as in all the others, powerful majorities of men are struggling for their rights of

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nationality in the reorganization of the State. Transylvania, Banat, and Bukovina, with 3,000,000 Rumanians, belong by right to Rumania. Subjected to Magyar rule since 1867, they have suffered the same persecutions as their brothers in the western part of the Empire; and although they have been tied to Austria since the time of the Treaty of Carlowitz, they have abandoned neither their customs, their language, nor their ideals. The *irredentist* spirit has never ceased to exist, but has become more intensified since the day of the national independence of Rumania. The words of the Transylvanian poet Muresheann, "Arise, Rumanians, from your sleep of death," embodied a spirit stronger than the repressions or the reaction of 1867, when Hungary, authorized by Vienna, absorbed the territories of the Principality of Transylvania; stronger than the Apponyi Law which closed the schools of Rumania and caused the old Francis Joseph to exclaim, "I hope that 'Magyarization' will be more effective now"; stronger than that papal persecution which, in 1913, to serve the Dual Monarchy, placed the churches of unredeemed Rumania under the episcopal jurisdiction of Hungarian bishoprics, with the object of removing the last vestige of the Ru-

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manian spirit from those peoples. Rumania entered the war and fought bravely, but with small fortune. Against her armies the Germans sent two of their foremost generals, von Mackensen and Falkenhayn, well understanding that Germany's success depended on the defeat of Rumania, otherwise she would have lost all contact with the Orient, which was the chief source of resistance to the Central Powers. The details of the Rumanian disaster are well known and may be attributed to many causes, but principally to the anarchical conditions permeating the Russian army and the unsoundness of Russian diplomacy even long before the revolution. Rumania made every possible sacrifice in the cause of the Allies; and it would be in the highest degree unjust if the aspirations and justifiable hopes of the people of the Latin State of the Balkans were to be substituted by the cruel terms of the Treaty of Bucharest, made, according to Berlin newspapers, while Kuhlmann was basking in the feminine praise of that capital.

In the north, Austria has nearly 20,000,000 subjects belonging to other races, most of whom still entertain their original nationalistic ideals. Chief among these are the Poles of what is called Austrian

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Poland, who, like those subject to Russian and Prussian rule, have neither lost their identity nor ceased to fight for a recognition of their rights both by active and intellectual methods, as they especially did in the revolution of 1863. In fact, the injustice to Poland, perpetrated through centuries, could not be legalized. Her people's ardent longing for an independent national life was not extinguished on the battle-field of Prague on October 29, 1794, when Kosciuszko was definitely defeated; and, for the same reasons, the treaty of October 10th of the following year has never been regarded by them as a final page in the history of their unhappy country. Poland has every reason for national consolidation and independence. From the moment when she separated herself from her Russian brothers by adopting the Catholic religion, which gave her greater contact with Western Europe and the advanced civilization of that period, when the Russians in their orthodoxy turned their eyes and their hopes towards Constantinople, Poland became an entity necessary at that time to the maintenance of peace in Europe as she is today of a world peace. Three powerful nations, respectively ruling a large portion of her territories with an iron hand, have failed to quench the national

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spirit of the Poles or their ardent desire to become a free people. In the war just ended, the 5,000,000 Poles engaged were forced to take sides with different belligerents to whom they owed nominal allegiance, but they were all enthusiastic in the hope of triumph for the Allied cause. Though not so badly treated by Austria as their brothers were by Prussia and Russia, the Austrian Poles had no love or loyalty for their rulers, and at the first opportunity deserted the flag for which they had given their blood much against their will, conditions that are emphasized by the fact that in the ranks of the Czecho-Slovaks now fighting in Russia these Poles number 40%.

The case of Poland presents some strange features. Both sets of opposed Powers in the war had long decided on the reconstruction of Poland, though evidently with quite conflicting objects. In the one instance the desire was to prevent the extension of military domination and to restore liberty to an enslaved nation, while in the other it was to strengthen Germanic power in Middle Europe and to serve selfish economic ends. These latter sordid purposes, however, are approaching destruction at the hands of the Peace Conference, which will doubtless permanently restrain the power of Prussia by

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granting to Poland a restoration of her former boundaries, including Posen and Danzig, with their extensive coal-mines. In Bohemia, as in Poland, the German element failed to efface national characteristics, as was evidenced by the attitude of the Bohemians in Russia, who formed the main nucleus of opposition to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The hatred of the Czech race for the German has always been marked by extreme bitterness; and where these two ethnological groups have lived in the same territory in anything like large numbers there has always been a sharp dividing-line. Each one has had its own universities, clubs, theaters, banks, and restaurants, where those of the other group could seldom be found. In the German University of Prague, in the academic year of 1910-11, there were 1,726 German students and only 86 Czechs, while the Czech University, in the same city, had 4,225 Czechs and only 9 Germans. Austria had persistently adopted measures of repression and of violence in the protracted but futile effort to Germanize Bohemia. Ever since the religious protest of Hus, directed not only against the corruption of the *curia romana*, but equally against the domination of the hated race, the Czechs were treated more harshly than any other

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subject people of Austria. But they vigorously challenged their persecutors. At the Congress of Prague in 1848, Schararik, the ethnologist, exclaimed:

Let us put ourselves in a position to say with pride before all nations, "I am Slav," or else let us cease to be so. A moral death is the worst kind of death.

In the war against Austria in 1866, Prussia adopted the system of false propaganda which more recently succeeded so well in Russia. The object was to create an anti-Austrian movement which it was hoped would succeed by the issue of a proclamation to the Czechs urging upon them their right to independence. The proclamation ended thus:

If our just cause proves victorious, the moment will probably have arrived when the aspirations of the Bohemians and the Moravians will be satisfied and their eternal happiness crowned by Providence.

The Germans little thought at that time that the propagation of these ideas would later serve to bring about their own downfall.

The Slavs of the South form another large group subject to the Hapsburg monarchy. They have always fought against Italy, and also fought against the Hungarians during the early struggles of the

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latter for separation from Austrian rule. The Slavs of the South comprise a population of nearly 7,000,000, divided into different races, speaking different languages and professing different religions; but, largely owing to their lack of unity and the limited character of their resources and literature, they have not assumed that energetic attitude of protest taken by the Slavs of the North. Since the conclusion of the armistice there has been a movement of an opposite tendency among the better-educated classes, but this may be described as an entirely Pan-Serbian agitation owing its origin to the heroic stand of Serbia in the various Balkan wars and in the world struggle of the past four years. While these Slavic groups have some worthy ideals, the desire for independence is not yet rooted in the national conscience, as even the last Congress of Lubian, which met six months ago, confirmed their adherence to Austria; and the Diet of Cracow at its session at the end of October solemnly reaffirmed their loyalty to the Dual Monarchy. It is reasonable, however, to assume that a greater Serbia will grow out of the prevailing situation, as the impending peace would be unjust in its final settlement if this widely prevailing hope should not be realized. Bosnia and

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Herzegovina, which (in the alleged interest of peace) Austria occupied in 1878 and definitely annexed in 1908, belong by every right to the Kingdom of Serbia. If the rest of what are called the Jugo-Slavs should be afforded the opportunity and the right to express their will by means of a plebiscite there would be an end to the spread of Balkan agitation. Then there might arise an echo, resounding through the homes of all the different groups, of the voice of that Archbishop of Warsaw, Woronicz, who at the beginning of the last century, exclaimed to the "Slav Goddess":

Why, O children of the same parent, why do you quarrel?
Be united and you will command the world.

In the solution by the Powers of the problem of an applicable and permanent justice in the territorial readjustments with which they will have to deal, something more than mere expressions of gratitude will be demanded of the communities who now seek national independence. They will doubtless be called upon to furnish evidence of their understanding, and guarantees, that the reconstruction of the map of Europe is not a return to that past which would presuppose the stern necessity of some degree

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of foreign control; but that it rather implies on their part a pledged obligation to work in a full spirit of co-operation with all other States on the new road to peace and progress. A just peace for the nations concerned must embrace all these problems.

Should the Slavs of the South desire to join the Austro-Germans, the foundations would be laid for the creation of an important State on the Danube which could contribute morally and materially of the common good. The racial differences that might still prevail would gradually disappear, as would the last of the elemental causes of difficulty in their secular internal disorders. In such a free organization, with the question of monarchy left to its proper destiny, there would be no necessity for oppressive laws. The greatness of States does not lie in their territorial extension or in the number of their inhabitants, but only in the intensive culture of the people and in their contribution to the general well-being. The Polish and Bohemian nations will be an insurmountable obstacle to the realization of any new Austrian or Prussian dreams of conquest, while their geographical situation will minimize the possibility of the Russian being ever again brought under the influence of Teutonic power-lust. Thus

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transformed, the map of the old Empire will be in line with the evolution which was inevitable with the advance of time. Under no obligation to serve as the sentinel of Western Europe against barbarian invasion, Austria will enjoy permanent peace and a happier state of civilization than was ever possible under the imperialistic sway of her former rulers. Her dream of grandeur, expansion, and dominion was simply a nightmare from which she was awakened at the borders of the Piave.

CHAPTER III

THE REMAINS OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE

THE armistice agreed to by Turkey, as in the case of Germany and Austria, constitutes complete surrender to the Allies, in whose hands she has virtually placed the future of her national existence. In every war of the past century in which Turkey has had part she has invariably been called upon to yield some of her territory, whether vanquished or victorious. The reason for this apparently anomalous state of affairs is probably to be traced to the fact that the Christian world, and particularly those of the Catholic faith, have always had a deep-seated prejudice against the Turk, with his strong hold over the Balkans. This aversion found definite expression at a later period in the propagation of what was called Hellenism, a political creed which acquired greater influence in the other countries of Europe—especially in England and France—than in Greece itself, and ultimately led to some of the Slavic countries, under

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the guidance of Russia, intimating to Europe, including those Powers with which they had themselves been in conflict, that Turkey was a State destined to disappear. On the eve of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Professor Edward Freeman thus expressed the general opinion of Western Europe upon this point:

The presence of the Turk in Europe is merely incidental. After 500 years he is as much a stranger as he was when he first attained power. European ideas and words, such as Nation, Government, Law, Sovereigns, Subjects, cannot be applied to him.

The Congress of Berlin, however, was not so much opposed to Turkey as was expected. On the contrary, the Treaty of San Stefano was modified in her favor; and Gortschakoff, the Russian Chancellor, regarded this action as a personal offence by Bismarck. Indeed, diplomacy, other than her own, has always saved the Oriental nation. Lord Palmerston had already said, "Only diplomacy can save Turkey"; and up to the time of the recent war the Chancelleries have succeeded in postponing what seemed to be the inevitable fate of Turkey. The tortuous methods of diplomacy had actually provoked the Crimean War of 1854-56, in which, side by side with the Turk, England, France, and little Piedmont, which was

already preparing under Cavour's leadership to unite with Italy, fought against Russia. Today Turkey is governed by discretion; but her problem is still in the hands of diplomacy, which will doubtless again save her from completely disappearing. It is evident that the statesmen of Europe had good reasons for repeatedly preventing Russia from obtaining the entire fruits of her victories. The existence of Turkey was a standing obstacle to Russia becoming a maritime power in the Mediterranean, while Turkey's disappearance would have meant a loss to the rest of the Powers. England in defence of her interests, especially at a time when her policy towards the Balkans formed one of the bases for her general policy, could not permit her Asiatic rival, Russia, to think of competing with her, under favorable conditions, in Africa. France, too, in spite of the strong friendship formed with Russia, could not relinquish her interests in Asia Minor, for, although they possessed a greater moral than material value, there was always hope of their development; nor could she permit a possible adversary of the coming centuries to enter the sea which was the center of her activities in colonial expansion. The conditions in Italy were likewise opposed to Russian influence in the Mediterranean

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by reason of the geographical situation of the peninsula, which extended for its entire length into that sea and made its coast-line easily vulnerable to attack.

The Turks were quite alive to the favorable situation thus created for them, and missed no opportunity to take the fullest advantage of the difficulties of the other Powers. Their religion placed them in an inferior position, owing to its prohibition of contact with Christians, but diplomatically, this was overcome to a great extent by the Ottoman Government virtually confiding the conduct of the country's foreign policy to a Greek of Constantinople, who, under the title of First Interpreter, discharged the functions of Reis-ul-Kitab, or Chief of the Foreign Department. Since the Napoleonic period when Mouhib Effendi, the Turkish Ambassador, could direct affairs from Paris, where, to the surprise of his government, he received considerable information relating to the international policies of the Western Powers, the Turks have steadily extended their influence in order to successfully maintain the equilibrium which has stood them in such good stead. European diplomacy and their own native cunning were the two factors which enabled them to preserve their Empire and to circumvent Russia; and at the

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same time to defeat the ambitions of the Arabs, who, in 1839, led by Mehemet Ali Pasha, marched on Constantinople to oust the Turk and create a great Arabian Empire. Spurred, however, by the Ottoman Government itself and by considerations of national policy, Russia, subsequently supported by England and Austria, wrecked the plans of Mehemet Ali, preferring the lesser evil of the weakness of the Turk to that of the strong imperial Arab. The treaty of peace approved by the Powers inflicted disaster on the Arabian army. France alone showed sympathy with the Egyptian movement against Turkey, but neither King Louis Philippe nor Thiers, who was at the head of the government, thought it wise to expose the military weakness of the country at that time, by any threats to enforce its representations. Forty years later the same conditions prevailed in regard to the relations of Turkey with the Western Powers; and at the Berlin Conference of 1878 the plenipotentiaries not only avoided the overthrow of the Musulman Empire by the modification of the Treaty of San Stefano of the same year, but the two British delegates, Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury, pursued a line of action designed to still further improve the Turkish situation. Bismarck, who presided at the

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Conference, with a firmness bordering on violence and a complete lack of interest in what he called "those countries with no future," did not hesitate to speak strongly when he referred to the Turkish delegates. On one occasion he said:

I cannot permit the Turkish delegate to have speech, or to make objections, even if the case required it; he has no right to it because his government has signed the Treaty of San Stefano. . . . I could not allow the Ottoman plenipotentiaries to interrupt the work of the Congress, and if they persist I shall be obliged, and I am prepared, too, to give a practical demonstration of my remarks.

And at ten o'clock one night he paid a visit to the Sultan's delegates to say to them:

If you think that Congress has met to show favor to Turkey, you are mistaken.

Yet, despite this seeming determination of the Iron Chancellor that Turkey should not be permitted to secure further protection by turning to her own advantage the political embarrassments of the greater Powers, the Conference decidedly favored the Ottoman Government in preventing a definite victory for Russia, and by the restoration to Turkey of territories which had been taken from her by the Treaty of San Stefano. With ever-changing conditions in the

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relations of the Powers, the diplomatic situation which had been so favorable to the "Sick Man of Europe" underwent a complete transformation. England had become less interested in the politics of the Eastern Mediterranean and especially of the Balkans, through a treaty entered into with Russia (August 31, 1907), whereby the questions of Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet, and the Persian Gulf were satisfactorily adjusted. The disasters of Mukden and Isushima had definitely destroyed the hope of Russian expansion in China. France could not discuss with her powerful ally a problem of such great importance to her; and Italy, then at war with Turkey, could only consider her immediate interests, although, after the Treaty of Ouchy which ended that war, she skilfully managed to protect Turkey in all the small conflicts which subsequently arose. Russia, after her defeat by Japan, again directed her attention to the possibility of controlling the Dardanelles and bent all her foreign policy to the prosecution of that end. The development of Southern Russia proceeded on a vast scale as part of that policy, but the closing of the Dardanelles by Turkey during the Italo-Turkish War of 1912 again stood in the way of a nearer approach to the realization of her hopes,

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and made it appear that the vast Muscovite Empire was destined to be perpetually barred from the sea, except through her only outlet to that part which is not navigable in winter.

The general struggle of the Slavic States with Germany for the expansion of their territories in order to secure access to the sea later assumed a new form and shifted towards the South, rendering Russian protection of the Jugo-Slavs scattered over the whole Balkan peninsula a practical necessity, rather than a matter of racial sentiment. To counteract this Slavic movement, Turkey abandoned her former protectors and turned her eyes towards Germany, who, up to that time, had evinced but little interest in Oriental affairs; and in gravitating towards Germany, Turkey became a willing party to her policy of aggression in the East whose principal exponent was Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, the last of the great Teuton diplomats. With the advent of the recent war, the unholy alliance of Turkey with Germany placed a different complexion on Russia's possibilities as a maritime Power. France, England, and Italy had agreed, in case of victory, to give up Constantinople and the Straits to Russia, who would thus have achieved her long-cherished ambition, had

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she remained in the war. But Russia's withdrawal and denunciation of the treaty which favored her relieved the Allies of all obligations in the matter. It is evident, therefore, that the aspirations of the once powerful State to the inclusion of European Turkey within its dominions, as agreed by the treaty subscribed to by the victorious Allies, have been thwarted, at least for many years to come, if not forever. On the other hand, the Russian situation is favorable to Turkey, although neither she nor the balance of power will any longer be necessary to the maintenance of peace, as at the time of the Berlin Conference. The theory of the balance of power has ceased to influence world diplomacy. It has disappeared; and in view of the approaching re-formation of the map of Europe, an *a priori* discussion of its possible resuscitation would imply a revival of all the evils of pre-existing forces. In any event, the solution of the Turkish problem will be guided by future considerations and not by those of the past. Like Russia, Bulgaria and Greece have also entertained sanguine hopes of occupying Constantinople and the Dardanelles, but Bulgaria has emerged so badly from the treacherous adventure she was inveigled into by German intrigue that it

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is doubtful whether she will be permitted to retain even her present boundaries. When it is remembered that her fatal course of action was taken after the Allied Powers had offered her the territory she had won in the first Balkan war, but which was denied her by Greece and Serbia, on the day following her victory, in spite of the signed agreement for its transfer, it becomes difficult to understand the attitude adopted by Bulgaria. All that she can now hope for is that the Allies will as far as possible respect her frontiers, if she furnishes guarantees that she will abandon her former ambitions and, in future, dedicate her efforts to the cause of civilization in its right conception.

Greece might have attained a commanding position in the Orient and, perhaps, have crowned her King in St. Sophia, but she did not grasp the opportunity of the historic hour. The Greeks made no secret of their entire accord with the policies of King Constantine; and it was only when they heard the roar of Allied guns, and not as an expression of popular will, that they indicated any change of sentiment. Their own Cretan statesman, Eleutherio Venizelos, while Prime Minister, under Constantine, despite his declared sympathies with the

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Allied cause, either was not inclined, or was not strong enough, to identify his country with it. It is true that after the deposition of the King he decided on war, but even then without giving to the Entente forces the full military support of which Greece was capable. With these facts in mind, the Allies will not be encouraged to extend Greek territory in an easterly direction. It cannot be denied that the Greek element is powerful in Constantinople, but the policy of self-determination is not likely to be applied in their case, as the Turk is absolute; and as has been demonstrated in another chapter of this volume, the theory of self-determination is only applicable to disputed territory under well-defined conditions. In these circumstances, the problem is not simplified, but rendered more complex by the exclusion of Russia, Bulgaria, and Greece from the occupation of Constantinople. A diplomat of the old school would express the common view that religion and public morality demand the expulsion of Turkey from Europe. For our own part, we believe that Turkey should be driven from Asia, leaving her, at most, Anatolia; and that it would be equally politic and just to keep her within controllable limits in Constantinople and the Straits. In

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Asia, Turkey governs foreign peoples in a colonial form for which she has no aptitude of any kind. In Europe she governs a people mostly Turks, with the liberties and systems of a modern State. Therefore to deprive her of her Asiatic possessions would be to end the terrible slaughter that constitutes the most shameful page in modern history. Europe appears to be agreed as to the future of Asiatic Turkey. Those regions, once so rich, are now in a state of appalling poverty and there has been a constant diminution of population. Lands which were the great seat of civilization, the cradle of the universe, are now in the most backward condition. The only apparent objective in the action of Turkish governments of all parties and in all periods has been that of extermination. Abdul Hamid, for example, said that the Armenian question could be settled by suppressing the Armenians; and this "red Sultan" was the complete, living expression of the old régime. The last Grand Vizier of the war, Talaat Bey, as the reason for assassinating an Armenian deputy, said, "There is no room for the two peoples in the Ottoman Empire"; and Djemal Pacha, Governor of Syria, of the "Union and Progress Party," drove out all the women and children, after slaying the

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men, so as to have the Turk predominate in that province. His press representative, in the paper ironically called *The Truth*, with matchless cynicism admits the crime and excuses it thus:

Many families who are related to the condemned men, or intimately connected with them, have been successfully transported to Anatolia. One might ask what has been the crime of these women and children whom the Council of War has been unable to find in any way responsible. As for the men, the Council of War has found proofs of their complicity morally or indirectly and has deemed it necessary to keep the community safe from contact with them. . . . The innocent women, young people, and children are the involuntary victims of their relatives, neighbors, and friends.

The ancient and the "Young Turk" régimes have not differed in the methods they have applied to the provinces. The ancient wanted absolute predominance consequent on religious fanaticism; the second, political unity, with equal Turkish predominance, a product not of cohesion of elements and common interest, but of unlimited obedience to the confines of the Turkish State, with which the Christian and Arab populations of Asia Minor had not till then any union except that which binds the conquered to the conqueror. On the other hand, laying aside these periodic cruelties which are the

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salient marks of Turkish rule in regions peopled by foreign races, their dominion over foreign territories and over entirely different peoples has been of the worst kind, and goes to show that political colonization is only tolerable when it is governed by the activities of a progressive State, free, of high moral sentiment, and appreciative of the needs and sorrows of others. Oppression by arms is always easy. Nations far superior to Turkey, who govern foreign peoples without understanding their psychology or their sense of freedom, have committed grave errors and incurred heavy punishment through the same lack of understanding, though it may not have been accompanied by the same brutal methods. In such cases, great evils must arise because it is impossible to honorably and justly govern a foreign people who consider themselves conquered, when the acts of those who govern are in no way controlled by public opinion or by a moral standard equal at least to that of the governed. The Powers, as has been said, appear to be in entire accord as to the future of the territories occupied by the Turk in Asia; and this preliminary agreement is a considerable step in the solution of the intricate problem. England, France, and Italy will have carefully defined spheres of in-

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fluence; they will construct railroads, establish steamship lines, and give every encouragement to commercial activity; they will spread culture and religious freedom; and in the organization of their administration and finances they will be preparing the people for a future far greater than a government of their own could bestow upon them, causing them to be independent of all foreign influence and capable of fulfilling their international duties.

Under Turkish rule these ambitions would be vain, even if Turkey should adopt the most advanced of political methods, because in addition to inherited enmity springing from a past of bloodshed, Turkey has not the economic methods with which to create a complete transformation in the territories she has gained by conquest and kept through the most brutal force. As the term victory in war signifies the opposite of defeat, so, if victory for Turkey had meant territorial Pan-Islamism, or at least a large part of the countries of Islam attached to her chariot, then defeat ought at least to signify liberty and progress for the peoples who have suffered most cruelly at her hands. These provinces removed from the government at Constantinople would not have

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absolute independence conferred upon them at the very beginning; and it is unlikely that they would immediately be in a fit condition to use that privilege, either to their own or to the world's advantage. The transition would be too rapid; but the future belongs to them and will be theirs. Principles of justice in public life are not abstract conceptions for a dreamer to paint on delightful pages; they are subject, like all human affairs, to the factors of time and space, without which their application would only be ephemeral or illusive. It is beyond doubt that the victorious nations of the three continents would commit a grave error and would be morally responsible for all the crimes committed by Turkey against Syria, Armenia, Palestine, etc., if they should allow one of these great provinces to remain subject to Turkish government. The words of Lloyd George, emulating those of Cato the Censor, are the sequel to victory showing the most elemental criterion of justice and of the historic moment:

Delendum est imperium ottomanorum.

If, however, Turkey should be banished from Asia, from almost the whole of her present territory, excepting the regions inhabited exclusively by Turks,

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it would be a great mistake to expel her from Constantinople.

In international politics actions should be subject to constant control and necessity the sole guide to prudence. The old principle which chained the European balance to Turkey no longer exists; neither does the ambition of Russia; therefore the only thing left is the future convenience of the States. It might be argued that religious and moral considerations dictate an immediate settlement of the question, in which event it would be desirable to recall the statements of Talaat Bey in regard to Armenia; and to follow the advice of Abdul Hamid regarding the inhabitants of that region. Religion has no influence today in political decisions. The days of the Crusaders have declined. In none of the Christian countries was the public filled with indignation when, in November, 1898, at Damascus, William II said:

The 300,000,000 Mussulmans who are scattered over the earth may be assured that for all time the Emperor of Germany will be their friend.

The Christians or Catholics of England and France saw no blasphemy in these words, but merely a condemnable political attitude. The Catholics of

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Bavaria, like the Lutherans of Prussia, looked upon the friendship of the Mussulman in a different light. To them it meant that Turkey had opened the gates of the Orient to the Teutonic Empire, whose military virtues secured them a vigorous ally who might at a difficult moment compensate for the growing and hostile power of the Slavic States of the Balkan peninsula. The very head of the Catholic Church, during these years of war, has in the same way treated the infidel who, with a sacrilege that was borne far too long, occupied the sepulcher of Christ; and it may be said of the most Catholic of nations that the favor shown to the infidel has been done in a spirit contrary to that of their religious ideas. When the sword of the English redeemed the Holy Land there was none of that outburst of enthusiasm among Christians, or in the Catholic Church herself, which such an event would have provoked if it had been regarded from an exclusively religious point of view. The clergy of Austria and Bavaria viewed it as the beginning of great misfortune.

The Turks, on the other hand, have likewise given up their religious intolerance. The revolution of the "Young Turk" at the beginning was based on a State of laymen; and if, later, after the

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religious reaction which almost brought back the triumph of the old régime, the Constitution formed rules of a religious order as are shown in Articles 7 and 118, there was no ecclesiastical power created. In Turkey, the upper classes believe in the religion of Mahomet, as, at the period of the Roman Empire, they believed in paganism. But less important than the religious argument is this, that a Turkish State practising Christian morals should exist in Europe. It is incontrovertible that some familiar customs of that country are reprehensible; but the same are to be found in countries which, while not belonging to Europe, are in close direct contact with her and are, moreover, dependent on the great European States who make full use of their sovereign rights. As for private virtues, with the exclusion of the form of the oriental family, the Turk is certainly not the least moral in the Orient of Europe. As a matter of fact, he is considered by travelers and sociologists to be far better than those who have so frequently coveted and sought his territories. Then there is the question of government in Constantinople and the Straits, so converting this small territory into an internationalized State, organized and protected by the Great Powers. The idea would be welcome if

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the coming peace should be permanent and final, but who is prepared to accept that conclusion without some qualms of conscience and doubts of mind? Thus, if war is still a possibility, however remote, the creation of this small neutral State, controlled by the great nations, would place it in the foreground of all international conflicts; and the political condition of Constantinople, under such circumstances, would oscillate with each movement of the international situation of the big countries. The grave results that such an arrangement might bring to the States that have commerce with the Black Sea and the Danube cannot be ignored. A Turkish government stationed on the two shores of the Dardanelles, with small territory, a limited army, and restricted sovereign rights, would meet the requirements of the moment and would embody the least dangerous solution. That government would be the expression of the majority of the city's inhabitants and of its surrounding peoples, the Turkish element representing about 50% of the population of the city of Constantinople, while the other half is composed of persons of various nationalities. It would likewise give continuity to a traditional power against which there should be no opposition except

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in cases of urgent necessity. This tradition would equally serve to limit the sovereign authority of the State, and the Turks in modern times have always had this limitation. Evidently the abolitions of the Articles and of the Treaties of Paris of 1856 and of Berlin in 1878, which placed Turkey in an inferior position as a government, had no effect, as they were acts which were not subscribed to by all the high contracting parties. The Articles recognized the judicial, administrative, and financial rights of intervention by the Powers, which authority was exercised in 1860, at the time of the massacres in Syria; in 1866, during the first revolution at Crete; in 1877, in the days of the Bulgarian atrocities, so-called; in 1896, during the massacre of the Armenians, and on various other occasions of less importance. Since the democratic revolution which was supported by men who later brought her to the feet of Germany, and therefore to ruin, Turkey has under her chiefs, Talaat, Enver, and Djemal, enjoyed an entirely modern constitutional form of government. It was a military revolution and naturally encountered all the difficulties which usually accompany the preliminary regulations of every State which secures its liberty by strokes of force and not through a measured,

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mature evolution. But it would be a great injustice to deny that Turkey's organization was based on liberty and on a system of popular government. It is even more. The uprisings and dictatorships that have occurred have all been of a popular character, movements of the *plaza* and not of the Sovereign, excepting the chimerical attempt of Abdul Hamid. The violences, like the crimes of Enver, were received with popular sympathy which this lilliput Napoleon frequently aroused in the people of Constantinople. So great was the hold of this man on the public mind, that the assassination of the ex-heir to the throne was probably due to an order from Enver, who was then Minister of War. The proper application of a constitutional rule would create a political situation identical with the remaining countries of Western Europe. The line of least resistance will cause Constantinople to continue to be Turkish, the capital of a State, but with small Asiatic possessions instead of the vast Empire of the past. Thus while a political necessity would be satisfied, we should also preserve the note of local color in the typical Stamboul, which is decidedly to be appreciated at a time when our artistic sentiments are in danger of extinction through the uniform tendencies of the present day.

CHAPTER IV

THE RIGHTS OF ITALY

WHEN war between Italy and Austria was declared on May 24, 1915, it was the culminating issue of the antagonism that had been aroused by Austria's long stand for merciless domination and by her continued application of reactionary measures to the effort to weaken the influence of Italy. When she found she could not impose direct tyranny, she protected the many petty despots scattered over the peninsula, esteeming their devotion more important than the affections of the people they so cruelly governed. Italy, on the other hand, has always rebelled and lain in wait for her neighbor's difficulties to make a definite stand for her own liberty, a policy that met with success in 1859 when Napoleon III reached the plains of Lombardy; and again in 1866, when Sadowa and Custoza, ousting Austria from the German Confederation, enabled Italy to wrest Venice from her. The period of the Triple Alliance was re-

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garded by thinkers and by a greater part of the masses as nothing more than an interlude provided by the inventive diplomacy of Bismarck to stave off the moment for war which had ultimately to come as a result of the plans laid by General Conrad von Hertzdorf on the one side and by the perpetual irredentist movement on the other.

The explanation of the alliance between Italy and Austria-Hungary (the Triple Alliance), and of the events of the period embracing its currency, is well understood in Italy. For the Italians, the two principal reasons were the aggression of France in the violent seizure of Tunis, also inspired by Bismarck, and the latter's threat to raise the question of Rome remaining the capital of Italy, who had taken that city out of the hands of the Pope in 1870. The object of all the signatories of that treaty was to establish and maintain peace, at least for some time. Bismarck ardently desired it in order that Germany would be able to gather up the fruits and consolidate the results of her last three victorious wars. Austria, too, was anxious for peace, being concerned in the Balkan question, her paramount interest since 1859, when she began to give up territory in Italy; and since 1866, when she abandoned her germanistic ambitions

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for others equally disastrous. Italy even still more needed a long period of tranquility to organize anew her national life, to readjust her financial difficulties, and to restore her civil welfare. Abundant proofs of this conciliatory spirit are to be found not only in a careful examination of the foreign policy of that period, but most easily in the manifestations of men of public affairs. Thus, the distinguished internationalist, Pascual Stanislaus Mancini, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Italy, said in the Chamber of Deputies on December 7, 1882:

It is necessary to proceed with the greatest unity of purpose and understanding in dealing with European politics, especially with those nations who have greater interest in the maintenance of peace and who are better able to preserve it.

The German Ambassador in Vienna with evident sincerity said, briefly, "God bless this work of peace." Kalnoky and Bismarck said the same thing, though with fewer demonstrations, having agreed on making it a secret treaty. During the frequent renewals of this treaty which united the three Powers, the pacific intention and purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance were well defined; and when the Italian Prime Minister, Francesco Crispi, with the natural warmth of his southern temperament, wished

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to change the alliance from being a defensive one to one of offence, in spite of the pretended support of William II, it was precisely the Powers of Central Europe who opposed him. The Treaty of Alliance, however, would have to be broken whenever one of the parties concerned should enter upon an offensive war, although that course was not adopted on the occasion of the Italo-Turkish War. On the contrary, it was so construed that General von der Goltz of the German army was allowed to formulate the battle plans of the State of Greater Turkey; and still worse, Austria threatened to go to war with Italy if she did not stop her fight with Turkey in Europe and especially in the Balkans, an act the Italian Government was obliged to agree to against her will, or it would have meant an indefinite prolongation of the war.

When in August, 1914, Italy declared her neutrality, she faithfully fulfilled the legal interpretation of the clauses of the treaty, just as she had done a year before, as the Central Powers well knew. In that year (1913) Austria, having planned an attack on Serbia, wished to know what Italy's attitude would be in case such an offensive movement should cause a general European conflagration. To this inquiry Italy sent her reply through the Marquis San Giu-

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liano, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, after consulting the Prime Minister, Juan Giolitti, announced that in the event of Austria's intention being carried into effect, Italy would preserve her neutrality according to the terms of the treaty; and, as might have been expected, Germany and Austria offered no objection to this honorable and justifiable attitude. When the recent great war occurred, Italy was free to act; but her sense of justice prevented her from taking decisive action without that legal and moral justification which is natural to citizens in whose veins flows the blood of the greatest legal minds of the Roman period. The Italian Government applied the same theory, more or less, to Austria that the latter had held on the occasion of the Italo-Turkish War, and asked for compensation according to the text of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, for the Balkanic occupation by Austria. Austria emphatically refused to comply with the demand and merely gave formal explanations so utterly inadequate to the circumstances as to carry their own mark of insincerity. It would, therefore, have been courting danger if the Italian Government had yielded to the wiles of Austrian diplomacy and had further abstained from the exercise of her right and her obliga-

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tion to enter the war on the side of the Allies. Fundamentally, however, the declaration of war in 1915 was the ignition of the torch of suppressed rebellion which had for so many years embittered the relations of the two countries. In Italy the question was no longer one for decision by the government. Popular sentiment in favor of the war was aroused to such an extent as to compel the authorities to bow to the commands of the excited masses. The Ministry, led by Antonio Salandra, was forced to precipitate action through the country's unpreparedness, although convinced of the justice and necessity of commencing hostilities; and the Chamber of Deputies, containing a majority in opposition to war, had perforce to submit to the dictates of the Plaza Montecitorio and the more distant Plaza Colonna, both representing the strong voice of the people. Parliament itself could not quell this outburst of national spirit; and some of the opposing Deputies, including the venerable Minister Giolitti, had to seek shelter outside its walls to avoid possible violence at the hands of threatening crowds.

Italy entered the war at a crucial moment for the Allied cause, a moment, be it said, in honor of the nations fighting for universal liberty, that left no

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doubt of their unpreparedness, materially and diplomatically, for such a conflict of arms. Russia was just then invaded and oppressed by Teutonic armies; and the military situation of other theaters of war was but little more favorable to the Allies. Prince von Bülow showed this beyond doubt in a speech delivered at the time:

Italy declared war against Austria when the latter's great battle in the Carpathians, which had been proceeding for many months, was coming to a close; and when the Austro-German forces had exhausted the enemy on the Russian front up to the River Dunaice, thus rendering the military situation propitious to the cause of the Central Powers.

The specter of triumphant Prussianism, however, presented itself and obliged Italy to take up arms to defend the world against the possibility of such a calamity. The circumstances of the hour demanded immediate action, which, as results show, was neither premature nor belated. It is, indeed, safe to declare that just as Italy saved civilization by not intervening in 1914, giving France, in that first year of her terrible suffering, the hope of definite victory, so she saved the then critical situation by entering the war in 1915, to prevent the destruction of Russia and, later, to enable Korniloff to complete the vindication

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of the Muscovite nation's military honor. The military decision of the Italians, though hurriedly taken, was fully provided for by secret diplomacy. Baron Sonnino, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had already signed an agreement to adhere to the Treaty of London, so that Italy entered the war with a full knowledge of the consequences of failure or success. The terms of the treaty were guarded with secrecy until the Bolsheviki government, doubtless advised by Germany, departed from all diplomatic tradition and gave publicity to the secret documents of the State's archives. By that treaty Italy's claim to her unredeemed lands was recognized; she was provided with means of defence against predatory attacks from the opposite coast of the Adriatic; and, after the war, she was to have a sphere of influence in Mediterranean Asia proportionate to the measure in which England and France should respectively increase theirs.

There has been considerable international question as to the moral character of this treaty, especially by inspired politicians who attack in others far less than what in their own case they defend. The value of such criticisms, however, may be appraised by the fact that the most venomous of the critics of Italy's agreements with the Allies were the Prussian Junkers,

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for whom the sole existing thing in the world is the savage force called Might. On the other hand, this treaty is entirely in accord with pacts which invariably precede war alliances, while it was indispensable to Italy, who went into the war a year later than the principal Allies whose ideals and objects had already been defined. Without the Treaty of London Germany would undoubtedly have achieved greater success in her active efforts to promote dissension among the Allies. Recent exposures have disclosed the wide ramifications of the campaign undertaken by Germany with that object; but, for the same reasons that it failed in Europe, it had no effect on the United States, whose war aims embraced no selfish or interested purpose beyond that of moral defence. If there had been no such agreement as that provided by the Treaty of London, Europe, at the end of the war, would have been a battleground of Agramente, as, after the disappearance of the powerful enemy they had united to conquer, there would have been a revival among the Allies of those opposing tendencies and interests which had constantly endangered world peace, even before they became overwhelmed by the fearful peril of the Teuton. The treaty was, in reality, a condition precedent to uni-

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versal peace, since, in combining ideal principles and practical interests, it will cause peace to be maintained by the decided will of the Great Powers until the advent of that more fortunate day when it will be done by the will of the people.

No nation should expose itself to the cruel risks imposed by a great war without having previously resolved on the future course of its international policy. All war alliances have agreed beforehand on the respective degrees of participation in the fruits of victory. Italy was, therefore, morally bound, on entering the war, to take into account all the weighty considerations involved in that perilous step. Such, for instance, as the effect the defeat of the Central Powers would have on her international life; what would be the consequences of the triumph of right; and how much in her particular case would the Allies acknowledge to be her due in the practical and positive realization of the right in the universal conception of which she chiefly joined in the war. She was equally bound to proclaim to her people the meaning of the grave step she was taking in declaring war. It was necessary to make them understand that while on the next day they would have to march towards suffering, danger, and death, her honorable claim to

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national unity had not been forgotten; and that human justice, defended against the Teutons who wished to stain it, would be applied primarily to their satisfaction. The first provision of the Treaty of London acknowledges Italy's right to her unredeemed lands, a few square kilometers of land which mean nothing to the world, but which to Italy signify the inheritance of the whole of her history. These are Trento, Trieste, Gorizia, and Dalmatia, territories which also shared the grandeur of Venice or were bound to Italy by more direct ties. On those lands the greatest moral battles have been fought in which the Latin races and Western civilization have defended themselves in the past against the twofold invasion of Teuton and Slav.

In the name of all the Roman ideals, strengthened by the grandeur of their progenitors, the peoples of ancient Illyrium have never lost their racial unity, even when under foreign rule. Here and there, without doubt, some foreign elements might have filtered in—Croatians, Jugo-Slavs, and Magyars—but never has that specific mark of civilization been erased which is the predominant element in distinguishing one race from another. On the contrary, this element in all its struggles had a very marked distinctive char-

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acter. So it was that the Italian race imposed its language on the others, placed its literature and its art in the ascendancy, controlled the wealth of the country and monopolized its commerce. Its moral influence was so great and its mental superiority so overtowering that they were stronger than its own political organization. It was only later, when Austria saw herself in imminent danger of losing those possessions, that she began her policy of persecution—well-nigh extermination—using the Croatian element as a tool; a policy which might have had some momentary success in the field of public life, if not in other directions. This power of a subdued race to impose itself on its conquerors is nothing new in history. It is sufficient to recall the early barbaric invasions of Italy when the same thing happened; but the laws, religion, and customs of the conquered were adopted by the invaders, who bowed their heads before a superior civilization, in spite of having defeated them on the battle-fields. In the case of Dalmatia and Gorizia, to which we now particularly refer, the Jugo-Slavs, who inhabited the mountains, were employed by Austria against Italy after she had tried and failed to use the Hungarians for the same purpose. They were without a gleam of culture, or

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any idea of advancement, willing to serve Austria in their ignorance of everything but slavery; and with no ideals they found themselves before a people whose cities were armed with the best that intelligence and wealth could give. Their numbers made no difference, because even if in some regions the Croats represented a greater percentage in the census, the Italian element still predominated, owing to its possession of superior qualities. What happened there was the same as happens in many nations made up of more than one race, where the only source of predominance is the greater degree of culture, a more balanced state of well-being, and a more developed mentality. That Dalmatia is as much Italian as Trieste, Trento, and Gorizia is beyond discussion in the light of a geographical and historic examination. As Gazda observes, the Dinaric Alps so divide Dalmatia from the Balkans as to form a formidable bulwark of defence and to make commercial interchange difficult. These Alps separate Dalmatia from Bosnia especially, and in such a way that the two neighboring and coterminous provinces differ in language, religion, and customs as though they were thousands of miles apart.

Political rule was for the most part limited by geo-

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graphical boundaries. Venice for centuries had unquestioned authority. The line called Mocenigo included Dalmatia among the possessions of Venice, and the treaty of Carlowitz fully recognized her pre-existent right. Later the Treaty of Passarowitz extended the frontiers of the great republic of the Adriatic even further. It is certain that, according to high authorities, many of the boundaries were not well defined, but this irregularity occurred then, as it does now, as a result of the scarcity of population and the limited value of the frontier lands. While securing her right to her own lands Italy ought to have a fixed boundary which would protect her from invasion by her neighbor on the east. The slightest knowledge of the geographical situation of Italy would make it easy to understand this. It is not necessary to mention the boundary of the Trentino, which forms an open port in the heart of Northern Italy. The question of the Trentino is so obvious that Austria herself, in proposing terms previous to the declaration of war, offered to settle the dispute by yielding all that territory to Italy. Still, the Adriatic coast offers very little security to Italy. An invasion from the eastern coast of the Adriatic upon the western coast would be as simple as crossing a large river, with the dis-

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advantage to those on the defensive, that they could not concentrate their forces on land on account of the large extent of their territory, and could not defend themselves by sea on account of the scarcity of ports. The whole eastern coast is prepared as if for a daily battle; magnificent harbors, innumerable islands as a vanguard embosomed in bays, secluded straits and lofty mountains. The opposite side, *per contra*, presents a number of gay white cities, with no bays, ports, or other means of defence. From Venice to the Strait of Otranto on the left, navigation is quite easy, while on the right it is very difficult; for this reason Venice, the maritime republic, occupied the left rather than the right line of the Adriatic. Hence the explanation why no city of the peninsula bathed by the Adriatic ever attained maritime power at the time when Genoa, Pisa, and Amalfi tried to emulate Venice. It would have been absurd, therefore, to bring a victorious war to an end and still maintain that defenceless position, especially when the threatening lands on the opposite shore are Italian and are only occupied by the enemy by right of conquest. These two aspirations towards national defence and restoration to the motherland of her rightful territory are abundantly justified in the

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Treaty of London, which provides for their fulfilment and demonstrates the foresight of Baron Sonnino, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the wise judgment of the Allies.

The armistice authorizes Italy to occupy the lands provisionally conceded to her in the Treaty of London; and there is little doubt, if its deliberations are governed by logic and justice, that the Peace Conference will make the concession definite and final, as an absolute essential to the safety of Italy. The city of Fiume is also occupied by Italian forces and should be ceded to Italy, even if there is truth in the slightly different versions given by the Russian paper *Isvetia*, and the review *New Europe*, of the statement that it is not included in the unredeemed lands specified in the Treaty of London. Fiume is an anti-Croatian city, as was shown by popular demonstrations at the time of the announcement that Italy had become a party to that treaty; and by the visit to Rome of its mayor and of the representatives of other coast towns, after the signing of the armistice, to ask for intervention. In view of all these facts it may be assumed that, as the result of a sound military and political conception, a logical and appropriate boundary-line will be defined by the Allies at

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the Conference. The plenipotentiaries should take into account that the Adriatic represents in Italy what the Caribbean Sea and the Antilles are to the United States since the completion of the Panama Canal; what Belgian neutrality was to England; and the chain of Vosges Mountains to France.

Influence in Asia Minor is a question of the equilibrium of forces. Constantinople was originally reserved for Russia, whereby she would have had a powerful position in the Mediterranean and would have governed the Eastern Mediterranean if the traditional alliance with France had been maintained. If it had been possible to carry that plan into execution, British and Italian interests would have suffered a terrible blow, as, even with the achievement of victory, their power would have been diminished. In that event, England, and possibly France, would have restored the equilibrium by occupying a part of Asia Minor; and it was from that possibility that the idea arose of giving Italy a sphere of influence in that continent. The Treaty of London represented the diplomatic side of Italy's entry into the war, as its sentimental aspect was expressed in popular agitation. Three separate military pages mark the intervention of Italy in

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the last three years; the advance on Lubian and Trieste, the defeat at Caporetto, and the final great victory, which, as stated elsewhere in this volume, was the most decisive battle of the entire military conflict, whose true significance has not yet been fully appreciated. While the hour has not arrived for a close investigation of the precise circumstances under which the successes and the intervening failure were brought about, it may be stated that they were due to the special conditions attaching to the different phases of the war; and that future generations will be better able to apportion the glory and the responsibility in their proper proportions. The one outstanding fact is the increasing military power of Italy. Marshal Joffre is reported to have said that it mattered not where her armies were fighting. It made no difference whether the Italo-Austrian line was in the Carniolan or Julian Alps, or on the River Piave; the question was the actual number of troops engaged and reserves available. Generally, military power is not gauged by the number of fighters or by the quantity of war material, but by the importance of the enemy at the front; and that Italy has considerably increased her forces was proved by the constant in-

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crease of the enemy's army. A year ago Austria's forces were divided between two fronts—the Rumano-Russian and the Italian; previously there were three—the Italian, Russian, and Serbian. Later, her whole army was on the Italian front.

When one speaks of the military power of Austria, the public and even the experts only remember the defeats inflicted on Austria by ancient armies commanded by Frederick the Great and by Napoleon. It is difficult to understand that that epoch is past and that now we have in array fierce fighters of a purely German race, valiant Hungarians, cruel and resisting Bosnians and Slavs, and that all the leaders are of the Prussian school. Few remember that Austria is a nation of over 50,000,000 people, possessing wonderful industries and a marvelous railroad system. The Austrian and German armies differ very little in numbers and barely so at all in war material, the heavy Austrian artillery being considered superior; and this entire army stood facing Italy, whose forces obtained mastery in many titanic struggles. When one considers all that has been accomplished entirely by the force of will of the Italian people, numbering 38,000,000, with reduced resources, little iron and no coal; with incipient

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industries, almost no merchant marine; with hardly any wheat or meat, at a time when marine transportation was but little available, and that by the shutting in of their land their economic life was at a standstill—it will be seen that the resistance of the Italians was a *tour de force*. They have responded cheerfully to the demands of their government for money, taxes have increased, ordinary articles have become a luxury, and all their forest wealth has been utilized for railroad service.

Opposite parties have united in one common aspiration. Above all, the United Socialist Party was in complete accord with the war, as Claudio Treves, one of its most distinguished members, declared. The Catholic Party from the very beginning separated themselves entirely from the political ideas of the Ultramontanes and have even co-operated zealously with the Crown Councils. The remarkable homogeneity existing in France crossed the Alps, and in Italy, too, has been formed the same sacred union which characterized the great Latin Republic from the very beginning. Nothing has been able to shake the strong fiber of the Italian people. The economic improvidence of the whole allied group has been measured at its true value;

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and the lack of co-operation at the right moment when the march on Lubian might have destroyed Austria is explained by military exigencies of another kind. It seemed impossible that three and a half years of suffering have been borne by a people devoted to the virtues of peace and who, in matters æsthetic, follow the fine example of protest against all the severe laws of a blind, strict order. In truth, the great war has been the fruitful source of many unexpected things, not least of them that the peninsula of the Mediterranean has never lost her place among the great countries of civilization. During the Roman era she gave to the world the constructive idea of Right, redeeming human society from the individualistic conception of Greek æsthetics. Later, when barbaric invasions and their strong influences obstructed the practical course of their daily life, causing Dante, that equally marvelous political writer as immortal poet, to die in exile, and Machiavelli to waste away in the miserable village of San Casciano, playing with truckmen at the Crossway inn, she produced an overflow of genius unequalled by any other country. She gave to the world Dante and Petrarch, Marco Polo, Christopher Columbus and Amerigo Vespucci; Leonardo da

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Vinci and Michael Angelo, Galileo and Volta, Titian and Rafael, and afterwards, at this modern epoch, she rises foremost with the moral principle of the nations, which has received its supreme sanction from this last war.

CHAPTER V

COUNT WILLIAM ZOLLERN

THE mental exaltation induced by a belief in the theory of the "Divine Right of Kings" was revealed in almost every public utterance of the former Kaiser. In his megalomaniac conception, God, to Whom he owed deep reverence, was his great ally. Modern ideas and the established forms of human relations ceased to exist when the last of the Hohenzollerns treated the subject of his family rights; and history, even that of his own House, lost its true outlines when he directed his thoughts to the narrow interpretations and warped legends concocted by unscrupulous courtiers of earlier periods. In his adolescence his imagination was fired by the literature of the Palace libraries, where his psychology was formed at the feet of Emperor William I, during that epoch which marked the return of the veteran monarch from the victorious battles of Sadowa, and, later, of Metz and Sedan.

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He became inspired by the moral ideals of his ancestor, Frederick the Great, author of "Anti-Machiavellism," yet the most machiavellian of all the Princes throughout the ages; and when he ascended the throne of his powerful Empire his mind already reflected the dangerous influences to which he had been subjected in his youth.

The dominant note in all his official speeches was his supposed divine mission on earth, not as an individual, but as head of the reigning family, a conception held by the ancient Burgraves of Nuremberg, from whom he was descended. Nor was this settled conviction disclosed in merely isolated manifestations admitting of particular interpretations. It was demonstrated on innumerable occasions by purely personal definitions which leave no room for doubt. On March 5, 1890, in addressing a body of submissive Junkers in his beloved Brandenburg, when he declared that his grandfather, William I, considered the monarchy to be divinely appointed, he said:

I think as he thought; and I see in the people and the country bequeathed to me a divine calling which I must strengthen, as the Bible says, and for which I shall have to give an account some day. . . . Those who wish to assist me in this work I will

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heartily welcome; those who wish to impede me in this effort I will crush.

On this favorite theme, referring again to his grandfather, who had moulded him according to his own ideas without transmitting a certain generosity of sentiment which William I undoubtedly possessed, he exclaimed, on the occasion of unveiling a monument to the memory of the latter, in Frankfort on May 10, 1896:

We have before our eyes that great moment at Königsberg when, declaring his belief in the divine right of Kings, with the scepter in one hand and the sword of the Empire in the other, yielding homage to God alone, he received the power from Him. Thus came he to be the instrument of the Almighty.

On many subsequent occasions he quoted the following words, spoken by William I on his accession:

The Sovereigns of Prussia receive their crown from God. I shall, therefore, take my crown at the altar of God and shall place it on my head.

And as though to express the inadequacy of the view that divine authority was confined to the Sovereigns of the House of Hohenzollern, he broadened his earlier definitions by the succeeding reference to the entire reigning family.

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The house of the Hohenzollerns possesses a sense of duty which comes from the conviction that God has placed them in the position they occupy, and to Him only must they give an account for all the acts they accomplish for the good of the country.

There have been instances in which his words have been less easy to interpret, as, for example, when he disturbed the repose of the soul of Charlemagne by calling him his ancestor; but his mediæval conception reaches further back than that of the Middle Ages; it partakes of the essence of the Ghibelline ideas at a time when popes and emperors fought for supremacy. A stranger to the age he lives in, so different from the long historic period during which William and Mary of Orange had to swear to a document containing a long list of popular rights, before they could occupy the throne; a period which had shown him the picture of a king belonging to the most ancient and illustrious house of Europe beheaded by the guillotine and the monarchy subsequently overthrown; the disappearance of the supremely powerful dynasty of the Napoleons; and lastly, which showed him, as it were, a moving picture of monarchies, great and small, driven from power probably never to be restored—his conception can only be attributed to paranoia as the result of

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his education, family traditions, the intoxicating atmosphere of victory, and—why not say it?—also to the hereditary disease of which there are so many symptoms justifying the belief that they have been his sad inheritance.

The similarity of the general characteristics of William I and William II would almost make it appear that the latter was destined to be the natural successor of the former, and that Frederick William II, son of the one and father of the other, so different in every respect from both, was but a moral parenthesis in the order of succession. During the three months in which Frederick was nominally the head of the Empire he was buffeted by all and especially dominated by Bismarck, who, from the first days of the unhappy monarch's assumption of the throne, was already forming a Régency for the son, until the death of Frederick at San Remo rendered further intrigue unnecessary. William did not inherit any of those qualities which made his father a lover of peace and a hater of domination. It may even be said that he did not inherit any of the virtues of either of his parents. He was alien in nature to both his father and mother and completely out of sympathy with them. Indeed, he

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maintained and extended the truly Hohenzollern tradition of struggle between King and successor, and carried it so far as to lead to serious disagreements with his mother, which was undoubtedly the main cause of the dislike borne him by Edward VII, her brother. With his inbred conception of the rights of royalty, it must have seemed fitting to him that his mother and grandmother should constantly have been referred to by Bismarck as "the Englishwomen," in the most deprecatory sense of that term. His tacit approval of these offensive references, which must be assumed from the frequency of their occurrence, indicated his antagonism to the liberal, peaceful, and just ideas which those two illustrious Queens sought to introduce into the methods of Hohenzollern rule, with a loving co-operation that would have brought gain rather than disaster to its diplomacy.

Lacking moral self-control and so ignorant of the science of government that on the eve of ascending the throne he found it necessary to take a severe course in the study of politics, he was called to govern a nation at the height of its prosperity, with its people and resources spread over every corner of the globe to secure an extension of its foreign military,

political, and commercial interests. From that moment forward he began to develop his long-conceived project of world domination; and he encountered but little public opposition to his plans, which caused him to ignore the fact that the submissive attitude of the population towards his ambitions and dangerous policies did not necessarily imply one of loyalty. Through this want of a due sense of proportion and a natural failure to properly estimate the necessary means to an end, he plunged into the first step on the road to ruin by expelling from office the aged Chancellor, who little merited such injustice, and, later, by retiring the prudent von Bülow for having criticised his indiscreet utterances. This definite assertion of the imperial self-will was of course followed by the appointment of mediocre and servile officials who enabled the Emperor to establish a system of violence and intrigue in the conduct of foreign affairs, instead of a well-defined and consistently just policy. He was equally unscrupulous in his efforts to weaken the power of Russia when he urged her to war with France, in abuse of the trust placed in him by Czar Nicholas II, who himself was incapable, cowardly in spirit, and of small mind. Anxious for war, even at that early stage of his

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reign, the Kaiser ignored Balkan agreements and incited Turkey, on the one hand, and Bulgaria, Greece, and Rumania, on the other, to pick quarrels with each other. At the same time he offered support to the Mussulman and assured the Catholics of his respect for order. On occasions he would divert his propaganda westward by impressing on France his willingness to form a continental alliance and by declaring to England that the traditional Anglo-Prussian friendship would continue for the good of humanity. Yet, while all these intrigues and protestations may have inspired the world with some confidence in his underlying sincerity of purpose in the propagation of pacific influences, his braggart declarations at home and abroad as to Germany's "civilizing mission" secured for him the title of the *commis-voyageur* of his country; and, in truth, he had all the characteristics of that type. His domestic policies differed but little from those which he pursued in his country's international relations. They were marked by the same vacillation and contradictions. One day he was a socialist; on the next he persecuted that party. When circumstances made it expedient he pretended to oppose the Junkers, while, in reality, he was their most

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active supporter. As was natural, this apparent instability created an atmosphere of unpleasant expectancy which made his people fear him, though they did not love him; and as the outward form of love is similar to that of hate, he appeared to be the idol of the nation when he was but its diseased medium of expression. The lavish splendor with which he surrounded himself was the exclusive result of his megalomania, fed by the power of control of 70,000,000 subjects and of the greatest army in the world; and it was also the growth of this disease that carried him into the war which has brought him and his dynasty to an inglorious end—the war for which alone the last of the Hohenzollerns was responsible, but which could have been avoided if the policy of Bismarck had been continued by a worthy successor.

It was too late in 1914, as the fatal march of events as far back as 1906 had rendered the conflict almost inevitable. All the official acts of William, both before and after that time, were directed towards war. Every move of his government tended to create enemies abroad, and the closer isolation of his country. That nothing could be done without the consent of Germany and her Emperor

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was the key-note and symbol of his foreign policy. The "imprisonment" of which he complained so much was the result of his own threatening attitude. His political mistakes brought about the union of his former rivals and enemies, until England and France formed an alliance against him; and Russia and England, whose interests in Eastern lands had always conflicted, adopted a united policy regarding the Balkans and even Asia. The result has been that in the Mediterranean, Italy and France have grown closer to each other; and Japan has joined Russia, her blood still fresh on the soil of Manchuria.

The cries of the paranoic leader of a powerful army and ruler of the most vigorous of nations filled all others with terror and led them to adjust their own quarrels in order to be prepared for the general war to be let loose on the world by the former. How far away seemed the time when Bismarck wanted France to occupy Tunis, and England to enter Egypt! And how well did he succeed in urging both nations to spend all their energy and money in the pursuance of a course of action that, while appealing to their passions, nearly brought them to the brink of war against each other, so that he himself could launch an attack on the world and

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regain at one stroke his lost prestige! William aimed for conquest by land and by sea, when neither land nor sea was prepared to conquer so many enemies. To accomplish the end which was the towering ambition of his reign, described in his own words as the desire "to gird the sword of Frederick the Great and to hold the scepter of Neptune," William needed the elementary essentials of far greater statesmanship and a far greater sense of proportion than he had before given evidence of. Providence and a lack of foresight interposed to prevent the realization of ambitions growing out of blind infatuation for Hohenzollern traditions. If the aged Francis Joseph of Austria, whose unhappy life was filled with public and private sorrows, had indulged in similarly wild aspirations, some extenuation might have been found by reason of his ancestral grandeur; but the conditions of the Hohenzollerns were entirely different. Their glory, embodied exclusively in the achievements of the Great Elector, of Frederick the Great, and of William I, is of a historically recent past. It was only in 1417 that Frederick I, Burgrave of Nuremberg, became Elector of Brandenburg; and in 1618 that the Elector Sigismund succeeded to the Dukedoms of Eastern Prussia. The

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Great Elector came to the throne in 1640, but it was not until 1701 that Frederick I assumed the title of King, which has thus been held by the family for little more than two centuries. Frederick the Great, who enlarged the narrow confines of his new kingdom, definitely gained possession of Silesia by the Peace of Hubertsburg in 1763; and in 1772 his territory was further extended by the infamous repartition of Poland. As a matter of historic fact, it was only at the latter date that the Hohenzollerns really became Kings *of* Prussia, their previous description from the year 1701 having been that of Kings *in* Prussia. The present Empire, which William II helped to form, was proclaimed at Versailles in 1871.

The name of Hohenzollern has even less claim to the dignity of ancient lineage. To the family cognomen of Zollern, taken from the name of the castle situated near the Rauhe Alps in Suabia, the prefix "Hohen" was added about the year 1200, to distinguish its members from the many Counts of Zollern who then abounded throughout Prussia and Southern Germany. The title of Burgrave of Nuremberg naturally commanded greater respect abroad; and Frederick Barbarossa may have conferred that hereditary

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distinction upon them as a reward for services rendered in the Italian wars of his time, which were similar to the recent conflict in the cruelty and destruction practised by the Germans. It was probably the rapidity of the growth of the power of the Hohenzollerns that helped to transport William II to the realms of mythology and to strengthen his belief in the "Divine Right of Kings," so opposed to the beliefs and theories of other reigning families in Europe and even in Germany, with many more centuries of monarchical life and a prouder record of glories achieved. William may also have been encouraged in his wild thoughts by an implied faith in the story invented by Albert Achilles, Elector of Brandenburg by descent, who sought to justify the possession of his classic name of Achilles by declaring that a companion of Eneas, as he fled from burning Troy, had arrived with the latter at the shores of Tibet, which was the original site of Rome. This pleasing legend which makes a Teuton the offspring of a Græco-Roman family did not, however, serve its intended purpose, as William came to the end of his exciting career not as a descendant of Priam, King of Troy, nor even of a Roman Emperor of the period of the "Decline of Rome," but merely as one of the

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progeny of Count Zollern, the administrator of small estates.

When faced by real danger to his own person and to his dynasty, a state of abject terror took the place of the vain boastfulness of the attitude he assumed during more promising stages of the war; and instead of remaining at the head of his Prussian Guards, crying, "*Preussen über alles*," he deserted his brave soldiers by escaping in the dark of night to Holland, without even one look at that capital which had given him so much glamour and glory. He is now haunted by a double fear—a fear of his own people and of the nations upon which he forced his cruel war—a fitting corollary to his blundering policy at home and abroad consequent upon his unquenchable thirst for world domination.

CHAPTER VI

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

PREVAILING world conditions render it almost impossible to assign a true significance to the Russian revolution. The inherent justification for such a rebellion against centuries of economic and political serfdom has not yet been measured by a proper standard of proportion. If humanity had not been absorbed in one single problem, such an event in history would have aroused more wide-spread enthusiasm; but the dominant thought of the war naturally gave a subordinate place in the public mind to the lofty ideals embodied in the fierce but just upheaval of the Slavic world, which came to the Germans as the dawn of salvation, and to the Allied nations as an act of treachery imperiling their very existence.

Russian political annals record a long series of martyrdoms and cruel abuses of power. Until lately, the progress of civilization had hardly penetrated the

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Muscovite Empire. The knout had always been the symbol of governing authority and Siberia or a violent death was the penalty paid by every man or woman with dignity of soul and the courage to rebel against political and moral enslavement. With the advance of the twentieth century the tide of democracy began to flow into Russia; and in order to stem its onrush the subjects of the Czar who were becoming increasingly bold in their demands for a release from the stern methods of imperial rule, were lulled into a sense of approaching liberty by the creation of a National Assembly and the conferment of a consultative vote in the conduct of the affairs of the nation. This supposed reform, however, left conditions practically unchanged; and the vast population, and territories embracing one-sixth of the world's land surface, still remained in the absolute control of one man, or one family, in whose veins there no longer ran the vigorous blood of Peter the Great. If, more than fifty years ago, Gladstone could truthfully exclaim that the reign of the Bourbons of Naples was a negation of God, the statesman of today could just as reasonably apply that condition to the history of the Empire of the Czars.

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The tragic circumstances surrounding the political martyrology of Russia are almost beyond description. No country has known such sacrifice in every sphere of its national life. Families of noble birth, the wealthy *bourgeoisie*, high and low officials, workers of every grade, have yielded up their sons, who, to secure their rights as free men, flocked to the work of propaganda in the underground of the cities, or in the fields, only to march later in sorrowful caravans to desolate Siberia; or they openly joined the terrorist movement which inevitably led to the gallows. One definite though not final phase of this revolutionary movement forced the abdication of the Romanoff dynasty; and to realize this long-pent-up aspiration there was waged around the effort the most intense struggle between the numerous class of rapacious bureaucrats and a group of intellectual rebels fighting to influence a supinely ignorant and fanatic people. Like all revolutions, that of Russia had comparatively small beginnings. It was created by contact with the ideas of Western Europe. The misery and theories of progress which arose and clashed at the beginning of the past century awakened in the minds of thinkers the reasonable view that even Russia could be a land where suffering need not

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permeate its social life. By an increasing knowledge of the literary men of France, great writers of its golden age of literature sprang up, and in the exchange of ideas with German philosophers these writers formed the theories of nihilism. This intellectual relationship, however, did not destroy the essential part of the Slavic soul—that conception of human affairs so simple, flexible, almost childish, which the young generation sees in its environment. In the wider communities a very different interpretation was placed by students on the sinuous, difficult, and complex theories of the Germans; but as a general conclusion it may be said that the far-seeing yet contradictory philosophy of the Teutons became in the Slavic mind ideas of negation, absolute, final, and fanatic.

The first of the Slavs who participated in the spread of German ideas in the earlier half of the eighteenth century (which, according to de Rémusat in an address before the French Academy in 1845, comprised “a period equal to that half-century in Greece which followed the school of Socrates”) could not understand the subtleties of pure reason and of practice (Kant), the one following mere phantasms and the other forming general principles; they could not

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analyze the march of progress or the "eternal evolution" of Hegel, which, like infinitesimal calculation, works towards an end without ever reaching it. Only in its outward and superficial aspect did they conceive of the identity of the "Ego and the Will" of Schopenhauer. Still less could they grasp the humanitarian teaching of Fichte and of Schelling, or assimilate the ideas of the sinister Hegelian call which transferred science from the hands of masters to the communal field. Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Hartman, whether in the optimistic conception of the former two, or in the pessimism of the latter two, all appear to condemn an existing evil and to reveal a far-distant good; and the Russians imbibed their theories from a strictly psychological point of view, disregarding the objective reality. They thought that change was easy and alteration always possible, and that to destroy an existing condition and substitute that future which they so faintly perceived must be the work of philosophers and politicians. Feuerbach had said, "The law should be the love of man for man." Gaspard Schmidt, under the pseudonym of Max Stirner, had affirmed that "there is no law outside of myself." Bauer, who was further back, sought the destruction of institutions which

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separate men. But these ideas implanted in the German mind with a due sense of proportion as to time and space lost all proportion in the Russian mind, and from abstract thoughts they became a fruitful field for an active political agitation. Thus, we have Alexander Herzen and Michael Bakunin, who drank copiously of these fountains, carrying the ideas of masters to their ultimate conclusions with the logical rigor of all simple minds. In Russia, nihilism was created; in Germany, on the other hand, it culminated in Marxism. In the former nation, brought into contact with the atmosphere and individual psychology of its thinkers, there was formed an intolerant and destructive revolutionary party with no practical conception of life, dreaming of good as if in a nirvana in which we should suddenly find ourselves by virtue of our spirit as it overthrows evil. In the latter nation a disciplined party was organized, reasonable like the fighting *bourgeoisie*, firm in a single ideal representing the abstract and, on the other hand, transitory in all practical aspirations, ready, as events have shown, to form the greater part, the fighting element of the Kaiser's army. Later on, the intellectual revolutionaries of Russia, as a result of sacrifices insufficiently appreciated, con-

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quered the masses of the vast empire and instilled their own ideas into the untrained minds of the laboring classes which, strange, but true in every country, are always more practical than those of the thinkers who govern them. And so the struggles of the *plaza*, as of parliament, were the reflection of a pre-existing imperfection and of the vicious origin of that word "nihilism," so fitting to the whole Russian revolutionary movement, but which could never serve as the basis for a work of construction, even though it might have helped martyrs in their painful marches over the vast steppes of Siberia, or in prisons battling with hunger and the inhumanity of warders.

Social Democracy, which was also organized in Russia in imitation of the theories of the German socialistic party, could never overcome the purely revolutionary tendency which the preceding and essentially Russian theories of the heroic epoch had stirred up and kept alive by the atmosphere of repression. So that the same Marxist organization which had gathered the masses in other countries, like a new "Society of Jesus," gave place in Russia to constant diversity of opinion agitated by the supporters of the minimum program and of the maxi-

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mum program respectively bearing the names of Mensheviki and Bolsheviki; all with the hope of securing social improvements even during the capitalistic and catastrophic rule which only admits of an integral change in the social system as a possibility. Such diversity of view is to be found in many other countries, but nowhere has it assumed such proportions as have been revealed by the Russian revolution. The leaders of the two groups were the illustrious Pleckhanoff and the vigorous Lenine.

Beyond the limits embraced in the program of "Social Democracy," the Social Revolutionary party maintained its traditions. Though less rigid in its aims and rather supporting an agrarian socialism based principally on the "Rural Community" of past periods of the Russian Empire, it was more energetic in its methods and viewed the terrorist system as being necessary to such a reactionary atmosphere. When the Czar assembled the first Duma, the three groups for the most part abstained from voting. At the second session, however, the Social-Democratic party gained 75 votes, and the Revolutionary Socialists 35, not including 100 members of the Labor party who frequently inclined towards their neighbors of the extreme left.

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This took place at the beginning of the year 1907, the year of the Second Peace Conference with which Russian politics intended to circumvent parliament, sustained on one side by the all-powerful bureaucracy and on the other by the agitations of the market-place; but the second Duma lasted for a period of exactly one hundred days and met with the same destiny as that fateful period in history has shown in various abortive and tentative occasions of transitory rule, such as have occurred in France, China, and Russia, in three different epochs.

Further limitations were subsequently introduced into the electoral law, and in the preamble to the imperial decree providing for the legislation the following words occur:

The historic right possessed by the Czar to repeal a law and substitute another is confirmed by the autocratic power granted to us by God. It is therefore before His altar that we assume the responsibility of holding in our hands the destinies of Russia.

The illusion of both parties having consequently been of brief duration, they returned to their respective positions; and with the spirit of Trevow and of de Plehve again prevailing among those who exercised power, the masses once more resolved on absolute negation.

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Bakunin has said, "Let us destroy, so as to bring the rebirth of the golden century." The "golden century" had approached in the form of triumph for the Russian revolutionists, but still finding them as unfitted for the whole work of organization of public life as were those whom they expelled. The war gave the revolutionaries an opportunity; it brought to their side the whole capitalistic democracy; it delivered to them the weapon with which the Czar had kept the people in constant slavery, viz., the army; and the revolution was formed with spurs of gold, as it was said of the bloodless wars of the Middle Ages. The fact is that in Russia everybody thought it was time for a change of rule; all were revolutionists, but the dangerous Colossus representing Czarism, the lack of communications, the great distances between large cities, the ignorance of the rural classes, the number of races throughout the vast State, the hundreds of languages and dialects spoken in the widely spread territories, all combined to retard the revolution, as was natural in a political enterprise not guided by unity of purpose. But the secret movement still existed, and although it gradually attained larger proportions during the period of 1904-06, it was only at a much later stage that its

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real triumph was achieved. The reaction of 1906 again fired the minds of the Russian people, especially those of wealth, who were more opposed to revolutionary ideas and who saw with horror the terrible cruelties of the police against the revolutionists, such as "putting out the lights of their cigars against the bodies of the tortured, kicking prisoners, digging out their eyes, filling their wounds with blood and burning their feet," as described in an official account published by the Russian Government itself during the imperial epoch. The torture formerly employed in isolated cases in distant regions or against individual revolutionists had become an organized political system. Thus, it was natural that a feeling of compassion, aside from any keen desire for justice, made revolutionists of all classes. This political transformation, however—this very justifiable humanitarian revolution—came at an unseasonable time which caused its control to fall into the hands of terrorists who were incapable of undertaking the great work of making a nation out of a State, a people out of those sedentary tribes, or a democracy out of that Empire. In the interior a firm stand for order should have been maintained. In the exterior the first canon of the new rule should

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have been war against the invader—against the autocratic power of Central Europe. The revolutionists did not understand, under their momentary intoxication, that not mere ideas, but definite aims, were necessary for the masses. Instead, they hoisted a flag which meant suicide—"Peace and Land"; and while they gained the favor of the lower orders they lost control over them. "Peace and Land" became a more powerful principle than revolutionary ideals, and for an oriental people, as the Russians still are, it was a more important factor even than their national existence.

Kerensky failed to cope with the situation, and Lenin will succeed Kerensky both in victory and in defeat. Kerensky was a product of the barricades, a common case in revolutions. With fluency of speech and enthusiastic souls these men faced momentous situations which were beyond their grasp; but, imbued with the spirit of their oratory, they believed themselves equal to the task without thinking that action and public speaking bear the same relationship as achievement and desire. Kerensky seemed and was indeed formidable so long as he represented the masses delirious with doctrines; he could march against General Brusiloff and even

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against the Germans; he could close the gates against reaction; but when it became necessary to maintain some order, to establish that revolution so quickly quelled, it was not so easy for him to escape from the power he had held amid general applause and expectation. Today this revolution, which has failed to understand the historic hour of its triumph, stands confronted by a double menace of destruction, an internal reaction coming from the consciousness of its own preservation, or an external reaction supported by the arms of other nations.

William II, in the final period of his greatness, from the Eastern part of his Empire, in reply to the Prussian Diet's congratulations, said:

We owe our victories chiefly to the morale and the spiritual treasures showered on our people by the great philosopher of Königsberg.

The Kaiser indeed spoke very truly, but from quite different causes than he supposed. Emanuel Kant did not shower spiritual treasures on a people who have silenced for so long the sentiments of right and of honor; but he certainly did unwittingly give to his neighbors across the Eastern frontier the germs of those ideas which finally brought them to the

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feet of the powerful Kaiser, where they would still have remained if they had not been freed by the arms of foreign countries whose people have a right conception of liberty and order. Nor was it in vain that F. H. Yacoby, in 1799, with scientific inaccuracy but foreseeing the trend of history, invoked the philosopher of Königsberg speculating on "nihilism," a word hardly representative of an active party. The Russian Revolution which should have meant real progress, and should have been enthusiastically acclaimed by all who believe in Liberty as no empty word, has placed in danger the vast population of the country and has prevented an easy victory for the international camp. Instead of making its extensive territory more European it has probably turned it over to Asia as the Tartars once did, to be plunged into a night of gloom longer even than that in which every trace of civilization disappeared from that part of the country which Adam of Bremen, the mediæval writer, has called *Æmula sceptri Constantinopolitan clarissimum decus Græciæ*. This perhaps explains why this rebellious phase of all the Russias was at first viewed sympathetically and subsequently with much misgiving. Even those who desired the hasty overthrow of the

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Czar's empire as a step forward for humanity are overcome with sorrow. It is strange that the lucid mind of Nicholas Lenine does not grasp the difficult situation in which he has placed not only his country—evidently an indifferent consideration to him—but his own avowed principles. Destruction as a system may be a revolutionary deduction from the German philosophy if the revolutionary principle be of a negative phase; but when it concerns the reconstruction and building up of a people, destruction, incendiarism, assassination, and general terrorism cannot create a system or consolidate a situation. On the contrary, the result is a repudiation, for perhaps many years, of the noblest ideals. We have it on historic evidence that even the most bloody revolution cannot produce as many victims as the opposite reaction. That is what we fear, that through the blind persistence of a few, Russia may lose the conquest of the liberty she deserves and that the white terror may succeed the red terror.

CHAPTER VII

PACIFISM, PAST AND FUTURE

WHEN the world war became imminent there suddenly arose a reactionary public sentiment whose appealing force and wide diffusion seemed likely to dominate the entire civilized world within a very short time. The underlying ideas inspiring this outburst of feeling constitute the basis of what had long been known as the Doctrine of Pacifism, beloved of so many noble souls with a lofty conception of human life. Originally conceived by unpractical theorists and gradually strengthened by its increasing hold on the public mind, it soon became the property of statesmen. In England, it was favored by the governing party of more than a decade. The Czar of Russia, under the influence of the humane spirit of William T. Stead, called a conference of all nations, but, remarkable as the act was as a spectacle, it failed to produce any material results. The era which witnessed the rise of democ-

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racy, the independence of the American Colonies, and the birth of nations through the successful employment of armed force, presented this new ideal, described by socialists as "Solidarity" and by internationalists as "Pacifism," although the one was really complementary to the other. With a few notable exceptions, the pacifists were socialists; and the socialists, already numbering millions, were decidedly pacifists; but the actual outbreak of hostilities brought a sudden attenuation of their ranks, and the powerful world force which existed at the moment immediately preceding the war lapsed into a threatening but comparatively insignificant group.

With the air filled with the scent of battle, the defenders of peace, forgetting their ideal conceptions, began to draw distinctions, reserves, and hypotheses. The German socialists, in particular, cast aside their habitual hypocrisy and, with August Bebel at their head, declared in open socialistic and international congress that if Germany were "to be attacked," its members would march in the vanguard of her army. Neither Bebel, nor his followers, nor those who heard him, defined the phrase "to be attacked" in the sense in which it had been used. They evidently preferred to retain its interpretation until the excite-

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ment of the hour should render the diplomatic and official meaning more acceptable. It was only among the strong Italian and Russian socialistic groups and some British elements that the word pacifism had one signification irrespective of time or place. All educated in the school of Karl Marx or influenced, like the British, by a high sense of human justice, they spread dogmatic theories and inflexible logic to show to what extent the ideas of a leader of a school can disturb the minds of his followers if he has the mental power to destroy their critical faculty. In honor of the French socialists, who had clearer foresight, it is due to them to place on record that they were the most influential in the dogma of the maintenance of peace, while not denying the possibility of war. The national emergency made them forget the maintenance of peace, their view being that a continuous peace should be founded on the idea of justice and on disarmament. Jean Jaurès conducted the campaign, both like a statesman and like a visionary, placing side by side a lofty conception of peace and the practical methods of reaching it; but the large vote in favor of the internationalism of all peoples, together with the alleged objections, disappeared at one stroke on the

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day that the call to arms claimed all men. Foremost marched the German socialists, and after them German professors who formed part of the "Pro-Peace" societies without embracing the socialist creed. It was more or less the same thing for German socialism, accustomed to parade under the iron discipline of its chiefs, to snatch its members from their own ranks to join an army destined to murder and cruelty, as to reverently follow Bebel to publicly commemorate the deeds of his private life; and so they passed Wilhelmstrasse in review before the eyes of their scornful Emperor. Whereas they had for leaders and symbols Marx and Lassalle, Singer and Vollmar, now they would serve under Moltke, Falkenhayn, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff. In the psychology of the German people, socialism in that country had formed no free consciences, or created a type of rebel who hates submission, and, through the crucible of his own mind, would test the ideas of others; or men of character who, though tied to a rock, still lifted their fist to heaven; but it had undoubtedly formed powerful minds who gave distinguished service to intellectuality, while at the same time it failed to create men who could work out the future of socialism as it was conceived and

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taught. Only Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, and a few others of minor importance feebly protested. Karl Liebknecht, indeed, had a family trust to fulfil. In 1870, when the German mind still showed some sign of moral independence, his father had protested with all the force at his command, with Marx and Engels (the party leader), against that other war, also provoked by his own nation. But such agitation was easily overruled by force, and Scheidemann, assuming the character of Dante, looked at his companions with scorn and followed the lead of the Junkers of Prussia. The German socialist has ceased to think. Thinking little before the war, he has thought not at all since its occurrence: the Kaiser and the military clique have done the thinking for him. Thus, the pacifism which German leaders produced for exportation and which only met with reserves and distinctions before the war, has not found a single genuine representative on German soil during this war. Not a voice of protest was raised against the infamies in Belgium, the useless destructions in France, the systems of war which increase evil unnecessarily, the deceptions of Brest-Litovsk, or the sanguinary reaction in Russia. It would seem that they were all subdued by the

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fury of bloodshed; by that single desire for killing and being killed, while the thought never entered the minds of the learned or the ignorant that in case of victory in this international struggle they might break their own chains, and in case of defeat might gain their liberty. A real and sane pacifism which seeks its justification not in the defeat of justice, but in its victory; which lifts the mind to high conceptions of virtue; which brings well-being without force, would have been very useful to mankind if it could have won the German masses by its energetic proclamation. Failing in the very field where it was needed to hold back the hand of the aggressor, any course adopted by pacifism among the conquered would have been injurious and would have produced exactly the opposite of what was intended, viz., the upholding of the triumph of a system of force which, by taking society back to past centuries of violence and bloodshed, would have denied its basic postulates.

A curious phenomenon which makes one doubt of human virtue is to be found in the fact that while there was no opposition to the war in those despotic countries where injustice prevailed, it was, in some measure resented among the free nations where

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public liberties were not interfered with and where the sacrifices of a bloody conflict were willingly undertaken in homage to high moral principles. No doubt the justification for this lamentable condition is that some countries do not highly appraise the heroism of differing from the majority, while in others independent political thought and action imply the possibility of death by execution. Yet, this strange phenomenon must not be confounded with the peace movement *ante bellum*. It perhaps has its origin in the theory which regards evil as based on good, as a passionate crime is on love or honor, or as depravity and vice are based on vital action. War having been declared almost universally and rebellion against militaristic violence hushed in Germany, pacifism entered upon an interlude that will only be terminated on the day the world begins to pursue its normal course.

In Italy, a great number of the official leaders of socialism were at the beginning opposed to war and formed a campaign of opposition to the wishes of the greater number of its party, which, if it did no great harm in the early period of the war, ended by contributing to the disaster of Caporetto, a disaster which would have brought Italy to an inglorious

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death if it had not been for that hidden power of energy existing in all Latin peoples, an energy which awakes to meet the great crises of history. Constantino Lazzari, secretary of a powerful labor organization, found pleasure in sending out pacifist circulars; others provoked the movements of Turin, and others, of less importance, spread propaganda in public places, all sheltered by the same authority whose desire it was to maintain unbroken Italian unity. Caporetto made them understand that there was no place for defeat in the camp of the ideal; and so, with Turati and Treves (the serious leaders of Italian socialism) at their head, they realized the significance of plunging Italy and her civilization back into the dark Middle Ages to be a victim of the reactionary spirit of all princes and of the lust of all peoples.

It is in Russia, however, that we find the phenomenon of how ancient pacifism, though eclipsed by the historic moment, has left a trail of treachery and crime among men of genius as well as among the masses. The situation in Italy gave marked signs of general defeat and submission to the foreigner; it was like a momentary nightmare, like a swift spasm of terror which gave renewed vigor to the social or-

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ganism; but in Russia defeat and subsequent conquest have been seen in their true colors, in their terrible reality. The nation was governed by the Czar, as we have said, under the most degraded and horrible political conditions, and had no strength to liberate itself. The war came and they accepted it enthusiastically and, in spite of their mercenary and rudimentary leaders, they fought heroically. It was owing to this that they could free themselves. A few men gave them liberty, the revolution being only a blow from the fist. As a result, the press gave expression to the most radical ideas and violent speeches were the order of the day in the public thoroughfares. Encouraged by the new régime, soldiers selected generals; military and labor councils were convened; Kerensky, who had opposed Korniloff, had no power against Kirlenko and less against Lenine and Trotsky. With the disappearance of the knout the heroes of a bygone day, with guns on their shoulders, fought, even in retreat, to destroy the enemy, thus casting a stain on pre-war pacifism, robbed of its nobility to become the synonym for cowardice, abandonment, and depravity. The reign of the Bolsheviki began with the cry of "peace at any price." As is usually the case, the ideas of the

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masses were in advance of those of their leaders. Kerensky led them to disintegration when he meant to give them liberty; and Lenine led them to violence in the desire to give them peace. Kerensky and Lenine have shown that they had no intimate knowledge of the popular psychology, as has been the case with many revolutionists, including the greatest in history, Washington and Bolivar, and the more fanatical Robespierre and Marat.

The revolutionist is temperamentally an agitator. He appears to be, in a moment, the human expression of the tendency of an epoch and the exterior symbol of the popular will. Generally he expresses only one phase of the social trouble; and when he rises to the position of statesman, which he rarely does, he has not the wide outlook necessary to grasp definitely the sure and unalterable progressive course of the centuries. Pacifism, in the face of war and especially of a war which was to decide the fate of the world, became of necessity a supine submission to the will of the more vigorous combatant who held victorious arms against his enemy. Thus Russia was at the mercy of Germany. Other manifestations were the first conference and its fruitless termination; the new Teutonic invasion, following on the heels of the sol-

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diers of the revolution who had just surrendered their arms; the second conference with its strange idea of a one-sided declaration of peace, which gave so much amusement to von Kuhlmann; and, finally, the resort to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. There was yet something more: Russia was divided and torn to bits from that moment and was considered a negative factor. In her own interior she is giving her life blood which she refused to give on her frontiers to protect the soil of her ancestors and to maintain aloft that honor to which her history entitled her. The action of the Bolsheviki has brought revolution to her own doors instead of to Germany's, as they intended. Once more are the inhabitants of the Ukraine brought under the sway of the knout, and railroad laborers know that strikes which were formerly favored by Kerensky are now punished by execution. The watchwords of "Peace and Land" of a day's duration have been transformed into ceaseless toil and hunger.

That revolutionary ideal which caused the forced abdication of the Czar, and later took his life, has disappeared; and we now have the paradox of the pacifistic Russia still shedding her blood while the functions of war have been suspended in the rest of

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the world. An autocratic situation has been resumed, and all that magnificent rebellion which was to have put an end to the most hateful tyranny, and would certainly have marked a wonderful epoch in the world's history, has been reduced to an act of petty treachery giving over to the invader the country, degraded and destroyed, hated and despised by the rest of mankind who before had entertained feelings of compassion for her grief and admiration for her purity of ideal and for her rebelry filled with sacrifices.

If, today, the European and North American Chancelleries are contemplating a peace that does not protect Russia, what will become of that nation and of the ideals of Lenine? If, perhaps, through a momentary sordid interest, the diplomats of the belligerent nations seated at the Peace Table should remake the map of the world, extending France to the Rhine; England to Southern Asia; the United States and Japan to Siberia; Italy to the Jugo-Slavic countries, and should also favor Poland, Bohemia, and perhaps Hungary, what would be the fate of Russia and the avowed principles of Lenine and Trotsky and of their submissive followers? Naturally, if this were to happen, our free spirits would rise in

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protest; civilization would be outraged and there would be a general outcry not only in Russia, but in all the Allied countries, that this was not the conception which led so many young and heroic lives to their death. It would be undeniable that such a self-seeking attitude could only be equalled by that of the Bolsheviki if, in making peace, they should forget the nations that are still at war; if they should forget France, who declared war to keep a noble promise made by international treaty; or England, who could have been to her own advantage an impassive spectator; or Italy, who came late, but armed, to save Russia from the victorious Austro-German invasion of 1915; and the United States, which, from the highest motives of humanity, abandoned her traditional pacific policy and crossed the ocean to give lavishly of her money and her blood.

The Bolsheviki themselves, when, powerless, exiled, and in some cases ennobled by martyrdom, they traversed the free countries of Europe and America, disclosed how everything was a medium of barter in Russia; and the rule of the Czar confirmed later that the most moral principles were the mediums of purchase and sale. The existence of these conditions was made even more manifest, in the trial of the ex-

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Minister of War, General Souhonmiloff, and in the book of General Krapotkin, on the disastrous campaign in Manchuria, during the Russo-Japanese War. Whether the new government in Russia is, in this respect, an improvement on the old is difficult to decide; and it is unfair to condemn in the absence of positive evidence of criminality or treason. If the present Russian government has been guilty of these crimes, the proofs will doubtless be forthcoming. In all countries and in all circles one hears the voice of those who openly impugn the honesty and the patriotism of the Bolshevik leaders; and, coincident with this belief, unfortunately, there is to be found, within the revolutionary party itself, an equally strong belief that not the government, but their own leaders, have again and again sold themselves to the policy of the Czar. With such doubts and suspicions prevailing, the right course is to leave the supreme decision to popular judgment. The acts of September and the Revolutionary Tribunal of the French Revolution were decidedly criminal, but they ultimately guided French history back to its logical course. Public opinion then had a clearer vision than was exhibited by statesmen.

In France and England, pacifism, kept within hon-

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orable bounds respectively by Albert Thomas and by Arthur Henderson, disappeared as if by magic after what happened in Russia. In Italy, the few who had not been convinced by Caporetto learned only too soon the bitterness of defeat. Those neutral countries which still doubted of German greed have had a full view of it. Spain, who has not denied her pro-German tendency, saw what the Germans were capable of when they attacked a country by force of deceit, corruption, and arms, which are synonymous terms in the complex jargon of the cunning subjects of the Kaiser. The conservative people of the world, led by the Catholics, have had to change their belief and comprehend that Germany is not an expression of order, but of conquest, because it was for this end that she plunged Russia into the greatest disorder and placed it in the hands of the mob.

At the beginning of the war, during the agitation of the early part of August, the French socialists tried to save the principles of peace. One of the victims of this chimerical attempt was Jean Jaurès, who fell by the hand of an assassin in a modest restaurant in the rue Faubourg Montmartre. Since then they have remained faithful to their duty without verging from their outlined program; and, facing

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those realistic dreams which aspired to make of war a political weapon in spite of the difficulty of the situation which urged the necessity for concentrated power, they have tried desperately to preserve that liberty which is the pride of modern France. Like the English, they have realized that the work of pacifism is that of avoiding future wars; and out of this last one, to come to a solution which, while it will destroy warlike ambitions nourished by peoples and sovereigns, will find its greatest reward in a strict adherence to justice in its dealings with the conquered. France is the country where there has been most talk about a League of Nations. Those who preached peace in their desire to avoid the terrible catastrophe of recent years are today at open war, and with a foretaste of calm they are begging that henceforth, having experienced the true significance of modern warfare, all nations, large and small, may be united and that future conflicts may be settled by other systems than that of wholesale murder and ruin of the human race.

The English socialists, notwithstanding the surprise with which war was received in the United Kingdom, have followed the wise lead of the French in contributing their aid to an Allied victory in

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order to do the pacifist work of the future. War broke out just when England was completing in a definite manner her own revolutionary cycle. The Liberal party in England has, greatly to its credit, accomplished a bloodless revolution. The struggle between classes has been equalled by few nations in its intensity, and this war has brought it to its dying embers. The efforts of the serene, large-minded Asquith and of the vigorous, impassioned Lloyd George saved the country before the war and since then have placed her on the path of conciliation. We cannot too highly appreciate the assistance given by the English nobility, who, in dying gloriously at the battle-fronts, have been faithful to their ancient traditions. At the outbreak of war three members resigned from the Cabinet—the aged John Morley, educated in the school of Gladstone; the radical Trevelyan; and the labor representative, John Burns. These three statesmen relinquished public responsibilities not because they protested against the policy that led to a declaration of war, but only because they felt that a position in the Cabinet was incompatible, in times of war, with their ideas and their past traditions. The oldest pacifists in England proved themselves most in favor of the war.

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Their "splendid isolation" completely gave way before the new happenings, and it was precisely those who viewed the war with the greatest preoccupation who have brought to a consummation the work begun by Edward VII.

Among the English Government representatives there was just one, a conservative of the purest type, who from motives of prudence sounded the note of peace without conveying the slightest suggestion of injury to the cause of victory. Lord Lansdowne's idea was not only pacifistic, but it contained a fear concerning class differences and a deeper misgiving that, in the final analysis, even a victorious England may find her entry into the war to have been detrimental to her power. In reality, however, England has reached the greatest height of her traditional tenacity in the marvelous effort she has made. With an army of 7,000,000 men and an expenditure of thousands of millions of pounds sterling, her conduct, in spite of the difficulties of her labor problems and aggravated by the excessive cost of living, has been perfect. Her lofty spirit has been maintained throughout the darkest hours of the Allies' struggles, and each defeat aroused greater determination to win. In contrast with the genial qualities of the

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Latin races and the disciplined temper of the Teuton, the Anglo-Saxon race possesses the strength of endurance and a tenacity of purpose that have been the source of its triumph throughout history; and triumph is only attainable through the power of resisting to the end.

In the United States pacifism was not a tendency, nor the conviction of the rebellious, nor the ideal of a few; it was entirely a State policy, and the last war with Spain, twenty years ago, was undertaken as a self-imposed duty on the part of Americans. The voice of Theodore Roosevelt, then merely Assistant Secretary of the Navy, proclaiming and demanding preparation for war, was even at that time urging his policy of preparedness to protect the country against threatening dangers, although no one had thought of war until the last minute. Presidential elections were contested with a peace program in view. Both parties looked upon war not as an impelling duty, but as a thing that might have to be dealt with as the emergency of a plague. Events have shown that the Germans were right in advocating preparedness for war in advance, while the Anglo-Saxons of both continents avoided doing so until war was thrust upon them, which serves to prove

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the theory that the aggressor is always prepared, while those who are attacked rely on spontaneous energy.

In the United States, pacifism as a system affecting the life of the people yielded to the war fever. The whole nation rose as one army, and mothers were proud to sacrifice their sons. The Anglo-Saxon spirit was stirred by the characteristic enthusiasm of all America, although at the outset there was a brief agitation which was unpopular. The part taken by Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman was evidently sincere, but it is strange that these two anarchists have not followed the general trend of their party, the only one in Russia among extremists, which has most enthusiastically agreed with the war. Their intellectual chief, Prince Krapotkin, declared himself in favor of the war from the beginning, his sympathies being entirely with the Allied cause. Many French and Italian anarchists have died gloriously in the front lines, rebellious against their own country, but fighting for a still higher ideal, the cause of humanity. In the Argonne, one of them, with monocle in his eye and no weapon to kill with, went to the attack and fell peacefully with a bullet through his fore-

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head. Still, the agitation was carried on *sub rosa* by Germans and apparently by a few Irish elements who hated England; but the latter were rather influenced by a desire for vengeance than occupied by the problem *per se*. This difficulty, however, was easily overcome by the reigning sentiment for war which, in its exaggeration, became a serious consideration for the government who had previously encouraged that spirit.

The old pacifism of generous minds which called so many conventions and made us believe that the Temple of Mars had been closed forever has gone under an eclipse; its final purpose cannot be discovered in this contest except in the dissolving form of cannon. The ancient pacifists like Stead, Moneta, and D'Estournelle de Constant must have been in advance of their time and place, even if they did not abandon themselves to denunciations like those delivered by Romain Rolland from his retreat. The pacifism of other times was described by John Mackinnon Robertson in the House of Commons in his statement that, having been a pacifist all his life, he considered that peace was impossible so long as the Allied forces were unable to enforce disarmament. Yet it is natural that a man of humane

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tendencies should feel repugnance at such prodigious slaughter, if his ideas have been developed in an atmosphere favorable to permanent peace and his activity has formed in him another nature which may have accustomed him to look across the seas or continent without misgiving. But the consequence of this personal condition could not be that desire for peace which is based on the material or even the moral triumph of Germany.

It is difficult for modern times, with a psychology formed on the past, to comprehend the present war in its real meaning; and it is from this lack of comprehension that evil interpretations and different tendencies arise. Throughout the centuries we have known of many struggles which had their *raison d'être* in race differences, in territorial questions, in the interest of a reigning Power, in the wish of a caste; but the struggle of today, to the honor of the twentieth century, is a struggle between two ideas: Is the world to be governed by material force, conscious, organized, well-directed? Or, on the other hand, is it to be moved by the influence of generally admitted principles which, without entering the field of fancy, are universally sanctioned as worthy of application? This is the great dilemma. The Germans have not

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without reason chosen the word "Kultur"; the Allies have not without justification used the word "civilization" on their war program. To fight on behalf of the second conclusion of the dilemma, to apply the ideas of those great men who have given us the grandest bases for modern democratic life, is the work of pacifism. It would have been profitable to have worked this out through conventions and speeches, or by means of discussion and conviction, but from the moment that the Prussian militarist class, enthusiastically supported by all Germany, declared war and the challenged world refused to bow to the Colossus armed with unbreakable weapons, any struggle other than that advocated by force would have been worse than idle—it would have been ridiculous. The socialistic groups who had made pacifism their highest creed understood it with the subtle instinct of the masses and better even than their learned leaders, though not every social revolution can find its satisfaction in being attached to the triumphal car of the German Emperor.

However much some socialist workers may wish to generalize in treating with the *bourgeoisie*, placing them all under the same prism, whatever may be said by journalists in neutral countries, it is evident that

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in the light of the efforts of these classes there was a tremendous difference between the Teuton Powers and the rest of the world; and that social evolution, as well as social revolution, finds a basis in free countries which it certainly has not found in countries with less liberty. This is why all nations have risen. Both great and small have declared war against Germany; they come from every continent; some of them are even Germany's own ex-allies. Those who are neutrals are so on account of their geographical position and political tendency; the small nations are the republics which a writer, wishing to honor them, has called lilliputian. This general consensus of opinion cannot in good faith be attributed to diplomatic action, as diplomacy is an external art and not internal in its operation. There must be another and more powerful reason for it. A whole world cannot rise against one nation without an imperious reason. Now that the power of Germany, in spite of her people's warlike tendencies, is turning towards active participation in the civic progress of humanity, towards pacifism which was a vague aspiration before the war, and during the war was obliged to fight ardently against a preponderance of power, or with reckless destruction, she assumes a

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new purpose, a new peace—the goal, perforce, of all the movements of public life. We do not believe in a permanent peace which is the spontaneous product of the wish of all States and all nations. In international life, that which is good and just is the criterion to which we aspire without ever reaching it. There will probably always be those who attempt to conquer others by insidious plotting without directly threatening. There will always be unsettled and rebellious peoples. We have more fears in this respect about the Slavic race than about the Germans, because they have as yet no conception of social discipline, which is the prime element of internal and external order.

If the Anglo-Saxon ideal, which seems now more influential than ever, should declare itself, not as a new international authority, but as a moral power permeating the psychology of the peoples, the consequence would be that the latter will find the satisfaction of their aspirations in the enjoyment of perpetual peace. Pacifism will then be able to prepare the road for all the practical motion of governments. Its activity would take two forms: one of generic propaganda which would in itself be of no efficacy, as we saw in 1914, but would be most efficacious if it

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should represent the ideal expression of tangible deeds; and the other, destined to create a large number of institutions on all boundaries common to all peoples, which would transform the abstract idea into a living reality. Pacifism, in future, will be generally exercised, and will offer to governing bodies the substratum for the construction and maintenance of the League of Nations. It will be indispensable to the future development of this international movement, because it is through contact with public understanding and through preparation that any attempt to further it will be saved from failure and from becoming a soulless form. Moreover, as the League of Nations itself must go through some evolution according to the eternal laws of progress, its motive power must of necessity be represented by the popular will, a constant stimulus to give initiative to governments which are well known to be most partial to the *status quo*.

The only danger incurred by pacifist principles, even today, is that involved in the presentation of too generous ideas before a large public. The masses always feel more than they think and may be too lenient to the conquered of the present day, not knowing that history is sometimes a repetition of

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great tragedies. Until Germany, Austria, and Turkey receive a punishment sufficient to prevent them from repeating the wrong they have inflicted on humanity, until the Slavs learn that peace must not be disturbed by an innate spirit of disorder, until great and small States learn that individual gain is subservient to the universal good—not till then will the pacifist movement have free rein; and only under these conditions will it truly represent the finest poetry and the noblest aspirations of the human soul.

CHAPTER VIII

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE idea of a League of Nations, though new in form, is but the embodiment of a basic principle foremost in the minds of statesmen during and after many of the earlier wars recorded in history. The excessive cruelties and horrors of the past four years of war have naturally created throughout the world an ardent longing for peace. Hence the renewed expression of the desire to bind nations together in one common aspiration towards a civil life opposed to the arbitrament of the sword for the adjustment of international differences. Human nature has rebelled against the slaughter and devastation wrought by the war just concluded, and is seeking, in reaction, the forces wherewith to spare future generations from the awful sufferings of the present. The vibrations of the cries of anguish coming from every quarter have deeply moved the statesmen who were constrained by necessity to

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throw their countries into the struggle with the full knowledge of its moral significance; and it is to avoid similar disasters in the future that they are now using all the machinery at their command to promote the unity of nations. During the recent conflict, in 1916, Aristides Briand, the silver-tongued orator who for many years directed the affairs of his country, was the first to publicly express the view that to establish universal peace the individual interests of nations must be subordinated to those of the entire body, to which principle he gave the title of "collective sanction."

Briand's idea was the spontaneous impulse of a moment of moral crisis, the impulse of a man of ardent radical tendencies whose soul was stirred by the events then plunging the entire world into grief and horror, and who sought to realize the dreams of his youth by methods more in line with the responsibility of public life and the reflection matured by experience. The theory of "collective sanction," in other words, a League of Nations, secured popular endorsement in England; and particularly by the ex-Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, a disciple of the humanitarian school of Gladstone and a pacifist like all his colleagues of the Liberal Cabinet to whose

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lot fell the declaration of war against Germany. Yet, while both these eminent men spoke of international sanction for the larger action of States, neither ventured upon a proposed solution of the many difficulties that would necessarily follow such world legislation. At a later stage, President Wilson also formulated the guiding principles of a League of Nations, but similarly abstained from entering into the working possibilities of the suggested international association. To the honor of the President, however, it should be recorded that the humane purpose underlying the proposal was in his mind at the moment he was declaring war against Germany. On that very day, in April, 1917, in his moving address to Congress, he said:

In the discussions assembled to close this war there will be no doubt that peace must be followed by a formal gathering of the Powers for the purpose of preventing a renewal of a catastrophe like the present. . . . It will be absolutely necessary to create a force destined to secure the permanency of the solution agreed upon. . . . If the peace of the future is to be durable it must be a peace free from danger, secured by the highest efforts of mankind.

Thus, notwithstanding the absence of practical guidance as to the future, we have absolute demon-

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stration of the fact that the popular pacifist theories of former days now constitute the dominating influence in the minds of the more conservative governing classes of the great countries. We have seen this in the speeches of Lloyd George in England; of Clemenceau in France; of that great orator and former Prime Minister, Pablo Boselli, in Italy; and even in Germany, where Bethmann-Hollweg, forgetting the indiscreet utterance of 1914, spoke constantly of peace. Side by side with the statesmen who enunciated the views of their respective governments there were also other public men and authorities who greatly influenced popular opinion. Ex-President Taft of the United States, the historian Gabriel Hanotaux, Edward Delbruck, and others all advocated the union of States after peace; and the most ardent supporters of the war in both camps declared that it should be ended by decisive victory, so that, influenced by the victor, there should come the long-desired union for the maintenance of peace. The same basic principle governed the movement of the federation of the United States of America; a similar effort was made by Bolivar to unite a large part of Latin America with the same object. In Europe, the Holy Alliance of 1815, with

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its mistaken view of placing principle above peoples, also aimed at perpetual peace, external and internal, but failed because the effort was really designed to stay the hand of time and the inevitable evolution of democracy among reactionary governments. Since the Middle Ages, all leagues of nations have sought victory which would establish principles of permanent peace; and even in the Roman period, warlike and imperialistic as it was, the Temple of Mars was closed after each war in the hope and belief that it would never open again.

The contemporary conception of a League of Nations is, without doubt, the reaction of public sentiment in the face of the enormous sacrifice of young lives during the recent war, but there are many reasons why calmness should supersede popular excitement in the consideration of so grave a matter. On the one side, we have the imperative necessity for completely suppressing Germany's ambitions so that she may never again be a disturbing element in world peace; we have the Russian situation with all its uncertainties; the still less assuring prospects of a permanent union of nations through possibilities arising out of the emancipation of the other Slav peoples; besides the opposing factors that would

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enter the formation of a League of Nations coming immediately after a great war that has intensified national hatreds. On the other side, we have the influence of liberal Anglo-Saxon ideas, and the democratic principles and peaceful desires of the people of the United States, backed by the great international authority of their government, to counteract the unfavorable elements specified above. But there are other points to show the dangers of making the League of Nations an integral part of the peace treaty to be decided upon at the forthcoming Conference. When Germany, in her final moments of resistance, resorted to her notoriously dishonest methods of diplomacy to save herself from defeat, she based her activities on a convenient interpretation placed on the utterances of the President of the United States, in order to create dissension among the Allies. Happily, all nations had become so accustomed to German intrigue that none was fooled by the clumsy attempt to divide them. Peace is the natural sequel to the war, and the treaty which sets forth its conditions should deal exclusively with the immediate consequences of the conflict. To convert the treaty of peace into a political instrument would be to provide an unnatural solution of the war

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and to carry humanity back to the *status quo ante* by reviving the existence of the very things which caused such suffering. The treaty of peace as a corollary of the war must bear an intimate relation to it and, as far as possible, remove the causes that produced it, so as to make its recurrence impossible; but the belief that representatives of many nations assembling for mutual understanding in order to forget the past and to promote new ideals, differing in thought and sentiment from the practice of former years, will have the desired effect, is to indulge in utopian thought. If a nation has not contributed her energies to the war, nor shed her blood, if she has remained neutral and simply broken diplomatic relations with one of the belligerents, the principle of mutual understanding may seem possible; but if, on the contrary, she has had a life of struggle, sacrificing her best in manhood and wealth, if her inheritance of liberty and independence has been imperiled, an agreement of that kind seems not only impossible, but absurd. It must not be forgotten that nations have not the same changeable sentimentality as individuals, every social organization being slow in elaborating ideas and sentiment, and consequently slower in changing them, extreme

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though they may be. The alliance projected by the peace negotiations, for instance, between Germany and France, Austria and Italy, would be the most original of spectacles ever witnessed by man. Not all the will of our greatest men could suffice for the success of such an alliance under the prevailing conditions.

A League of Nations formed at the Peace Table would give great victory to the ex-Empires of the Teutons and would again stir up their ambition to dominate the world. In spite of the many treaties that may be written and the many guarantees to be demanded, it is beyond doubt that the machine of war, full of glory from the last four years' fight, would again be organized and directed against new sacrificial victims. It is also beyond doubt that if within a reasonable limit of time they selected a convenient occasion for a renewed attempt to dominate the world, Germany and Austria, with their vassal nations, would not find all the nations in arms against them, as is the case today, thanks to the happy coincidence of the far-seeing English and French policies initiated by Edward VII and Delcassé. Belgian patriots, Serbs, Italians, Rumanians, Russians, would tremble rather than flock

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to the defence of the attacked. One might even ask whether England and the United States would be disposed to enter another terrible conflict, or if, instead of a more cruel war than the past, they would prefer to accept those hypocritical diplomatic assurances the assaulting nations would be disposed to give. Indeed, all the circumstances indicate that a League of Nations organized at the Peace Table would again place continental Europe at the mercy of Germany and her allies. There is no doubt that, since Russia has been removed from the map as a State and even as a nation, the Teuton Powers constitute a considerably greater force than France and Italy. Thus the policy of the continental Powers, who, according to Briand, Asquith, and Wilson, would necessarily direct the operations of the League, would be in the hands of the Central Empires. The United States and England might preserve the independence of the League for a time, by the strength of their united forces, but to pretend that this armed watchfulness would be permanently exercised is to ignore the decidedly pacifist psychology of the American and British peoples. Its constant maintenance would encounter general opposition in America; and it has already been seen that in Eng-

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land one of the main issues of the last electoral campaign, still outlasting the war situation, was the abolition of conscription. Under the conditions arising out of such a position, France and Italy would be helpless to avoid disaster if Germany and Austria seized the psychological moment to strike a blow at them.

Our conception of the task of the Conference is that it should conclude a peace based principally on military considerations that would render the Central Empires powerless to repeat the recent evils; and, having accomplished that end, and then only, the effort should be made to avoid all future wars sought by other States or arising from other questions. But even that modified program will not lessen the difficulties presented by the formation of a League of Nations to enforce peace. First, there will be the question of the inclusion of the Central Powers. Then there is that of a clear definition of the rights of each State; of the force to be employed against violators of the terms of agreement; of the punishments to be imposed; and of all the changes that will have to be made in pre-existing doctrines which, in spite of being antiquated, have by long practice become necessary to our rules of conduct.

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To us who respect and maintain the rights of small nations a union of all States under the same hierarchy would be a satisfactory solution of the problem if there were better promise of such a union being able to stand the test of practical application. It is doubtful whether decisions of small States would be readily accepted by the more powerful (not only in arms as they are today, but in area, wealth, and other physical and moral resources) unless under convenient conditions. Even the Latin republics of Central America, with all their respect for Pan-Americanism and actuated by a spirit of justice difficult to maintain in international relations, resisted the judgment of the International Court of Cartago concerning their rights over the Nicaraguan Canal, which they considered had been violated by the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty; and that resistance ended the League of Central American Nations, whose inauguration was heralded forth as one of the greatest events in Pan-American history.

In order to enforce the resolutions of the League, it would be necessary to maintain an international army and navy recruited principally from the ranks of the Great Powers; and this force, created through pressing necessity, would be controlled by those

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States which possessed the greatest moral authority and economic influence. Such a force could be safely entrusted with the nominal preservation of international order, but it would still be possible that a violator might find open or secret allies to save the offending State from punishment and thus demoralize the whole union. With the destruction of old principles there would be nothing substantial in their place. There would also disappear from Europe the doctrine of "balance of power," new alliances and circumstantial treaties; while in America the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism would vanish and be relegated to the annals of past diplomacy. Finally, we would find ourselves in a very sensitive period of transition, with the old order changed and no new sound institutions to replace it. The fact is that to create a new order, national or international, there must be a "State of Necessity" and a "Psychologic State" both in agreement, as the one cannot exist without the other. As we understand it, the former is embodied in the League of Nations, but the latter would gradually come into existence. From what has already been done, however, there cannot be a return to the past which would create a still more dangerous situation.

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A change is absolutely necessary; the masses who do not discuss problems demand it. If the civilized world does not, through its statesmen, speedily settle the problem of a permanent peace based on justice, it will be done by the people through revolutions which will make the period of transition from old to new more protracted as well as more difficult and painful.

The union of all nations into a permanent organization with equal formal rights should bring no inconveniences, but should, on the contrary, constitute the principal foundation for a League such as nations have frequently endeavored to establish on different lines. The Hague Conferences and special conventions convoked to deal with various international subjects in recent years furnish precedents for those efforts. The great nations should now assume, within the collective States, an executive function representing a moral delegation of all the States and a more direct protection of their several interests. The organization of the League should also determine the limits of this authority to be exercised by the great executive forces; and it should only be carried out in cases of sharp conflict demanding the application of justice and when inter-

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national peace might be threatened. To avoid misunderstandings it would be necessary to determine the sphere of influence of each one of the Great Powers who in the exercise of their office would have no territorial ambitions or motives for benefits of an economic nature. England and the United States should be the police of the seas, with the co-operation of the other nations whose coasts are bathed by the ocean. Japan would co-operate in Asia; France in the Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic shores; Italy in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea; and in South America, the growing Powers of this continent, who, in turn, would find union among themselves. This delegation of States in favoring England and the United States with the privilege of the control of the seas do so not only because of their exclusive maritime power at the present day, but because it is a necessary measure in view of the fact that they have a greater right to guard the transport of materials of which they are the largest producers. It cannot be said, without injury to the truth, that England, with her absolute power over the seas since Trafalgar, has ever abused that privilege; rather does civilization owe her a debt of gratitude for having kept open the great

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highways of communication, for which service she has often been poorly compensated in many instances of piracy and by the transactions of the African slave-trade. No country should feel any worry or alarm in conferring supreme power on the Anglo-Saxon nations, first of all because they could assume it on their own initiative without having it arranged for them, and also because they have between them a greater extent of coast-line than any other two groups of countries.

It is generally useful to concede what is theirs to those who have superior faculties and who are at the same time interested in exercising them for the convenience of others as well as for themselves, which is the case with England and the United States. If the Powers and the other States do not accept a resolution of this kind they will find themselves obliged to accept something worse without hope for the future. Germany is an example, and many more are afforded by history in the successive struggles sustained by England against Holland, Spain, and France. England cannot give up her power over the seas without suffering political and economic destruction. If, however, the question of the seas and the spheres of action to be assigned

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by the League of Nations to the Powers be a comparatively simple matter, it becomes more grave and difficult when applied to *terra firma*. Japan might want a free hand in Asia and still be within the limits of international agreement. This would violate the rights of the English, who would not permit it, because their power in Asia is greater, just as the interests of Japan and the United States would clash, seeing that the latter have a growing commerce to defend; and the same with the French and their rights in Asia. In continental Europe there would be Italy and France alone, left with the weight of maintaining international order face to face with new States whose co-operation is yet an unknown factor; face to face with Russia, who will probably be revolutionary or reactionary; face to face with Germany and Austria, whose power, however weakened, would not be destroyed; and face to face with the Balkans, all disordered and at war. In reference to the latter point, it may be of interest to recall how the small Balkan States failed to carry out the resolutions of the Conference of London at a moment when all the Great Powers were in agreement—a situation that could easily recur under the new conditions. In America, complications

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might also ensue through misunderstandings arising out of the diversity of race and customs of some of the countries and by reason of the view that the adhesion of the United States to the European combination would militate against the complete co-operation of North and South, necessary for the good of all the nations of that continent.

Special attention would have to be given to those groups of States where conflicts frequently grow out of disputes on questions of boundaries and spheres of influence; and in no lesser degree to the conditions of Europe, the principal center of disturbance. The group of Great Powers will not disappear, because to destroy them would not be to end all wars, but, instead, to remove the elements necessary to their avoidance. History shows that the Powers have always operated in the interests of peace until Germany and Austria combined for the opposite purpose. Thus, while a League of Nations would exert considerable moral influence upon the policies of the greater Powers, inclining them to extend the fullest measure of justice to those whom they would be called upon to defend, it would recognize in them the element necessary to the re-establishment of order. They would also act as inter-

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mediaries between the League and the countries holding the guardianship of the seas of the different continents. Just as in the majority of States, internal Public Law bases the standard of national representation on the creation of elective bodies with clearly defined powers and functions pertaining to the different branches of government, International Law should similarly organize its administrative agencies so that it would be brought into line with the democratic ideal of representation based on the will of the majority. In that event all the States in the League would be on an equal footing. England would have no stronger voice than the Republic of Andorra, and the United States no greater importance than the Republic of San Marino; but that anomaly could only be produced by absolute justice; and ever since the time of the Romans the proverb "*Summum jus suprema injuria*" has been an accepted truth.

In the various suggestions for the form of the proposed League of Nations, there are four great principles standing out: a reduction of war-machines, the settling of conflicts by arbitration, commercial freedom, and a democratic form of internal organization for the States. Lord Bryce has in-

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dedicated three of these principles, for the most part out of respect for tradition, a sort of fetish attached to what is called the "sovereignty of the State." This abstract conception of self-determination, valueless at a period of such limited international relations, almost saved William II his crown. Professor Aulard, who holds the professorship of the "French Revolution" at the Sorbonne, on the other hand, determines the principle of internal liberty as the essential point. Edgar Milhall also accepts the thought that through democracy peace will be evolved; "Democracy in future will be the law of Europe, of the world." It is curious that this last point, which has been much discussed, or rather has not received general acceptance, should be the one that has been earliest decided upon. Seldom has a political suggestion had quicker results than the persistence of President Wilson in impressing the Germans with the necessity for removal of the Hohenzollerns. The President has pointed out to Germany the evil from which she has been suffering and the greater perils of the future; and six months of this persistent political game over the top of the trenches have brought him the greatest success. It was a "drive" of peace, the only one of the enemies of

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Germany, who replied with vigor to the many fruitless attempts of the statesmen of that nation to further impose their will upon the world. Democracy presupposes pacifism because a basis of liberty for all peoples is indispensable to any future international organizations. The institutions which have been established in Europe under the influence of a state of war should be preserved, except in Russia, where she should certainly be defended against the reaction that has been undermining her and still threatens her; and in America the decided spirit of democracy in the people should be supported to prevent tyranny of a mean and grotesque nature. Nations who have their destinies in their own hands might at any moment lose their love of peace; they might be influenced by exaggerated writers or by political demagogues, but they would never lend themselves to the slow, gloomy task of preparing for war. Two other basic points, the reduction of armaments and the settling of disputes by arbitration, have been generally accepted. The reduction of armaments is also a political necessity, an imperative economic need. The European States are drained in blood and resources; they can give neither men nor money to the war-machine. Besides, it has

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been very clearly demonstrated that the war-machine, being an organization with a crying demand for operation, is in itself the greatest cause of war. To destroy it must be the first act of peace and the first decree of justice. Compulsory arbitration is a principle which was gaining a hold on the popular mind even before the present war, and there are many existing treaties which have sanctioned it by law. At the present time arbitration should be universally acclaimed by all nations. Instead of being a protesting institution it should be a compelling one. The only difficulty that may come up is the matter of carrying out the decisions. However, if there is sincerity in the union of certain countries against another, there would be economic reasons more potent than military or political considerations for arbitration, now that the German defeat has proved how difficult it is to preserve independent economic zones. Commercial freedom is another rock for the League of Nations to split upon. Although theoretically all are strongly in favor of the greatest commercial freedom, we fear that, if carried to an extreme point, there will be much division of mind on the subject. The idea is evidently unfavorable to the United States, where the Republican

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party has triumphed in the last Congressional elections; and France would with difficulty accept such a proposition. It is also possible that in the final issue it may be found necessary to oppose this measure in its full interpretation. The policy of "Dollar Diplomacy" is not yet dead in the United States, though its equivalent has completely disappeared in France, where the flag of commerce still floats. We do not know the future policy of the Republican party, nor which section of it will prevail in the nomination of the next presidential candidate, the followers of the "Old Guard" or the progressives of Theodore Roosevelt. It is certain, however, that this party is already opposed to the League of Nations, and in the Senate, which is the executive body of the United States in international affairs, ex-Secretary of State Knox, speaking with the full responsibility of his position, pointed out the dangers the League may fall into. No attention has been paid by the party to the vigorous and convincing speech of ex-President Taft. He has understood that in homage to the new international institution the United States will be asked for her share of sacrifice, and that this will be done according to the traditional policy from the days of Washington to the declara-

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tion of war against Germany. Commercial freedom ought not to be understood in any way as the prevention of a State from defending herself against foreign competition; absolute commercial freedom has to be an aspiration which can only become a reality when the constant interchange of emigration and increase of commerce place all nations on the same basis of productivity. But it must be well understood that there are no nations who do not share this noble conception which is the true source of progress, while it is the opposite conception which has been the cause of the greatest conflicts. With a great assemblage of representatives of all nations many things are required to ensure success. At least there must be an executive Power maintained by a limited group of Powers with spheres of international policy previously defined, but subject to superior organizations of the Councils; arbitration as a permanent principle and no possibility of conflicts of an economic order; the principles of democracy organized and practised internally as the compulsory rule of all governments; the reduction of armaments and the penal sanction of economic and political order. These are essential conditions to a satisfactory working of the League. In the uni-

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versal conscience, however, there must be the underlying conviction that we must have peace and that conflicting interests should be adjusted through justice and not by force. When the world has absorbed these principles the differences of institutions will not matter, as they will gradually amalgamate and be improved. It must be confessed at this moment that we know not whether we are writing another chapter in the history of the war or its last page. We do not know but that we may be creating new sources of controversy and stirring up new discord. The discretion of statesmen cannot be too great, because in arriving at the lofty decision that is urged upon them there is the ever-present difficulty of safeguarding the world from a repetition of the causes that produced this war and of preventing this very council of international justice from being a source of friction. When that decision has been made and when the League of Nations shall have reached its final goal, we who have lived through this exceptional period, wonderful and terrible, may be able to say with the eloquence of René Viviani:

We shall then depart from the world's stage, leaving future generations to reap the greatest and the noblest inheritance from the united sacrifice of humanity.

CHAPTER IX

THE FOURTEEN POINTS

DURING the long but triumphant struggle for mastery between the exponents of force and the advocates of the principles of international justice, the public and parliamentary tribunes of the great countries have vibrated during the latter part of the war with the eloquent words of statesmen in their enunciation of the two existing psychologies of the world. On the one side, the theories of the Germans, based on force, as expressed in William II's address to the workmen at Essen on September 12, 1918, on the eve of defeat, "the unity of the German people, formed in steel, will show its strength to the enemy, and we must press forward against our opponents, no matter how long the struggle"; and, on the other side, those of the Allies, as expounded in the appealing sentences of Briand, the majestic eloquence of Salandra at the Roman Capitol, the vigorous oratory of Lloyd George, the concise

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and scholarly dissertations of Asquith, the forceful speeches of Clemenceau and Orlando, and in the illuminating addresses of Woodrow Wilson—the voices of all of these, raised to declare the rights of man, happily, with final victory for their aims and their ideals. It is not to be expected, however, that the full effects of this triumph will immediately follow the resolutions to be adopted by the Peace Conference. The process of establishing international rights must necessarily be gradual in its development, as the labors of the Conference will be more particularly applied to the immediate problems of the war than to the adjudication of claims and disputes dating back to an earlier period. In the future organization of the world in its international aspect, errors and injustices of the past will be rectified and reduced to a minimum; but the task of the Conference will be limited to the just solution of the questions directly arising out of the war, as a basis for the establishment of the universal rule of right.

In previous Peace Conferences individual interests have invariably prevailed, as, for instance, in the case of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which was little more than an assemblage of princes struggling

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to secure kingdoms which they could rule with absolute power. The forthcoming Conference, though formed on different lines for more honorable purposes, may equally result in a clash of interests if there is a tendency to exaggerate the measure of justice to which the victory of the Great Powers entitles them. It must not be forgotten that an uneven dispensation of justice is equivalent to injustice; and this view has doubtless received conscientious consideration in the formulation of the peace program shortly to be presented. The terms of the demands of France, Russia, England, and Italy are set forth in substance in the Treaty of London, the proposals of the United States not having been embodied in any diplomatic document, owing to the desire to preserve individual freedom of action in the event of circumstances necessitating such a course. The government at Washington evidently believed that it was unnecessary to formally bind the country to a set of fixed conditions for its participation in the conflict. By the adoption of this attitude the government not only maintained the traditional policy of the United States, but, by reason of its reinforcement of the military power of the belligerents through intervention, has also estab-

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lished a position of paramount influence in dealing with the important questions likely to arise. When it was seen that the end of the war was approaching and that the people of the United States were abandoning all their personal and national considerations to the single object of securing victory, the government, through the President, assumed a more active attitude and dictated terms which might have been regarded as imprudent if they had not been treated by the Allies as the product of the abstract observation of so lofty a personality.

On January 8, 1918, President Wilson set forth the fourteen points which he thought and felt should form the underlying conditions of peace; on July 4th of the same year he added four rules to amplify the principles embodied in those points; and on September 28th, when hostilities were drawing to a close, he expounded a policy of guidance for the future in an interpretation of the principles first laid down. These declarations, of the highest moral value, naturally lacked binding force without the sanction of the co-belligerents; and that sanction was withheld until two of the points reserved for consideration had been carefully examined. Their recognition, however, as a basis for peace prelim-

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inaries came unexpectedly as the outcome of brief conferences with the Allies. Before this stage had been reached, Germany and Austria-Hungary accepted the fourteen points of President Wilson who seemed for the moment to be an intermediary as well as a belligerent; and negotiations for peace were initiated with apparent signs of a successful issue. Seldom has a statesman been placed in a more difficult situation, the replies from the Central Powers to his notes having been models of skill. Every one feared the possibility of a lessening of the President's prestige; but calm and sincere, he justified his words by deeds and impressed both the Allies and the enemy with his sense of justice and sincerity of purpose. The task of the President of the United States has been unusually difficult. His mental tendency is to generalize, and he enjoys lengthy discourses. Radical in political tendencies, he is opposed to old methods; and being a man of theoretic and scientific bias, he prefers the construction of a system to the consideration of its practical operation. Obligated by a democratic nation, whose government is based on the dictates of public opinion, to make frequent addresses, he did so on several occasions before a Congress which was

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fretting over the restrictions imposed upon it by a state of war. Wilson, on his side, eager to send his messages flying over the trenches, seized every opportunity to speak without reserve, being sure of himself, though sometimes disconcerting to others.

Throughout this war many have questioned whether his work possessed the quality of the great statesman or the astute politician. The reason for this is to be found in what has happened. He wanted to divide Austria from Germany, and he did it; he wanted to separate the Kaiser from his people, and he did it; he intended to dictate bases for peace, and he did it. If these results, as viewed by a writer not influenced by the passions of the hour, are examined in a just spirit, it will be seen that not only have they been accomplished, but that they have been accomplished with the smallest possible effort. His policy reached its highest point in the fourteen principles declared before Congress on January 8th, 1918: diplomatic publicity, absolute freedom of navigation in peace and in war, commercial freedom, and disarmament; these are the four chief points that German statesmen hastened to accept at the very beginning. This was hardly surprising, as these points could well have been accepted even by a

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neutral Germany, seeing that they are basic rules for international life inspired by the highest conception of public welfare. To give publicity to every diplomatic act, including conventions and treaties of whatever kind, and to secure disarmament, are two points which find general acceptance as preventatives of future wars, which in reality they are, because a secret treaty is a conspiracy and a standing army a menace. Thus, if these objects could be secured by the present peace a great service would be rendered to humanity. A subject calculated to provoke wider controversy is that of commercial freedom, which will be understood by the signatories of the treaty of peace to signify commercial reciprocity. The question then arises, should Germany be allowed to participate immediately in that policy? If her participation were limited to Western Europe and the American continent, in honorable competition, the privilege should be conceded; but there is Eastern Europe, impoverished and disordered, which Germany has always longed to dominate in her dream of *Mittel Europa*. The economic conquest of this zone would be much easier for Germany, whether as republic or empire, if she had equal rights with other nations. As we

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have already said, Germany's proximity to that region, the knowledge of its commerce, the adaptability of the capable Teuton to the management of the simple, submissive Slav, and the mutual interchange of commerce among territories so admirably fitted to each other, all combine to preclude the possibility of equal competition from others. It is evident, therefore, that the dream of *Mittel Europa* and its principle of absolute commercial power, which were conquered on the battle-field, might be sanctioned by the peace treaty.

The keenest debate, however, will center around President Wilson's clearly and comprehensively expressed policy of absolute freedom of the seas in peace and in war. This question, determined with admirable logic by Hugo Grotius, is the only real point of difference between the United States and England; nor is this difficult to understand when it is seen that freedom of the seas in its absolute sense in time of war would be a serious menace to the British Empire, whose possessions are scattered over every continent. It is obvious, as matters stand, that England would not accept a policy involving a peril of that kind, on the heels of a victorious war in which she put forth all her man power

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and all her material wealth. If, however, the international world could be transformed and remade within the limits set forth in the previous chapter, England might accept the Wilsonian principle with the modification provided by the exception of cases where the seas shall be entirely or partially closed by international action for the purpose of enforcing the fulfilment of international treaties. The Allies naturally reserved to themselves the right to interpret the proposal as to the freedom of the seas in a manner that would serve the common interest; and Lord Robert Cecil expressed the British view when he said that for more than a century England had enjoyed supremacy over the seas and never in a single instance had abused the privilege, but, on the contrary, had always been the champion of the most expansive commercial freedom. There is no doubt of the strict correctness of this statement, but as the past to a great extent ensures the future it would be profitable for England to accept this point in the form specified by President Wilson, thus forming of the two great maritime powers of the world the executive authority of the League of Nations in all future conflicts concerning the high seas.

In the matter of territorial readjustments, the

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fourteen points are not always explicit. Belgium, for instance, is to be evacuated by German troops and restored to its rightful owners. This, from the very commencement of the war, was put forward by the Allies as a condition precedent to any discussions with the enemy; and the first offer to evacuate Belgium was made in the speech of Vice-Chancellor von Payer delivered in Stuttgart on September 12, 1918, in the following terms:

If beforehand we are given guarantees that no other State will hold a more advantageous position than ourselves in regard to Belgium, I think we may say that Belgium will be restored without hindrance or reserve.

There was, therefore, no difference of opinion on that point. Belgium represents the moral order and was the victim and opponent of a Power whose national emblem was force, the one a violator of treaties by a treacherous exercise of power and the other a challenger of ruin in defence of her self-respect. There is still a point in discussion which the President could not reasonably touch upon, and that is the question, will Belgium be restored to a condition, as before, which divests her of one of the attributes of her sovereignty, will she be subject to compulsory

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neutrality as provided by the treaty of 1839, or will she assume all her sovereign rights and enter into the sphere of free international life? If the League of Nations fulfils the anticipations of its promoters, the difficulty will be removed; but it would be to the advantage of Belgium to resume her former position, seeing that her neutrality as an international obligation has been recognized as a necessity since the date of her independence and that with the results achieved by the war just ended there would be no likelihood of future violations. England and France are the nations most interested in this question, and for the sake of international harmony as well as for the security of Belgium herself it would be in their interest to maintain the *status quo ante*.

In his references to Alsace-Lorraine and the Italian territory, made in January, 1918, when the Germans were dealing offensive after offensive and inspiring the fear that one or other of the nations might weaken before victory could be gained, the President offered no detailed plan. He said in substance:

The wrong done by Prussia in 1871 must be repaired and a reconstruction of the Italian frontiers must be made in accordance with clearly recognized national boundaries.

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In these brief sentences he summed up the half-century struggle of France and Italy against Germany and Austria; and in the absence of a more precise definition they were naturally subjected to different interpretations. France appeared to be satisfied by the knowledge of America's friendship for her, but in Italy there were considerable doubts as to whether the President had gone far enough. Her national boundaries, far from being recognized, are quite confused on her eastern frontier; and it is equally important that a line of boundary should be geographically defined as it is that there should be the recognition of a characteristic racial element in a nationality. Was the President of the United States guided in his references to Italy by the Treaty of London, which granted to Italy a large part of the eastern coasts of the Adriatic? The answer is in the negative; and the obscurity on that issue, strengthened by the date of the declaration of the fourteen points, has been the cause of the recent agitation of the Jugo-Slavs laboring under an entirely mistaken conception of race. The great Italian victory which precipitated peace negotiations has somewhat changed these conditions, and, it is believed, has inclined the President to accept

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the aspirations of the Italians almost in their entirety, while the rapid downfall of the Germans has accentuated his desire to favor France's just territorial claims.

In regard to Poland, the question of territory was very explicitly handled, as were the conditions under which it is to become an independent State. The thirteenth of President Wilson's fourteen points specifically provides that an independent State of Poland must be formed, embracing territories peopled by Poles, with definite access to the sea, whose political independence and economic and territorial integrity must be guaranteed by international agreement. The provision of an international guarantee is of great importance and was, no doubt, considered by the President in the light of the past successive divisions of Poland; but under future arrangements such a guarantee would serve to keep Germany within her national limits, as, apart from the sharply defined boundary limits of France and Austria, Germany will find herself between three States guaranteed by the Great Powers—Belgium on the west, Switzerland on the south, and Poland on the east. It must be remembered, however, that the distinctly Polish communities are not easily discernible. The

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Slavs, like the Germans before them, have insinuated themselves everywhere and have even imposed themselves upon each other. As in the Balkans, there are groups of Bulgarians near the Adriatic and Serbians near the Black Sea, so in the north are groups of Slavs similarly intermixed. Thus, there are no exact lines of division between the Ruthenians, Czecho-Slavs, and Poles. On the other hand, Germany has for many years fought violently to destroy Polish tradition as well as the language from what she calls German Poland, a fact that is admitted in Prince von Bülow's last book, *Political Germany*. Further, there is the territory known as Eastern Prussia, which is peopled by the most ardent Germans and stands as a barrier between Poland and the sea. The geographical limits of this territory are not specifically determined, like those of France, Italy or Rumania, but are confused and somewhat elastic. This confusion of boundaries is largely the cause of recent Slavic agitation, because each of the new peoples of Eastern Europe wishes to be represented at the Peace Conference as a member of the family of nations; but unless the right to representation is conceded with the greatest caution, occasions might arise for the recurrence of

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struggles similar to those of the past. If President Wilson had not given public sanction to the territorial claims of these eastern communities and had reserved his expressions of approval until the Conference had assembled, there would have been fewer hopes and difficulties today, which proves that there are occasions when secret diplomacy, like most evils, may bring some good.

Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro have received special attention from the President. Rumania will benefit greatly from this war, to an extent undreamed of when the Latin country of Eastern Europe was invaded and devastated by the German foe. As a matter of fact, the political and economic independence of all the Balkan States should be guaranteed internationally, which, while protecting them, presupposes a measure of independence; and President Wilson has displayed subtle wisdom in proposing it for Poland. For historic reasons Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria will not remain tranquil within their territorial boundaries unless some provision of that kind is made in the treaty of peace. For more than half a century they have been a nightmare to the world. Europe liberated these nations from Turkish rule and never received any thanks;

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they have always shown favor to Russians, Austrians, and Germans as suited to particular occasions, so that they must now be given a definite place and definite boundaries once and for all. The President's fourteen points also sanction the right of self-determination to the people of different races subject to Austrian rule. Thus Bohemia and Moravia will constitute one State, and, being a strong, active people, are likely to grow into a great, progressive nation in Central Europe. Jugo-Slavia will probably be united to Serbia; and to paraphrase President Wilson's words, the Austro-Hungarians, to whom it is desired to give a secure place among nations, must be given every opportunity for autonomous development. These words imply both a desire and a decision, the desire pertaining to political independence and the decision to autonomy. By that expression the President did not ignore the possibility of the Hapsburg monarchy having three States modeled on the plans of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, whose assassination was the pretext for the great war, and therefore took a definite stand to avoid such a contingency. The entire conception of self-determination originated with the Bolsheviki; indeed, the lofty principle of a

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people having the right to determine the course of their own destiny has been extensively converted into practice by the Russian revolutionaries.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

AS stated in the preface, the purpose of this volume is to give the reader material for reflection in a consideration of the war problems, so that by his moral effort he may possibly contribute his quota to the great work of reconstruction. In treating the questions of greater importance we have endeavored to arrive at their true inner significance, though it might have been more agreeable to adorn them with the beautiful theories of some of the worthy but unpractical people who desire to form the ideal of our every-day life. We think, on the other hand, that the facts of today will cause no disillusion to those who look for a radical change in human affairs, but will rather serve to strengthen the hope of a new era, which, though accompanied by the difficulties that surround all great changes, will give the certainty of a definite and favorable transformation to the future conduct of international affairs.

CONCLUSION

Reviewing the entire situation at a moment of social crisis and without regard to the possibility of changes resulting from altered conditions, we have arrived at the following conclusions as to what, in our opinion, will be necessary to secure a permanent peace and to fulfil the desires of all the nations who are engaged in the struggle to establish world justice:

I. The Central Powers have not been absolutely conquered; therefore the peace treaty will have to be framed in such terms as to prevent them from again menacing the peace of the world, while giving them full opportunity for development. As far as Germany is concerned, both results could be accomplished by undoing the work begun by Bismarck in 1864 and by taking from her the eastern territories that were once Polish. In the case of Austria, by giving freedom and independence to the Slavic races who were her vassals; and by uniting her German population with Hungary, giving immediate predominance to the Hungarians.

II. All international agreements respecting the Danube should be revoked so that this highway of communication does not continue to be practically monopolized by the German and Magyar races. It should be definitely settled that the Straits between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea remain open at all times; that the Ægean and Adriatic Seas should have free communication with the Balkans; and that Danzig be ceded to the new Poland for the outgoing products of the Slavic States of the north.

III. Turkey should be allowed to have those parts of Europe

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and Asia which are distinctly Turkish, with the territories known as Asiatic Turkey placed under the influence of the European Powers.

IV. Bulgaria should be left within the boundaries of her former territory as determined by the Treaty of Bucharest.

V. Rumania should be strengthened by the union of all Rumanians to preserve order in the Balkans and to stand as a bulwark against Russian expansion, if the latter country should resume her former imperialistic policy, or spread ideas of disorder to the other Slavic States.

VI. There should be a full and free acceptance of Italian claims in the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, so that with Rumania and Poland she may hold the balance against Russian and German power; thus also giving Italy just compensation for the stupendous effort she made in the war in defense of the interests of humanity.

VII. The economic and political development of France should be assured by measures of a protective character against German intrigue, so that she may continue to be a substantial contributor to the cause of civilization.

VIII. Regard should be had for the maintenance of British naval power, which has rendered great service to the world in a century of supremacy, associating her, however, with the United States in the maintenance of the freedom of the seas.

IX. In fighting against Russia's present state of disorder the aspirations of her people should not be destroyed; and, above all, the lives of her soldiers fighting for freedom should not be permitted to be placed at the service of a reaction in that country which for so many years has outraged all the canons of a civilized form of government.

X. Encouragement should be given to the universal movement

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of pacifism, but only in its new form of action preparatory to harmonizing all States, and not as a blind aspiration leveling evil and good and thereby giving partiality to one as against the other.

XI. The League of Nations should be formed on the basis of equality in the assemblage of all States with an international legislative power; with an executive authority represented by the Great Powers who would re-distribute spheres of action within previously specified limits.

XII. Liberty and Democracy in the interior organization of all the States should be an indispensable condition to entry into the League of Nations. There should also be genuine disarmament except where the maintenance of national and international order should compel the employment of armed forces.

The universal desire and hope for the dawn of a new era is doubtless intensified by the great sacrifices of blood and treasure made by all nations during this war; but in a period of great moral revolution such as the present a single generation cannot realize all its desires. To endeavor to carry the work of reconstruction to a premature conclusion and not according to the logical sequence of events is to create possibilities of greater reactions. It is important, however, to direct international life into the path of justice and order, so that the happiness of mankind may be secured in a never-ending evolution.

APPENDICES

FOR purposes of permanent record and to emphasize many of the references contained in this volume, the author considers it of service to add the now famous Fourteen Points of President Wilson, as set forth on January 8, 1918; the subsequent amplification of those Points on July 4, 1918; and the final interpretation of the main issues as given on September 28, 1918. Placed side by side, these important declarations cover the entire policy of the United States in regard to world reconstruction after the disasters of the past four years, as they not only outline the nature of the peace to be made with the enemy, but likewise provide for that peace to be surrounded by such safeguards as will reduce to a minimum the possibility of any great wars in the future.

There are also included the texts of the secret treaties and documents extracted from the archives of the Russian Foreign Office and published by the

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Bolsheviki government, together with the Note of Trotzky, explanatory of his motive for their publication. Another highly interesting document in these records is that embodying the conditions of Italy's entry into the war, which forms part of the Treaty of London, signed by all the allied and associated belligerents, except the United States.

APPENDIX I

PRESIDENT WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINTS

JANUARY 8, 1918

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will

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secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

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XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guaranties of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guaranties.

XIII. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guaranties of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

THE AMPLIFIED POINTS

JULY 4, 1918

I. The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice

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disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.

II. The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

III. The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct toward each other by the same principle of honor and of respect for the common law of civilized society that governs the individual citizens of all modern States in their relations with one another; to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right.

IV. The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that can not be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned.

THE FINAL INTERPRETATION

SEPTEMBER 28, 1918

First, the impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be

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just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but equal rights of the several peoples concerned;

Second, no special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all;

Third, there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations;

Fourth, and more specifically, there can be no special, selfish, economic combinations within the League and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control;

Fifth, all international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.

APPENDIX II

TROTZKY'S preface to the publication of the secret treaties, announcing that "the government of workers and peasants abolishes secret diplomacy."

Secret telegram from Tereschenko, Russian Foreign Minister, September 24, 1917, to the Russian Ambassador in Paris, concerning the willingness of the then Russian Government to publish the treaties concluded before the war.

The treaty by which Italy entered the war, April 26, 1915.

Report of General Polivanov regarding causes of Rumania's entry into the war, November 20, 1916.

Confidential memorandum, source not indicated, of offers to Greece for her aid to Serbia.

Agreement with regard to the division of Turkey, February 21, 1917.

Following is the text of Leon Trotsky's preface on

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secret diplomacy issued at the time of the first revelation of the documents.

SECRET DIPLOMACY

In commencing the publication of secret diplomatic documents, in the field of foreign policies of Czarism, and of the Bourgeois-Coalition governments for the first seven months of the Revolution we are fulfilling the obligation which we assumed when we were the Opposition Party. Secret diplomacy is a necessary weapon in the hands of a propertied minority which is forced to deceive the majority in order to subject it to its own interests. Imperialism, with its world-wide plans of plunder and rapacious treaties and agreements, brought the system of secret diplomacy to its very highest development. The struggle with the imperialism that has bled white and ruined the peoples of Europe connotes at the same time the conflict against capitalistic diplomacy, which has many reasons to fear the light of day. The Russian people, and with it the peoples of Europe and of the whole world, must learn the documentary evidence of those plans hatched in secret by the financiers and industrialists jointly with their parliamentary and diplomatic agents. For the right to this evidence the people of Europe have paid with countless sacrifices and utter economic ruin.

The abolition of secret diplomacy is the foremost condition of honest, popular, truly democratic external policy. To bring about such a state of affairs is the purpose of the Soviet Government. Therefore, in openly proposing an immediate armistice to all belligerent nations and their governments, we at the same time publish such treaties and agreements which have lost all their binding force

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on the Russian workers, soldiers, and peasants, who have taken the power of government into their own hands.

The bourgeois politicians and scribblers of Austro-Hungary and Germany may attempt to make use of the published documents in order to present in a favorable light the diplomatic efforts of the Central Empires. But any attempt in this direction will be doomed to complete and sorry failure. And this for two reasons: firstly, we intend soon to present before the judgment of public opinion the secret documents which characterize quite sharply the diplomacy of the Central Empires, and secondly—and this is of greater importance—the methods of secret diplomacy are just as international as imperialistic rapaciousness itself. When the German proletariat through revolutionary means will find access to the secret vaults of its government chancelleries, it will extract therefrom documents in no wise inferior to those which we are about to publish. It remains only to be hoped that this event will take place as soon as possible.

The government of workers and peasants abolishes secret diplomacy with its intrigues, lies, and cipher codes. We have nothing to conceal. Our program formulates the ardent desires of millions of workers, peasants, and soldiers. We want the speediest peace based on honest co-habitation and co-operation of peoples. We want the speediest overthrow of the domination of capital. Revealing to the whole world the work of the ruling classes as it finds its expression in the secret documents of diplomacy, we address ourselves to the workers with that call which constitutes the unchangeable basis of our external policy. "Proletarians of all countries unite."

The People's Commissary of Foreign Affairs.

L. TROTZKY.

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Following is the text of a secret telegram from Tereschenko to the Chargé d'Affaires in Paris concerning the willingness of the then Russian Government (September 24, 1917), to publish treaties concluded before the war.

RUSSIA'S READINESS TO PUBLISH THE TREATIES

[Secret telegram from the Russian Foreign Minister to the Chargé d'Affaires in Paris, communicated also to London and Rome, 24 September, 1917, No. 4225.]

With reference to your Nos. 947 and 952. The assurances made to you by Ribot [then French Foreign Minister] on the occasion of his declaration in the Chamber regarding the eastern frontiers of France, are unfortunately not altogether straightforward. The question of linking this agreement with the agreement regarding Constantinople and the Straits was raised neither in the exchange of Notes with Paléologue [then French Ambassador in Petrograd] nor in my verbal declaration to Noulens [the present Ambassador]. Noulens proposed to me the publication of the treaties concluded before the war—that is really the Russian military conventions. To this I remarked that such a publication of a treaty which is generally known would be completely misunderstood by public opinion and would only give rise to demands for the publication of the agreements which had been concluded during the war. The publication of these, and especially of the Rumanian and Italian treaties, is regarded by our Allies as undesirable. In any case we have no intention of putting difficulties in the way of France

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or of placing Ribot in a still more painful position. In order, then, to avoid in the future such misunderstandings as have already twice arisen owing to his statements in the Chamber, I request you to intimate officially to the French Government that on the part of Russia no obstacles will be placed in the way of publishing all agreements published before or during the war, in the event of the other Allies who are parties to them consenting. Regarding the question of Asia Minor agreements I will communicate to you my views in a special supplementary telegram.

[Signed] TERESCHENKO.

The following agreement among the Powers of the Entente dates back to the first year of the war and the régime of the Czar. Signed on April 26-May 9, it preceded by just a fortnight the entrance of Italy into the war:

THE ITALIAN AGREEMENT

The Italian Ambassador, Marquis Imperiali, under instructions of his Government, has the honor to deliver to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir E. Grey, the French Ambassador (in London), and the Russian Ambassador (in London), Count Benckendorf, the following memorandum:

Art. I. Between the General Staffs of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy must forthwith be concluded a military agreement. This agreement shall define the minimum military forces which Russia must move against Austria-Hungary in the event the latter should concen-

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trate all her forces against Italy, and Russia against Germany. In an equitable fashion the agreement shall regulate the questions of armistice in so far as these relate to the commanding staffs of the army.

Art. II. On her side Italy obligates herself, with all the forces at her command, to enter into the campaign in combination with France, Russia, and Great Britain against all of the Governments at war with them.

Art. III. The naval forces of France and Great Britain will actively and fully co-operate with Italy until the Austrian fleet is completely destroyed or until the conclusion of peace. Between France, Italy, and Great Britain shall be signed forthwith a military naval agreement.

Art. IV. Under the imminent treaty of peace Italy must receive: The district of Trentino; the entire Southern Tyrol to its natural geographic boundary, the River Brenner; the city and suburbs of Trieste, Goritzia, and Gradisca, all of Istria to Quarnero, including Volosca, and the Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussino, and also the smaller islands of Plavnik, Unia, Canidole, Palazzuolo, San Pietro dei Nembi, Azinello, Grutzo, together with the neighboring islands.

Art. V. In the same manner Italy is to receive the province of Dalmatia in its present form, with the inclusion within its limits on the north of Lissariki and Trevino, and on the south of all lands to a line drawn at Cape Planca to the east along the watershed in such a manner that in the Italian domains shall be included all the valleys along the rivers flowing into Sebiniko, such as Chicollo, Kerka, and Butisnitza, with all their tributaries. In the same way Italy is to receive all the islands located to the north and west of the shores of Dalmatia, beginning with the islands of Premua, Selva, Ulbo, Skerd,

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Maon, Pago, and Puntadura, and further to the north, and to Meled on the south, with inclusion therein of the islands of St. Andrew, Buzzi, Lissa, Lessiono, Tercola, Curzola, Kaisa, and Lagosta, with all the islands and bluffs belonging to them, as well as Palagozza, but without the islands of great and little Zirona, Bua, Satti, Brazza.

Art. VI. Italy shall receive in full right Vallon, the islands of Sasseno, and a territory sufficiently extensive to safeguard them in a military way, approximately between the River Voyuss on the north and the east, and to the boundaries of the Schimar district to the south.

Art. VII. On receiving Trentino and Istria in accordance with article IV, of Dalmatia and the Adriatic Islands in accordance with article V, and the Bay of Vallon, Italy is obligated in the event of the formation in Albania of a small autonomous neutralized state, not to oppose the possible desire of France, Great Britain, and Russia to redistribute among Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece of the northern and southern districts of Albania. The southern shore of Albania from the boundary of the Italian district of Vallona to the Cape of Stilos is subject to neutralization.

Italy shall have the right to conduct the foreign relations of "Albania." In any event Italy obligates herself to leave certain territory sufficiently extensive for Albania, in order that the boundaries of the latter are contiguous on the west from Lake Ochrida, to the boundaries of Greece and Serbia.

Art. VIII. Italy is to receive in full right all the island now occupied by her at Dodekez.

Art. IX. France, Great Britain, and Russia in principle recognize the interests of Italy, in preserving the political balance in the Mediterranean Sea, and her right to receive on the division of Turkey an equal share with

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them in the basin of the Mediterranean, and more specifically in that part of it contiguous to the province of Adalia, where Italy had already obtained special rights and has developed certain interests vouchsafed to her by the Italo-British agreement. The zone subject to transfer to the sovereignty of Italy will be more specifically defined in due time, and in correspondence with the vital interests of France and Great Britain. Likewise, the interests of Italy must be taken into consideration, even in the event the territorial inviolability of Asiatic Turkey shall be sustained by the Powers for a further period of time, and if only redistribution of spheres of influence is to take place. Should France, Great Britain, and Russia, in the course of the present war occupy certain districts of Asiatic Turkey, the entire district adjacent to Adalia and herewith more specifically defined, shall remain with Italy, which reserves for itself the right to occupy the same.

Art. X. In Libya all the rights and privileges which prior to this date have been acquired by the Sultan on the basis of the treaty of Lazansk are recognized as belonging to Italy.

Art. XI. Italy shall receive such share of the military contribution as shall correspond to the measure of sacrifice and effort made by her.

Art. XII. Italy joins in a declaration made by France, England, and Russia as to leaving Arabia and sacred Mohammedan places in control of an independent Mohammedan Power.

Art. XIII. In the event of expansion of French and English colonial domains in Africa at the expense of Germany, France and Great Britain recognize in principle the Italian right to demand for herself certain compensations in the sense of expansions of her lands in Erithria,

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Somaliland, in Libya, and colonial districts lying on the boundary, with the colonies of France and England.

Art. XIV. England obligates herself to assist Italy immediately to negotiate on the London market on advantageous terms of a loan in a sum not less than 50,000,000 pounds sterling.

Art. XV. France, England, and Russia obligate themselves to support Italy in her desire for non-admittance of the Holy See to any kind of diplomatic steps for the purpose of the conclusion of peace or the regulation of questions arising from the present war.

Art. XVI. This treaty must be kept secret. As to Italy joining in the Declaration of September 5, 1914, only said declaration shall be made public immediately after the declaration of the war by or against Italy.

Taking into consideration the present memorandum, the representatives of France, Great Britain, and Russia, having been duly empowered for this purpose, agreed with the representative of Italy, who in his turn was duly empowered by his Government, in the premises as follows: France, Great Britain, and Russia expressed their complete agreement with the present memorandum presented to them by the Italian Government. With regard to Art. I, II, and III, of this memorandum relating to the co-operation of the military and naval operations of all four Powers, Italy declares that she will enter actively at the very earliest opportunity, and at all events not later than one month after the signing of the present document by the contracting parties. The undersigned have set their hands and seals at London in four copies the 26th day of April, 1915.

SIR EDWARD GREY,
CAMBON,
MARQUIS IMPERIALI,
COUNT BENCKENDORF.

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Significant in the following memorandum addressed to the Russian authorities is the policy of double-dealing which it suggests with regard to Rumania which had entered the war on the side of the Allies and had met with disaster. General Polivanov, the writer of the report, evidently finds consolation for Rumania's misfortunes in the reflection that in case of victory Rumania would have attained a degree of prestige and military influence detrimental to Russia.

RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS RUMANIA

[Report of General Polivanov (No. 240) regarding the causes of Rumania's entry and recent events on the Rumanian front, 7-20 November, 1916.]

Since the outbreak of the European War Rumania had officially adopted a neutral attitude, which very frequently and noticeably inclined now to one, now to the other side, according to the course of military operations. This was based upon two main calculations: the wish not to arrive too late for the partition of Austria-Hungary, and the endeavor to earn as much as possible at the expense of the belligerents. Our successes in Galicia and Bukovina in 1914 and early in 1915, the capture of Lemberg and Przemyśl, and the appearance of our advance guard beyond the Carpathians, brought the question of Rumanian intervention to a head. At the end of May of the same year our retreat from Galicia and Poland took place, and Bukovina was abandoned, and the feelings of

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leading circles in Rumania correspondingly changed. The negotiations for intervention came of their own accord to a standstill.

At the end of 1915 and early in 1916, after the destruction of Serbia and Bulgaria's intervention, Rumanian policy leaned very noticeably towards the side of our enemies. At that time the Rumanian Government concluded a whole series of very advantageous commercial agreements with Austria-Hungary and Germany. This circumstance forced our military, financial, and commercial authorities to show great caution in the question of the export from Russia to Rumania of war material and various other supplies, such as might fall into the hands of our enemies. In consequence of the brilliant offensive of General Brusilov in the spring and summer, 1916, Rumanian neutrality leant once more to the side of the Entente Powers, and there arose the possibility of renewing the interrupted negotiations for Rumanian intervention. It is to be observed that, from the first, the Chief of Staff, for military reasons, held the neutrality of Rumania to be more advantageous for us than her active intervention in the war. Later on General Alexeiev adopted the point of view of the Allies, who looked upon Rumania's entry as a decisive blow for Austria-Hungary and as the nearing of the war's end.

In August, 1916, a military and political agreement was signed with Rumania, which assigned to her such accessions of territory (Bukovina and all Transylvania) as quite obviously did not correspond to the measure of Rumania's share of military operations; since she had undertaken only to declare war on Austria-Hungary, and had confined herself to operations in Transylvania.

The events which followed showed how greatly our Allies were mistaken, and how they overvalued Rumania's

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entry. Under the impression of the catastrophe currents arose in Rumania itself, which opposed a continuance of the war and made the early conclusion of peace, even of a separate peace, their aim. The misfortune which overcame Rumania is the natural result of the complete lack of military preparation under the two-sided policy of Bratianu. Rumania's easy victories in 1913 and her diplomatic success after the Balkan Wars contributed materially to both society and Government exaggerating their own importance. Politically and militarily, the Rumanians greatly overrated themselves, and are now undergoing a bitter disappointment.

From the standpoint of Russian interests, we must be guided by the following considerations in judging the present situation in Rumania. If things had developed in such a way that the military and political agreement of 1916 with Rumania had been fully realized, then a very strong State would have arisen in the Balkans, consisting of Moldavia, Wallachia, the Dobrudja (*i. e.*, the present Rumania), and of Transylvania, the Banat, and Bukovina (acquisitions under the Treaty of 1916), with a population of about 13,000,000. In the future this State could hardly have been friendly disposed towards Russia, and would scarcely have abandoned the design of realizing its national dreams in Bessarabia and the Balkans [*sic*]. Consequently the collapse of Rumania's plans as a Great Power is not particularly opposed to Russia's interests. This circumstance must be exploited by us in order to strengthen for as long as possible those compulsory ties which link Russia with Rumania. Our successes on the Rumanian front are for us of extraordinary importance, as the only possibility of deciding once for all in the sense we desire the question of Constantinople and the Straits. The events now occurring in Rumania have

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altered to their very foundation the conditions of the Treaty of 1916. Instead of the comparatively modest military support which Russia was pledged to provide in the Dobrudja, she had to assign the defence of Rumanian territory on all sides almost exclusively to Russian troops. This military aid on the part of Russia has now assumed such dimensions that the promise of territorial compensations to Rumania prescribed in the treaty in return for her entry into the war must undoubtedly be submitted to revision.

[Signed] POLIVANOV.

The following confidential memorandum, the exact source of which is not indicated, concerns the offers by the Ministers of Russia, England, and France, to the Greek Government in Athens, of territory in South Albania and Asia Minor in return for immediate Greek aid to Serbia:

OFFERS TO GREECE

[Confidential Memorandum, exact source not indicated.]

Offer of South Albania.—On 22 November, 1914, the Ministers of Russia, England, and France declared to the Greek Government in Athens that Greece would receive the southern portion of Albania, with the exception of Valona, in the event of her immediate entry in aid of Serbia. For immediate entry Venizelos demanded a sure guarantee from Rumania against an attack of Bulgaria upon Greece. This guarantee was not given by Rumania. Consequently Greece gave no help to Serbia and the offer lapsed.

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Offer of Territory in Asia Minor.—On 12 January, 1915, the British Minister in Athens, on instructions from his Government, informed Venizelos that if Greece at the moment of a fresh attack upon Serbia came to the latter's aid, the Entente Powers would recognize to Greece important territorial acquisitions on the coast of Asia Minor. On 15 January, 1915, the Greek Ministers in Petrograd, Paris, and London handed in the answer of the Greek Government to the English proposal, containing a whole series of conditions. The negotiations begun on 20 January regarding Greek wishes in respect of Asia Minor were held up by negotiations regarding Bulgaria's entry, and were interrupted by the resignation of Venizelos on 21 February, 1915. On 9 March, 1915, the Greek Foreign Minister, Zographos, handed to the Ministers at Athens a Note in which the Cabinet expressed the wish to resume the negotiations interrupted by the departure of Venizelos. On 30 March, in answer to this, the Entente Ministers expressed the readiness of the Russian, British and French Governments to guarantee the vilayet of Aduin to Greece in the event of her entering against Turkey. They resumed the negotiations, adding verbally that the offer would lapse unless Greece without delay declared her readiness to intervene. In the reply Note the Gounaris Cabinet on 1 April declared its willingness to enter at once, if the Entente Powers would be ready to commence military operations against Turkey jointly with the Greek troops. Intervention was made dependent on a formal guarantee of Greece's territorial integrity, with the inclusion of North Epirus and the islands during the whole war and for a definite period after it. The territorial acquisitions of Greece in Asia Minor and elsewhere were to be the subject of subsequent deliberation. The negotiations were not renewed during that month, and on 1

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May the Foreign Minister declared that the Entente Powers obviously did not wish to guarantee Greece's integrity and that the Gounaris Cabinet had decided to preserve its neutrality still further.

Information with regard to the division of Turkish territory in Asia Minor is contained in the following memorandum of an agreement entered into in the spring of 1916 as result of negotiations taking place in London and Petrograd between the British, French, and Russian Governments. The document has no signature, but is certified as being true to the original.

THE DIVISION OF TURKEY

[Information on the question of Asia Minor, February 21, 1917.]

As a result of negotiations taking place in the Spring of 1916 in London and Petrograd, the British, French, and Russian governments came to an agreement with regard to future distribution of their zones of influence and territorial acquisitions in Asiatic Turkey, and also with regard to organization within the limits of Arabia of an independent Arabian government or Confederation of Arabian governments.

In general this agreement is substantially as follows:

Russia acquires regions of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, Bitlis, and also the territory of South Kurdistan, along the line of Muscha Sert Ibn Omar—Amali Amalia, Persian boundary. The furthest point of Russian acquisition

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on the shore of the Black Sea is to be a point west of Trebizond, subject to future determination.

France is to receive the coast strip of Syria, Addansk District and territory bounded on the south by a line running, Ajutab-Mardin to the future Russian boundary and on the north by a line Ala-Daga—Kosanya-ak-Daga—Ildiz-Daga—Zara—Ogim—Kharput.

Great Britain acquires southern part of Mesopotamia with Bagdad and reserves for herself in Syria the ports of Harpha and Akka.

By agreement between France and England the territory in the zones between French and English territories shall be formed into a confederation of Arabian governments, or an independent Arabian government, the zones of influence over which are herewith defined.

Alexandro is declared a free port.

With the aim of conserving the religious interests of the allied powers, Palestine with the sacred places is to be separated from Turkish territory and is to be subject to a special régime by agreement between Russia, France, and England.

As a general condition, the contracting powers mutually obligate themselves to recognize the respective concessions and prerogatives existing prior to the war in the territories acquired by them.

They agree to assume a proportionate share of the Ottoman debt equivalent to their respective acquisitions.

True to Original.

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THIS instalment concerns the important agreements entered into with regard to territorial readjustments on the Franco-German frontiers, and at Constantinople, and the Straits. A further document deals with information that a Swedish diplomatic pouch is to be opened at Madrid.

The documents given are:

Telegrams from Sazonoff, Russian Foreign Minister, on joint agreements for territorial readjustments and on forcing German trade out of China. Dated February 24, 1916.

French annexation plans in Western Germany as communicated in an Imperial audience at Petrograd by M. Doumergue. January 30, 1917.

Note from the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs restating French annexation plans in Western Germany and pledging Russia's support.

Telegram from the Russian Ambassador at Paris on the agreement on exchange of annexations, March 11, 1917.

Agreement as to annexation by Russia of Constantinople, the Straits, etc., March 4, 1915.

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Telegram of Sazonoff, March 18, 1915, concerning Russian annexation of Constantinople and the Straits.

Telegram of Sazonoff to the Russian Ambassador in London restating agreements with regard to Constantinople and Persia.

Telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Stockholm on the information that it is proposed to open the Swedish pouch at Madrid.

In the following telegram from the Russian Foreign Minister Sazonoff we find the first mention of Allied plans regarding territorial readjustments at the expense of the Teuton Powers in case of victory. To Great Britain and France is conceded the right of determining the western boundary of Germany, in return for a free hand for Russia with the eastern boundary of the Teuton countries. The importance of forcing German trade out of China in conjunction with Japan is emphasized.

PROGRAM OF SAZONOFF

[Secret telegram to the Ambassador in Paris, February 24, 1916. No. 948. Refer to my telegram 6063 of 1915.]

At the coming conference you might be guided by the following general principles:

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Political agreements entered into among the Allies during the war should remain unalterable and are not subject to revision. This refers to our agreement with France and England about Constantinople and the Straits, Syria and Asia Minor, and also to the London agreement with Italy. All propositions as to future boundaries as to Central Europe are at this moment premature, but at the same time it is to be remembered that we are ready to grant to France and England complete freedom in fixing the limitations of the western German boundary, depending that the Allies in their turn will grant to us freedom in fixing our boundaries with Germany and Austria. It is important to insist on the exclusion of the Polish question as a subject matter for international discussion, and on elimination of all attempts to place the future of Poland under the guarantee and control of the powers. With regard to Scandinavian Governments it is important to make an effort to hold Sweden back from taking a hostile step, and at the same time to decide in time upon measures to win Norway over to our side in the event war with Sweden can not be avoided. To Rumania all political benefits have already been offered to induce it to take up arms, and therefore to look in this field for new decoys is altogether useless.

The question of forcing Germans out of Chinese markets is of great importance, but as its solution is impossible without the co-operation of Japan, it is preferable to submit it for discussion at an economic conference at which Japan will be represented. This does not exclude the desirability of exchanging ideas on this subject between Russia, France, and England through diplomatic channels.

[Signed] SAZONOFF.

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Nearly a year after the preceding agreement we find the Russian Foreign Office dealing in greater detail with French annexation plans in western Germany.

DEMANDS FOR ANNEXATION BY FRENCH BOURGEOISIE

[Secret telegram to the Ambassador in Paris. Petrograd, January 30, 1917. No. 507. Copy in London.]

Secret. At an Imperial audience M. Doumergue transmitted to the Emperor the desire of France to insure for herself at the termination of the war the return of Alsace and Lorraine and of a certain position in the valley of the river Saar, and also to attain the political separation from Germany of her beyond the Rhine provinces and their organization on a different basis, so that in the future the river Rhine should be a secure strategic boundary against German invasion. Doumergue expressed the hope that the Imperial Government will not decline to formulate at once its assent to these propositions. His Imperial Majesty in principle assented to this, in consequence of which I requested Doumergue after getting in touch with his government to communicate to me a proposed agreement which could be formulated by means of exchange of notes between the French Ambassador and myself. Meeting in this manner the wishes of our ally, I consider it my duty to call attention to the point of view of the Imperial Government expressed in the telegram February 2, 1916, No. 948, to the effect that "in leaving France and England full freedom in the determination of western boundaries of Germany we assume that in their turn the Allies will grant us equal freedom

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to fix our boundary limitations with Germany and Austria-Hungary."

On that account the forthcoming exchange of notes on the question raised by Doumergue gives us the basis for asking the French Government at the same time to confirm to us its agreement to leave to Russia freedom of action in the matter of determining her future western boundaries. Specific data on this question will be communicated by us to the Parisian Cabinet. Moreover, we deem it necessary to bespeak the consent of France on the exchange at the end of the war of easements in the Aland Islands. Please explain to Briand to the above effect and telegraph as to results.

[Signed] POKROFSKY.

The question of annexations in western Germany is restated concretely in the following note, dated only two days later than the preceding dispatch:

COPY OF A NOTE FROM THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FEBRUARY 1-14, 1917, NO. 26, TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN PETROGRAD

In your note of this date your Excellency was good enough to communicate to the Imperial Government, that the Government of the Republic intended to include among the terms of peace which will be offered to Germany the following demands and guarantees of territorial character:

- (1.) Alsace and Lorraine to be returned to France.
- (2.) The boundaries will be extended at least to the limits of the former principality of Lorraine, and will be fixed under the direction of the French Government. At

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the same time strategic demands must be taken into consideration, so as to include within the French territory the whole of the industrial iron basin of Lorraine and the whole of the industrial coal-basin of the Valley of the Saar.

(3.) Other territories located on the left bank of the Rhine, and not included in the composition of the German Empire, will be completely separated from Germany and shall be freed from all political and economic dependence on her.

(4.) The territory on the left bank of the Rhine not included in the composition of French territory, shall form an autonomous and neutral government, and shall be occupied by French armies until such time as the enemy governments completely fulfil all the conditions and guarantees mentioned in the treaty of peace.

Your Excellency stated that the Government of the Republic shall be happy to have the opportunity of counting upon the support of the Imperial Government in order to bring its intentions to accomplishment. In accordance with the order of his Imperial Majesty, my august sovereign, I have the honor to communicate in this note in the name of the Russian Government, to your Excellency that the Government of the Republic may count on the support of the Imperial Government to bring to fulfilment of its afore-mentioned intentions. Be so good, etc.

In the following concise restatement of the agreements between France and Russia concerning territorial readjustments there is the additional dramatic interest that at the moment the telegram was dispatched from the Russian Embassy at Paris,

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revolution was in full swing at Petrograd, and the Imperial Government carrying with it, as events showed, the entire elaborate structure of secret agreements made public by Trotzky. The abdication of Nicholas II did not come till three days later.

EXCHANGE OF ANNEXATIONS

[Secret telegram of Parisian Ambassador, February 26 (March 11, 1917). No. 168. My answer to telegram No. 167.]

No. 2. The Government of the French Republic, wishing to confirm the importance and meaning of treaties entered into with the Russian Government in 1915, as to object of regulating at the end of the present war the status of Constantinople and the Straits, in accordance with Russian wishes; and wishing to preserve for its allies all guarantees with regard to military and commercial relations necessary for the economic development and safety of the Empire, recognizes the complete freedom of Russia to determine her western boundaries.

[Signed] ISVOLSKY.

In the three appended documents are contained the dispositions of the Allies for the settlement of the question of Constantinople and the Dardanelles. These are, perhaps, the least secret of the documents made public by Trotzky, in the sense that their

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context had been a matter of fairly common knowledge from the beginning.

AGREEMENT AS TO CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE STRAITS.

(Second political division) (Information)

On the 19th of February (March 4th, 1915) the [Russian] Minister of Foreign Affairs handed a memorandum to the French and British ambassadors in which was defined the position as to annexation to Russia of the following territories, as the result of the present war: the city of Constantinople; the western shores of the Bosphorus, Marmora Sea, and the Dardanelles; Southern Frigia, to the line of Enos-Media; the shores of Asia Minor, between Bosphorus, the River Samarra, and a point of Ismid Gulf to be subsequently defined; the islands of Marmora Sea and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. The special rights of England and France within the limits of afore-said territories to remain undisturbed.

The French as well as the English Governments expressed their assent to the fulfilment of our desires in the event of a successful termination of the war and the satisfaction of a series of demands of France and England within the limits of the Ottoman Empire as well as in other places. These demands in so far as they refer to Turkey are substantially as follows:

The recognition of Constantinople as a free port for the transit of merchandise not coming from or going to Russia, and the freedom of passage through the Straits of merchant ships.

The recognition of English and French rights in Asiatic Turkey subject to specific definition in a special agreement between France, England, and Russia.

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The preservation of sacred Mohammedan places and of Arabia, under an independent Mohammedan rule.

The inclusion within the English sphere of influence of the Persian neutral zone created by the treaty of 1907 between England and Russia.

In recognizing these claims as in general subject to satisfaction the Russian Government nevertheless made certain reservations:

With respect to formulation of our wishes in connection with sacred Mohammedan places it is necessary to define now whether these places will remain under the administration of Turkey, with the retention by the Sultan of the title of Caliph, or is it the intention to create new and independent Governments. In our opinion it would be desirable to separate the Caliphate from Turkey. At all events, the freedom of pilgrimage is to be insured.

In agreeing to the inclusion of the neutral zone of Persia within the English sphere of influence the Russian Government considers it only just to state that the region of the cities Ispahan, Yezd shall be confirmed to Russia, as well as a strip of the neutral zone which cuts in the shape of a wedge between Russian and Afghan boundaries and reaching the boundary itself at Zulphogar, shall be included within the Russian sphere of influence.

The Russian Government also considers desirable at the same time to reach the solution of the question as to the territory of northern Afghanistan contiguous to Russia, in line with its wishes expressed in the negotiations of 1914.

After the entrance of Italy into the war our wishes were communicated to the Italian Government which expressed its assent on its own behalf on condition that, in the event of successful termination of the war, the Italian claims in general, and specifically in the East, be satisfied,

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and on recognition by Italy within the limits of territories ceded by us of identical rights as possessed by England and France.

THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE STRAITS

[Secret telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassador in Paris. March 5 (March 18), 1915. No. 1226.]

On the 23d of February (March 8) the French Ambassador, in the name of his Government, stated to me that France is ready to take the most friendly attitude towards the realization of our desires, stated in my telegram to you, No. 937, in connection with the Straits and Constantinople, for which I have instructed you to express to Delcassé my appreciation. In his conversations with you, Delcassé, even before, repeatedly expressed his assurances that we may depend on the sympathy of France, and only referred to the necessity of clarifying England's attitude, from which side he feared objections, before giving us more concrete assurances to the aforesaid effect.

Lately the British Government expressed in writing its complete agreement to the annexation of Constantinople and the Straits to Russia, within limitations indicated by us, reserving therein only for itself a guarantee of her own economic interests, and also a similar benevolent attitude on our side to the political aims of England in other spheres. For me personally the assurance of Delcassé, in whom I have the deepest confidence, is quite sufficient, but for the Imperial Government more specific declarations are desirable as to the agreement of France to the complete fulfilment of our desires, similar to that made by the Government of Great Britain.

[Signed] SAZONOFF.

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SECRET TELEGRAM OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO
THE AMBASSADOR IN LONDON

Referring to the memorandum of the British Embassy here, of the 12th of March, be kind enough to express to Grey the deep appreciation of the Imperial Government for the full and final agreement of Great Britain to the solution of the question of the Straits and Constantinople, in accordance with wishes of Russia. The Imperial Government fully appreciates the feelings of the Government of Great Britain and is positive that sincere recognition of mutual interests will forever assure the solid friendship existing between Russia and Great Britain. Having given its promise with regard to conditions for commerce in the Straits and Constantinople, the Imperial Government sees no objection to the confirmation of its agreement to the following arrangement: (1) Freedom of transit thro Constantinople of merchandise coming from or intended for Russia. (2) Freedom of passage thro the Straits of merchant ships.

In order to make the undertaking of breaking thro the Dardanelles easier for the Allies, the Imperial Government is ready to assist in attracting to this undertaking on a reasonable basis of other governments, the co-operation of which in the opinion of France and Great Britain is useful.

The Imperial Government fully shares the opinion of the Government of Great Britain that sacred Mohammedan places must in the future remain under independent Mohammedan rule. It is desirable to clear up now, however, whether it is the intention to leave these places under the rule of Turkey and conserve in the Sultan of Turkey of the title of Caliph, or whether it is proposed to create new independent governments—for only in one or

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the other event will the Imperial Government be in position to formulate its wishes. As for itself, the Imperial Government would consider it extremely desirable to separate the Caliphate from Turkey. The freedom of pilgrimage must, of course, be fully guaranteed.

The Imperial Government confirms its agreement to the inclusion in the sphere of English influence of the neutral zone of Persia. It, however, deems it just to state that the regions constituting the cities of Ispahan and Yezd, forming with the latter one complete whole, shall be confirmed to Russia, because of the Russian interests established there.

The neutral zone now cuts in a wedge-like shape between the boundaries of Russia and Afghanistan and comes close to the Russian boundary near Zulphogar. Because of that, it will be necessary to place part of that wedge within the Russian sphere of influence.

Of material importance for the Imperial Government is the question of the building of railroads in the neutral zone, which question calls for further friendly elucidation. In the future the Imperial Government expects recognition in it of full freedom of action in the sphere of influence allotted to it, with the reservation for it specially of prior right of development within such sphere for its financial and economic enterprises.

Finally the Imperial Government deems desirable a simultaneous solution of the question of Afghanistan territory contiguous to it, in the sense of the wishes expressed by the Imperial Minister in previous negotiations of the past year.

[Signed] SAZONOFF.

The chief interest of the following brief dispatch is in confirmation of the vulnerability as

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well as susceptibility of the Swedish diplomatic mail-bags.

SECRET TELEGRAM TO THE AMBASSADOR IN STOCKHOLM,
15-28 OF OCTOBER, 1917. NO. 629

With regard to matters in Madrid, I was informed that it has been proposed unexpectedly and by a mistake to open the Swedish pouch. In view of the circumstances communicated in telegram No. 628, and the readiness of the new Minister to meet us on that question, I earnestly ask you to take all measures, so that that which has been predicted by Solovieff shall not take place. Taking into consideration the painful vanity of the Swedes, we would be taking the risk of rousing the opposition of the new Cabinet even more than of the old, and would at once lose whatever benefits the change of government now being accomplished may have assured us of.

[Signed] GULKEVICH.

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CORROBORATION of the fact that an international group of bankers from the Allied and Central Powers had a conference in Berne in September, 1917, in an endeavor to arrive at an agreement for ending the war is contained in the secret documents revealed in this instalment. Two dispatches deal with this topic, one outlining the policy of Germany towards Russia in a prophetic manner, emphasizing the Teuton wish for separatism in Russia so that Germany might deal more effectively with the smaller nationalities in arranging commercial treaties.

A second group of dispatches, of especial interest to the United States, deals with the attitude of the Allied Powers towards Russia's new government in October last. Expressions of gratitude were sent to Mr. Lansing because the ambassador of the United States had not taken part in certain representations made to the Russian Government in Petrograd by the Ambassadors of Italy, Great Britain, and France.

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A further dispatch deals with the proposed Stockholm conference for peace; and finally a group of significant messages from Tereschenko afford a graphic picture of Russia's internal problems in the months before the Bolshevik Government overthrew Kerensky.

One of the puzzles of the international situation during the period preceding the fall of Kerensky was the sudden appearance of anxiety at Petrograd lest the Western Allies make peace at the expense of Russia. In view of the fact that the situation was usually regarded from the opposite angle—namely, the possibility of a separate peace by Russia at the expense of the Western Allies—this fear of betrayal by Russia had no plausible explanation until the appearance of rumors of a meeting of financiers from both belligerent camps in Switzerland for the purpose of talking peace. The following two telegrams offer a reason for the apprehension felt at Petrograd:

NEGOTIATIONS OF FINANCIERS AS TO PEACE AT THE EXPENSE OF RUSSIA. DECODED SEPTEMBER 14, 1917

[Secret telegram of the Chargé d'Affaires in Berne, September 4-17, 1917. No. 707.]

In the local press there slipped through information that certain financiers of both the enemy camps lately

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had extensive conferences in Switzerland. The makeup and aims of the conference are being kept strictly secret. The certain participants were: Jacques Stern from the Netherland Bank of Paris, Tuchman from the Paris Branch of the Lloyd Bank, Fürstenberg, director of the German Discont Gesellschaft, also a director of the "Deutsche Bank" and a director of the Austrian "Austro Bank." Although the English denied that they participated in the consultations, however on the 2d of September, Head-Director Bell of the Lloyd Bank arrived here from London under the pretext of establishing a branch in Switzerland. According to rumors as a basis of agreement were discussed: Return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, and satisfaction for Italy. Nothing definite was established with regard to Russia, only propositions were expressed that the Central Powers could receive certain compensations in the East. The German participants in the negotiations especially insisted on the cession to Germany of the Baltic region and on the independence of Finland. [Signed] ONU.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berne.

GERMAN POLICY IN RUSSIA .

[Secret telegram of the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berne, 17 October, 1917. No. 815.]

An influential Anglo-Jewish financier, who took part in the conference mentioned, stated that Germany's aim was to promote separatism in Russia so far as possible, so as to split her up into small states. For Germany it will be easy to conclude commercial treaties with weaker states (Lithuania, Courland, etc.). The maintenance of Russia's unity is equivalent to leaving her in the economic sphere of the Allies, which would be above all advantageous to America. For England the Russian market

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is not of special interest, because England is more occupied with her colonies and sea trade. Hence, for England, the splitting up of Russia into several small states seems acceptable, all the more so because in the event of Russia being weakened England would secure a free hand in Asia. In a dismembered Russia German industry and trade will find work for a long time to come. America's competition with Germany in the Russian market will be even more advantageous for England than the predominance of the influence of one or other of the two Powers. From the words of my informant it may be concluded that it was just these proposals which were the foundation for an exchange of views with the Germans at the conference in August and September. It can certainly be assumed that with the English, French, and German branches of the international financial clique a political agreement also has been concluded in this sense. There is not any proof of the Allied diplomats having taken part; it is out of the question that Mme. Andrus could have taken part; but in order to divert attention various devices may have been resorted to, in which they may have had their share.

In the subsequent telegrams we pass from the sphere of international relations proper to internal conditions in Russia, though here, too, we find traces of the international situation affecting Russia's internal problems. The first of these dispatches deals with the breakdown of the Korniloff uprising and its consequences in an enhancement of Bolshevik influence. It ends nevertheless with the assertion by

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Tereschenko of the Kerensky Government's intention to proceed with the rehabilitation of the army.

SECRET TELEGRAM TO THE AMBASSADORS IN PARIS, LONDON, TOKIO, WASHINGTON, AND STOCKHOLM

The uprising of Gen. Korniloff has been completely liquidated. Everything passed without bloodshed, as the troops sent against Petrograd refused to go against the Provisional Government and declared their allegiance to it. Korniloff agreed to surrender himself to Gen. Alexieff. The generals taking part in the rebellion will stand trial. It is becoming clear that mutual misunderstanding and misconception played an important rôle in the whole matter, due to the participation of various unsuccessful and suspicious mediators, between the staff and the Provisional Government. In this the group surrounding Korniloff was especially to blame. At the present time there reigns complete quiet and order, except for certain disturbances among the Cossacks on the Don caused by General Kaledine, which cannot have important consequences. A new Government has been organized. Kerensky remains presiding Minister, and has been designated Commander-in-Chief, which was necessary to quiet down democratic elements and soldiers. Chief of Staff Alexieff will, in fact, conduct operations. A number of army appointments are being made, showing that it is the intention of the Government to create order within the army.

The Constitution of the Government will also respond to the needs of the moment, as is indicated by the appointment of General Verkhofsky as Minister of War, and of Admiral Verderevsky as Minister of Marine. Changes will take place in the rest of the make-up. Chernoff,

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certain Cadets, and Nekrasoff have gone altogether. Cadet Kishkin and several representatives of manufacturers will enter. I handed in my resignation with the other Ministers, but the question as to my return to the ministry has not as yet been decided. The problem before the new Government is to avert all disturbances, conflicts, and disorders in the army which may arise because of lack of confidence in the commanding staff. The most energetic measures will be taken to bring this about. At the same time that Petrograd and Moscow have been declared under martial law, all measures have been adopted to restore order in the rear of the army. At the present time, in connection with the Korniloff matter, Bolsheviki have been greatly strengthened, and demand that persons arrested on the 5th of July be released. However, the position of the Government has been greatly improved after its victory, which gives reason to reckon on most energetic conflict with Bolshevism. In general, it may be considered that the sad events of recent days, because of their rapid solution, have not weakened us for the struggle with the external enemy, but proved the unity of feeling and the general desire to concentrate on this struggle, without being diverted by internal disputes and conflicts. No matter what attempts may be made in the future by the left or the right to disturb the political course adopted by the Government, you may be assured that they will be met by the combined resistance within the country. The Government will persevere firmly and under all circumstances in the continuance of the war, and with restored energy will labor to revivify and rebuild the army.

Sent August 31. No. 4059. Code.

[Signed] TERESCHENKO.

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A prime weakness in Kerensky's position, and one which his Bolshevik opponents exploited to the utmost, was the charge that the Allies were interested in the restoration of Russian order only in so far as it might bring back the Russian army as a factor in the war. Representations made to the Kerensky Government by the English, French, and Italian Ambassadors on the 9th of October were regarded even by the Kerensky Government as tending to confirm this charge. The "painful impression" so created is conveyed in the following six dispatches, in the second of which the Kerensky Government expresses its appreciation of the conduct of the American Ambassador at Petrograd in abstaining from the joint effort to exercise pressure on Russia:

SECRET TELEGRAM TO THE AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON

26th of September (Oct. 9th), 1917. No. 4559.

The English, French, and Italian Ambassadors were received to-day by the Presiding Minister, and in the name of their Governments communicated to him as to the necessity of taking measures for rehabilitating our army's capacity for war. This step could not but create upon the Provisional Government a painful impression, the more so as the efforts of the Provisional Government, for the inflexible continuation of the conflict with the common enemy, are well known to the Allies. I ask you to communicate to Lansing in strict confidence, how high-

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ly the Provisional Government appreciates the abstention of the American Ambassador from participating in the aforementioned united step. [Signed] TERESCHENKO.

“A PAINFUL IMPRESSION”

[Secret telegram to the Russian Ambassador in Washington, 11 October, 1917.]

The *démarché* of the three ambassadors made a painful impression upon us both by reason of its contents and of its form. Our Allies know very well the extraordinary efforts made by the Provisional Government to restore the fighting efficiency of the army. Neither military misfortunes, nor internal disorders, nor the gigantic material difficulties availed to break Russia's unbending determination to carry on the war against the common foe until the end. Under such circumstances we must ask ourselves, with astonishment, what opinion could impel our Allies to such a step, and what practical result they expect from it. Please communicate to the Foreign Minister the contents of this telegram and convey to him my urgent request that he should represent the *démarché* of the Allies as the result of previous negotiations—in view of the dangerous excitement of our public opinion.

[Signed] TERESCHENKO.

No. 4461

The Presiding Minister, in his reply to the three Ambassadors, remarked that the Provisional Government will take measures to avoid such interpretation of their step as in the public opinion of the country might create irritation against the Allies. He pointed out at the same time that the present difficult position of Russia was to a considerable degree conditioned by the heritage from the old régime, the governments of which in their time met with

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trust and assistance abroad, perhaps not corresponding to their merits. He also called attention to the dangerous results that would follow the hesitation of the Allies in the matter of supplying our army with military material, and that the results of such hesitation affect the front two or three months after they have taken place. As to the war, A. F. Kerensky stated that in Russia it is always looked upon as an international concern, and because of that he considers it unnecessary to emphasize the sacrifices suffered by the Russian people.

The imperialism of the Central Powers presents the greatest danger for Russia, and the war upon it must be conducted in close unity with the Allies. Russia, having suffered more than others from the war, cannot bring it to an end without assuring her territorial inviolability and independence, and would continue the war no matter what may be the strain on all the other nations. With regard to measures for the restoration of the army's capacity for war, the Presiding Minister pointed out that this problem is taking up the entire attention of the Government, and that today's voyage to the general staff of the Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs was called forth precisely by the necessity for working out a program corresponding to the need. In conclusion A. F. Kerensky replied to the general charge of the Ambassadors that Russia is still a great Power.

No. 3 follows.

[Signed] TERESCHENKO.

SECRET TELEGRAM TO THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADORS IN
PARIS AND LONDON. September 17-30, 1917. No.
4303

With regard to conversations with the Allied Ambassadors here, and more especially with the most outspoken

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one of them, the American Ambassador, I have come to the conclusion that among our Allies in one of the latest conferences in Paris or London an agreement has evidently been reached with regard to distribution among them of those spheres in which they must materially co-operate with us in the continuation of the war. For example, the Americans it seems took upon themselves the problem of equipping for us of the railroad transport. This question is of tremendous importance to us, as it is, in fact, the technical and material problems which under present conditions are assuming a menacing character in the sense of our ability to actually carry on the war to its conclusion. I might be ready in view of that to meet the Allies by taking the initiative in a proposition for a more active than heretofore participation on their part in the organization of our industry and transports, if on their side would be shown a readiness to that effect. I ask you to carefully feel out the situation as to the foundation in this direction and to communicate your conclusion.

[Signed] TERESCHENKO.

SECRET TELEGRAM TO THE CHARGE OF AFFAIRS IN LONDON. COMMUNICATED TO REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS AND ROME. October 16-29, 1917. No. 4797

Referring to your telegram No. 365, with regard to your conversation with Balfour, I consider it necessary to confirm that in our opinion the forthcoming conference of the Allies must have for its problem the appraisalment of the general situation and the establishment of complete solidarity of the Allies in their views with regard to the same. At the same time the conference must determine the means for further conduct of the war and the mutual assistance which the Allies must give to each

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other. With regard to the participation at the conference of a person enjoying the confidence of our democracy it is necessary to keep in mind that such person will enter into the make-up of the Russian Government delegation in whose name only its head shall speak officially.

[Signed] TERESCHENKO.

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

“RUSSIA IS STILL A GREAT POWER”

(Mr. Kerensky and the Entente Ambassadors.)

[Secret telegram from the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government to the Russian Ambassadors in Paris, London, and Rome, 9 October, 1917.]

The French, British, and Italian Ambassadors expressed the wish to be received by the Premier. They made to him a statement emphasizing that recent events gave rise to fears as to Russia's powers of resistance and her capacity to continue the war. In this connection public opinion in the Allied countries may demand from their Governments details regarding the material help given to Russia. In order to make it possible for the Allied Governments to calm public feelings and instil fresh confidence, it was incumbent on the Russian Government to show by deeds its determination to use every means for restoring discipline and imparting a real war spirit to the army. Finally, the Allied Governments express the hope that the Russian Government will fulfil the task and thus assure itself of its Allies' support.

The Minister in his reply to the three ambassadors emphasized that the Government was taking steps in this direction, and that this step of the ambassadors was calculated to arouse great resentment generally, and made clear his astonishment at such a step. He also pointed

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out that the present difficult position of Russia was to an important degree connected with the legacy taken over from the old régime, whose Government had in its day claimed abroad a support and a confidence quite out of keeping with its merits. The Minister also drew their attention to the dangerous effects which were bound to follow any restriction by the Allies of the supply of necessities to the army. These effects show themselves after two or three months, and then can no longer be made good.

As regards the war, Kerensky emphasized that in Russia it was still regarded as a universal national affair, and that he therefore considered it unnecessary to lay special stress on the sacrifices made by Russia. The Imperialism of the Central Powers was the greatest danger for Russia, and the struggle against this Imperialism must be conducted in close accord with the Allies. Russia, who has suffered more than all others from the war, cannot end it without seeing her State interests and her independence assured. She will continue the struggle and do all that is possible to make the army capable of resisting. As regards restoring its fighting powers, the Premier pointed out that this task was the subject of the Government's attention, and that during his visit to the front speeches were made regarding the need of working out a program in this connection. Finally, Kerensky, in view of the collective manner of the Ambassadors' *démarché*, pointed out that Russia is still a Great Power.

[Signed] TERESCHENKO.

Great hopes were based by the Kerensky Government upon the preliminary Parliament, which, as a matter of fact, the Moderates succeeded in controlling, but which was simultaneously repudiated by

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the Bolsheviks. With the breakdown of the Preliminary Parliament, events moved rapidly towards the final collapse of the Kerensky régime.

SECRET TELEGRAM OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO
THE REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS, LONDON, ROME,
WASHINGTON, TOKIO, AND STOCKHOLM

Petrograd, Oct. 9 (22), 1917.

No. 4636.

Yesterday the Pre-Parliament was opened. The first session passed tediously, with the exception of the scandal created by the Bolsheviks, who left the session announcing that in such an institution they do not care to participate. It became clear that the representatives of the unsocialistic groups, together with the Moderate Mensheviks-Socialists and Social-Revolutionists, constitute a considerable majority, which will be in position to support the Government. The Bolsheviks are preparing for the forthcoming Congress on October 30 of the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, in which they expect to have a majority. A very strong campaign is now being waged in democratic circles on the question of the Parisian Conference. At the same time, it is important to note that on the question of peace there is no unity even in the parties of the Left. For instance, the instruction given to Skobilleff by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies meets with severe criticism among Socialists themselves. Against the candidacy of Skobilleff appear with caustic articles the papers "Novaya Zhizn" and the Bolshevik "Rabochiy Put." At the same time we cannot but note a peculiar patriotism and even a war-

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like spirit exhibited at the present time, by some of the extreme elements. Their basic frame of mind, in this connection, is due to the conviction that when we will propose a program of democratic peace desired by the Socialists, the German Imperialists may not accept it, and then it will become necessary to fight for the defence. This idea is vaguely expressed in the press of the Extreme Left, and has lately found an echo among the sailors. The latter, in their appeals in connection with the failure in the Bay of Riga, aim to emphasize the heroism of the fleet in its conflict with the external enemy, contrasting it with the insufficient steadfastness of the land armies. At the same time it is emphasized that the war is not only against the Germans, but against exploiters in general, to create a universal revolution. This point of view is directed against Bourgeoisie and the Government, which are being accused by the Bolsheviki in that they gave up Riga and are ready to give up Petrograd in order to finish with the revolution. The news of the intention of the Government to evacuate Petrograd is especially exciting the circles of the Extreme Left, which threatened to prevent it by force. It is not necessary, however, to attribute an exaggerated meaning to these signs of Jacobinism, but after all, their positive meaning lies in the awakening patriotism of the dark masses, which the internationalists must take into cognizance.

TERESCHENKO.

This dispatch from Tereschenko further traces the rise of Bolshevik influence as a result of the Korniloff affair, but takes, nevertheless, an optimistic view of the possibilities of a coalition of all the moderate parties.

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SECRET TELEGRAM TO THE AMBASSADORS IN PARIS, LONDON, ROME, WASHINGTON, TOKIO, AND STOCKHOLM.
Sept. 26 (October 9), 1917

No. 4438. After lengthy negotiations between the representatives of the Democratic conference on the one hand and the Cadets and manufacturers on the other, there was formed a Coalition Cabinet, the Constitution of which has been communicated to you. As the fundamental character of these negotiations is to be noted the great spirit of concession on the part of the leaders of democracy who recognize that the transfer of power into the hands of Socialists would at this time be very unprofitable for them. However, the importance of these concessions is minimized in that comparative moderate Socialist leaders have to a great degree lost control of the masses which tend to extreme directions and can be held in check only with great difficulty. In connection with this may also be recognized a split in the democratic circles. The more moderate government elements of all parties are tending to group themselves about representatives legally chosen, by means of the universal suffrage of Zemstvo and City Local Self-governments.

The participation in this movement of Co-operatives gives it great significance, as behind it stands organized peasantry. On the other hand, Bolshevistic and anarchistic tendencies are gradually gaining ascendancy in the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, which has taken place altogether in Petrograd and is also taking place in other cities. Such Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies placed themselves in a state of opposition and disobedience to the Government, but on the other hand are losing influence in extensive circles of the popu-

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lation. Very important will be the rôle played by the Pre-Parliament which, until the Constituent Assembly, must act for the national Government. Altho there will be a socialist majority in its constitution, it is positive that in combination with representatives of liberal parties, moderate socialists will be able to resist Bolshevism. It should also be remembered that the country will listen to the voice of moderate groups, whose patriotic declarations cannot remain without influence. As to the program of the government it comes down to three important points: to raise the military capacity of the army, to preserve elementary order in the country, to fight economic disorganization. Yesterday a general railroad strike was commenced. Against it measures have been taken partly in the way of satisfaction of the demands of the railroad workers and partly in the form of repressive measures. The strike can hardly develop, as it does not meet with sympathy. It is not spreading at the front.

[Signed] TERESCHENKO.

Writing after the fall of Riga, Tereschenko is still confident that something like military discipline can be re-established, and that the condition of virtual armistice which had set in with the revolution and been interrupted during the brief offensive of July, could be done away with.

TO THE AMBASSADORS IN PARIS, LONDON, WASHINGTON,
TOKIO, AND MINISTER IN STOCKHOLM

The capture of Riga has created a profound impression within the country and has considerably intensified the

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sobering process which has been noted before. The question of the army's capacity for war agitates everybody and there is noticeable in democratic organizations a turn in the direction of patriotism and a realization of the approaching danger. A proof of this is found in the last session of the Soviet of Labor Delegates and the organizations of the Petrograd garrison. The manifesto to the army and the population issued by them contains in it the appeal to sacrifice everything for the defence of the fatherland.

The attitude of the government in regard to the danger of German advance is becoming firmer and more definite. A series of measures for the defence of Petrograd and the establishment of order in it and its environs are nearing a stage of realization. Petrograd is being energetically relieved of unnecessary institutions and inhabitants, as this is vital in order to facilitate the food supply of the city. While not foreseeing immediate danger to the Capital, the government is yet ready to assist in decreasing the population for economic reasons and for the establishment of order. The matter of unloading [merchandise] has been placed in the hands of the Minister of Postal Communications, Nikitin, with special powers, he being a very energetic organizer. As to the military program, co-operation of the Staff and the War Ministry is completely arranged for. I cannot but note that the news arriving here from the allied countries, and especially the newspaper articles with regard to the latest military events on our front, have created in patriotically attuned circles a very depressing impression. At a time when every effort is being made here to strengthen the decision to continue the war at any cost, and when a general attitude is being evolved in the spirit of complete co-operation with the Allies, public opinion of the

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latter refuses, it seems, to place confidence in us. This creates here great perplexity, especially as, in spite of our defeats, our June offensive and the counter-offensive of the enemy have compelled the Germans to concentrate on our front even larger forces than at any former time. The aim of the Kerensky government to stop at any cost the actual condition of armistice, which in the Spring permitted the transfer of enemy forces from our front to the French front, has been completely attained. In view of this it is here considered as desirable to react on the public opinion of allied countries and to explain this situation, emphasizing that here exist neither in government nor in other responsible circles, not excluding those democratically inclined, no doubts or hesitations with regard to the future direction of our policies as to the continuation, thro every means of the war, in full accord with the Allies.

TERESCHENKO.

This brief dispatch dealing with the activities of Branting, leader of the Swedish Socialists, shows that in Russia Branting's activities in behalf of the Stockholm Conference were not at all regarded as a manœuvre in favor of a German peace.

SECRET TELEGRAM OF THE AMBASSADOR AT STOCKHOLM,
AUGUST 5-18, 1917. No. 445

Personally.

Branting, who at first was very low-spirited because of the situation created through the refusal of the Allies to grant passports to Socialists, is gradually beginning to quiet down. Yesterday, in a strictly private and con-

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fidential conversation he expressed himself in the following manner, which I am transcribing verbally as it was stated to me: "If Kerensky does not repudiate the idea of a conference, let him declare that at the present time he deems it inadvisable. Holland-Scandinavian Committee will be obliged to submit."

If you consider it necessary to make use of these data, I earnestly ask you to keep their source secret, and not to compromise Branting and not to deprive us of a valuable source of information.

[Signed] Z. GULKEVICH,
Ambassador at Stockholm.

THE END

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